Rogers v. Berryhill
Rogers v. Berryhill
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JEANNIE SHERRELL, Case No. 19-cv-01252-KAW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. ATTORNEY'S FEES
10 NANCY A BERRYHILL, Re: Dkt. No. 35 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiff brought this action seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 14 Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”). Following the Court’s remand of the case for 15 further proceedings, the Commissioner granted Claimant’s1 application for benefits, entitling 16 Claimant to $147,376 in retroactive benefits. (Mot. for Attorney’s Fees at 3, Dkt. No. 35; see also 17 Exh. 1 at 2, Dkt. No. 35-1.) Plaintiff’s counsel, Martha Yancey, now brings a motion for 18 attorney’s fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)(B), seeking an award of $25,725. (Mot. for 19 Attorney’s Fees at 1.) The Court deems the matter suitable for disposition without hearing 20 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Having considered the papers filed by the parties and the 21 relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS the motion, for the reasons set forth below. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On December 15, 2014, Claimant applied for Title II and Title XVI benefits. 24 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 173, 179.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied 25 Plaintiff’s application, and on March 7, 2019, Plaintiff commenced an action for judicial review 26
27 1 On December 13, 2019, a notice of Claimant’s death was filed. (Dkt. No. 25.) On March 31, 1 pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On November 27, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for 2 summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. (Dkt. No. 31 at 10.) On January 11, 3 2021, the parties stipulated to the payment of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to 4 Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the amount of $4,412.87. (Dkt. No. 33.) The $4,412.87 was received by 5 counsel. (See Mot. for Attorney’s Fees at 4.) 6 On September 24, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees, 7 seeking a fee of $25,725 (17.5% of the retroactive benefits). (Mot. for Attorney’s Fees at 1, 3.) 8 Plaintiff’s counsel’s request is based on a contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff that permits 9 Plaintiff’s counsel to seek 25% of past-due benefits for work performed before the courts. (Mot. 10 for Attorney’s Fees, Exh. 3 at 1, Dkt. No. 35-3.) The Commissioner filed a response on October 11 1, 2021, taking no position on the reasonableness of the request. (Def.’s Resp. at 4, Dkt. No. 36.) 12 No reply was filed, nor were any objections received from individual Plaintiff. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14
42 U.S.C. § 1383(d) governs the payment of representative fees for Supplemental Security 15 Income benefits. These regulations track those for the award of attorney’s fees under
42 U.S.C. § 16406.
42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)(A) (“The provisions of section 206 [
42 U.S.C. § 406] . . . shall apply 17 to this part”). 18
42 U.S.C. § 406(b) governs fees for the representation of a claimant before the court, 19 which is not to exceed “25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is 20 entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). When reviewing a motion 21 for attorney’s fees, the Court begins its analysis “by looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, 22 then testing it for reasonableness.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
535 U.S. 789, 808(2002). In assessing 23 the reasonableness of the fee agreement, the Court considers “‘the character of the representation 24 and the results the representative achieved.’” Crawford v. Astrue,
586 F.3d 1142, 1151(9th Cir. 25 2009) (quoting Gisbrecht,
535 U.S. at 808). Thus, the Court may apply a downward adjustment in 26 the event of “substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time 27 spent on the case.”
Id.While the Court is not to start with a lodestar analysis, it may use the 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff signed a contingent fee agreement in which Plaintiff “agree[d] to pay a fee equal 3 to twenty five percent (25%) of the total amount of any past-due benefits awarded to [Plaintiff].” 4 (Mot. for Attorney’s Fees, Exh. 3 at 1.) Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $25,725, or 17.5% of the 5 $147,376 awarded to Plaintiff in past-due benefits. (Mot. for Attorney’s Fees at 1, 3.) 6 The Court finds that the amount sought by Plaintiff's counsel is reasonable. First, the 7 results obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel were good, as the Court ordered that the case be remanded 8 for further proceedings, resulting in the award of benefits to Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 31.) 9 Second, the record reveals no undue delay or substandard performance that would warrant a 10 downward adjustment. Plaintiff’s counsel requested no extensions of time. 11 Third, the amount sought is consistent with the cap set by Congress in § 406(b) and is not 12 disproportionate to the time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel in this action. Plaintiff’s counsel spent 13 33.7 hours on this case, for an effective rate of $763.35. (Mot. for Attorney’s Fees at 3.) This rate 14 is comparable with rates awarded by other courts in this district. Compare with Goodbar v. 15 Colvin, Case No. 11-cv-4572-SI,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149980, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) 16 (approving effective hourly rate of $772.09); see also Crawford,
586 F.3d at 1153(affirming 17 reasonableness of effectively hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902). Further, the Ninth Circuit has 18 recognized that in assessing reasonableness, the court should not start with the lodestar method 19 because “the lodestar method tends to under-compensate attorneys for the risk they undertook in 20 representing their clients and does not account for the fact that the statute limits attorneys’ fees to 21 a percentage of past-due benefits and allows no recovery from future benefits, which may far 22 exceed the past-due benefits awarded.” Crawford,
586 F.3d at 1150. While the case involves 23 over six years of backpay, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s counsel was responsible for the 24 delay. Thus, considering the three Crawford factors, the Court finds that the amount sought by 25 Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable. 26 IV. CONCLUSION 27 For the reasons stated above, the motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED. The Court 1 EAJA fees that Plaintiffs counsel previously received. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: November 10, 2021 . 4 A. duane 5 United States Magistrate Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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Reference
- Status
- Unknown