Tamrat v. Sonoma County Main Adult Detention Facility Administration

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA HERMAN TAMRAT, Case No. 20-cv-08503-PJH 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND 10 SONOMA COUNTY MAIN ADULT DETENTION FACILITY 11 ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants.

13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 14 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

15 DISCUSSION 16 STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

19 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 5 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

16 LEGAL CLAIMS 17 Plaintiff presents allegations of mistreatment while in custody.1 18 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post- arraignment pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). To prove an excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the “force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

26 Id. “A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically.” Id. “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396).

3 A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of the force used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.

9 Because the Kingsley standard applicable to excessive force claims by pretrial detainees is purely objective, it does not matter whether the defendant understood that the force used was excessive or intended it to be excessive. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). A pretrial detainee can prevail by providing “‘objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Id. (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473-74)) (emphasis in original).

16 A claim for a violation of a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care arises under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). The claim is evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.

20 [T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause 21 of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which 22 the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant 23 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would 24 have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by 25 not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1125. With regard to the third element, a defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable – “a test that will necessarily ‘turn[] on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. (citation omitted). The four-part test described in Gordon requires plaintiffs to prove more than negligence, but less than subjective intent – something akin to reckless disregard. Id. 4 Plaintiff states that on October 25, 2019, in an act of protest he pushed his food try through the slot in his door to the ground and placed his hands through the slot.

6 Defendant Sergeant Alcala ordered plaintiff to remove his hands from the slot and keep his hands in his cell. Plaintiff refused and Alcala attempted to rip loose plaintiff’s firm grip with the aid of defendant Deputy Mann. Alcala then began to hit plaintiff’s wrist with a closed fist and then hit plaintiff’s hand and knuckles with a flashlight and punched plaintiff in the face. Alcala and Mann then twisted plaintiff’s arms and banged them against the tray slot. As a result, plaintiff suffered injuries. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Alcala and Mann.

13 Plaintiff also presents general allegations of denial of medical and psychiatric care, retaliation, intimidation and harassment. He states that he has not received sufficient assistance from classification officials and grievance officials. However, he fails to provide any specific allegations with respect to these claims. These claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

18 CONCLUSION 19 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed no later than April 23, 2021, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in this case only proceeding on the excessive force claim.

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the “Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5 Dated: March 23, 2021 7 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 8 United States District Judge