Huggins v. City and County of San Francisco

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO HUGGINS, Case No. 17-cv-06872-JSC

Plaintiff,

DISMISSAL ORDER v.

Re: Dkt. No. 50 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Defendant.

On May 5, 2021, pursuant to stipulation by the parties, the Court scheduled a Case Management Conference for July 22, 2021.1 (Dkt. No. 44.) Under the standing order of this Court, the parties were directed to file a joint case management statement one week in advance of the Case Management Conference. On May 11, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel moved to withdraw from the case, noting that Plaintiff gave knowing and free assent to counsel’s withdrawal. (Dkt. No. 45.) The Court granted the motion. (Dkt. No. 46.) In advance of the Case Management Conference, Defendant filed a unilateral case management statement. (Dkt. Nos. 47, 48.) Defendant attempted to contact Plaintiff as well as Plaintiff’s former counsel, but Plaintiff did not cooperate with Defendant to produce a joint case management statement, nor did he file a unilateral statement of his own. (Dkt. No. 48 at 1.) Thereafter, Plaintiff failed to appear for the Case Management Conference on July 22, 2021. The Court thus issued an Order to Show Cause as to why this action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Dkt. No. 50.) The Order to Show Cause was mailed and emailed to Plaintiff. To date, Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Order to Show Cause and the deadline to do so has passed. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below this action is dismissed for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order. See Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a court may sua sponte dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b)). “A Rule 41(b) dismissal must be supported by a showing of unreasonable delay.” Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate, the court must weigh the following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal ... or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, four of the five Henderson factors weigh in favor of dismissal. “The first two factors—the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket—relate to the “efficient administration of judicial business for the benefit of all litigants with cases pending.” Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1980). By failing to respond to the Court’s Order, failing to communicate with defense counsel, and failing to appear at the Case Management Conference Plaintiff has delayed adjudication of this action. Non-compliance with procedural rules and the Court’s orders wastes “valuable time that [the Court] could have devoted to other ... criminal and civil cases on its docket.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

As for the third factor, while “the pendency of the lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial itself to warrant dismissal,” the delay caused by Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action despite the Court’s order weighs in favor of dismissal. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff that failure to respond would result in dismissal of this action. (Dkt. No. 50.) Thus, the Court has fulfilled its “obligation to warn the plaintiff that dismissal is imminent.” Oliva v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ferdick, 963 F.2d at 1262 (“A district court's warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the ‘consideration of [less drastic sanctions] requirement.”). The fourth factor thus weighs in favor of dismissal.

The last factor, which favors disposition on the merits, by definition weighs against dismissal. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits. Thus, this factor weighs against dismissal.”).

In sum, four of the five relevant factors weigh strongly in favor of dismissing this action in its entirety. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643 (affirming dismissal where three factors favored dismissal, while two factors weighed against dismissal). The Court therefore DISMISSES this action without prejudice.

The Clerk shall close the case. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 |) Dated: August 24, 2021

] ol) mM ACQUELINE SCOTT CORL United States Magistrate Judge