Coy v. Trump

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

Coy v. Trump

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 BRAIDAN C. COY, Case No. 21-cv-01344-PJH

6 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 7 v. ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

8 DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 17 Defendants. 9

10 11 Plaintiff, an Indiana state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil action against a 12 governmental entity. The court denied the case at screening and plaintiff has filed a 13 motion to vacate, that the court construes as a motion to alter or amend the judgment 14 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 15 A motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59 must be made no later than 16 twenty-eight days after entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (effective Dec. 1, 17 2009). A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) “‘should not be granted, absent 18 highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 19 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the law.’” 20 McDowell v. Calderon,

197 F.3d 1253, 1255

(9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (en banc). 21 Evidence is not newly discovered for purposes of a Rule 59(e) motion if it was 22 available prior to the district court's ruling. See Ybarra v. McDaniel,

656 F.3d 984

, 998 23 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s denial of habeas petitioner's motion for 24 reconsideration where petitioner's evidence of exhaustion was not “newly discovered” 25 because petitioner was aware of such evidence almost one year prior to the district 26 court’s denial of the petition). 27 A district court does not commit clear error warranting reconsideration when the 1 not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration where question whether it could enter 2 protective order in habeas action limiting Attorney General’s use of documents from trial 3 counsel’s file was debatable). 4 Plaintiff sought court intervention in obtaining his economic impact payment (“EIP”) 5 pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (The “CARES Act”), 6

Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134

Stat. 281 (2020) and Scholl v. Mnuchin,

489 F. Supp. 3d 1008

7 (N.D. Cal. 2020). Plaintiff was advised that he was not entitled to relief to the extent he 8 sought the court to compel the IRS to provide his EIP. The court in Scholl found that the 9 EIP could not be denied only because an individual was incarcerated. However, the 10 court was clear that it took no position on whether individual incarcerated plaintiffs were 11 owed the EIP, which is the relief sought in this case. That responsibility fell to the IRS to 12 make an individual determination. More importantly, funds cannot now be distributed 13 pursuant to the CARES Act. The CARES Act imposed a deadline of December 31, 2020, 14 for EIPs to be made or allowed. That deadline has passed, and no more funds may be 15 issued. 16 In this motion, plaintiff presents the same arguments from his complaint and has 17 failed to put forth newly discovered evidence or show clear error or an intervening change 18 in the law. The extent plaintiff seeks damages for not being provided his EIP, that fails to 19 state a claim for relief. To the extent plaintiff seeks to file an entirely separate action from 20 Scholl or the Cares Act, he may seek relief in the appropriate district. Plaintiff’s motion 21 (Docket No. 17) is DENIED. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: November 23, 2021 24 25 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 26 United States District Judge 27

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