1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 CAMERON WARREN, Case Nos. 21-cv-09427-JCS 21-cv-09430-JCS 5 Plaintiff, 21-cv-09431-JCS 21-cv-09432-JCS 6 v. 21-cv-09434-JCS

7 QUENDRY GUERRERO, et al., ORDER GRANTING APPLICATIONS 8 Defendants. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CAMERON WARREN, 9 COMPLAINTS SHOULD NOT BE Plaintiff, DISMISSED 10

v. 11 CHENNEL HOSEIN, 12 Defendant. 13 CAMERON WARREN, 14 Plaintiff, 15 v. 16 KAREN BOWDEN, 17 Defendant. 18 CAMERON WARREN, 19 Plaintiff, 20 v. 21 EMMA BLANCO, 22 Defendant. 23 CAMERON WARREN, 24 Plaintiff, 25 v.

26 GUSTAVO GUITY, 27 Defendant. 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Plaintiff Cameron Warren, pro se, filed five complaints that are substantially identical 3 except for naming different defendants.1 Warren applies to proceed in forma pauperis in each of 4 these cases. Sufficient cause having been shown, those applications are GRANTED. 5 The Court now reviews the sufficiency of Warren’s complaints under 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(e)(2)(B). Warren is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his complaints should not be 7 dismissed for the reasons discussed below. No later than January 14, 2022, Warren must file, in 8 each case he wishes to pursue, either an amended complaint curing the deficiencies addressed in 9 this order or a response arguing why his current complaint is sufficient. Any case where Harris 10 does not file such a response or his response fails to cure the deficiencies addressed herein will be 11 reassigned to a United States district judge with a recommendation for dismissal. 12 II. THE COMPLAINTS 13 Each of Warren’s complaints asserts a claim for infringement of trade secrets under the 14 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”). Each complaint includes substantially the same 15 factual allegations, differing only as to the name of the defendant:

16 Plaintiff (Mr. Warren) alleges that Defendant ([name of defendant]) was proposed a Non-Disclosure ‘equivalent’ Agreement, on or son 17 [sic] after the 25th of March, 2021, to receive payment to control information pertaining to the Plaintiff’s intellectual property (IPhone 18 Live Photo—of a sexual nature), that the plaintiff owns because Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s then modeling agency never consented to its’ 19 unlawful creatin, or unlawful distribution, or use, there-of. 20 Warren seeks damages and injunctive relief to discover “all other parties that agreed to a 21 similar agreement.” 22 III. ANALYSIS 23 A. Legal Standard 24 Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under

(a)(1) and is granted leave 25 to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which: 26 (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek 27 1 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B); see 2 Marks v. Solcum,

(9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 3 Procedure provides that a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 4 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint that lacks such statement fails to state a claim 5 and must be dismissed. 6 In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court assumes that all factual 7 allegations in the complaint are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington,

(9th 8 Cir. 1995). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is 9 inapplicable to legal conclusions” and to “mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “A pleading 11 that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 12 will not do.’”

(quoting Twombly,

). The pertinent question is whether the 13 factual allegations, assumed to be true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 14 Twombly,

. 15 Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts must 16 “construe the pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. 17 Pliler,

(9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “A district court should not dismiss a 18 pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 19 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa,

(9th Cir. 20 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood,

, 1203−04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 21 B. Warren’s Complaints Fail to State a Claim 22 Warren’s only claim in each case is under the DTSA. Under that statute, the “owner of a 23 trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action . . . if the trade secret is related to a 24 product or service use in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. 25 § 1836(b)(1). The DTSA defines the term “trade secret” to mean:

26 . . . all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, 27 compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 1 photographically, or in writing if—

2 (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 3 (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 4 potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can 5 obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information. 6

(3). 7 “Misappropriation” giving rise to liability under the DTSA is defined as:

8 (A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper 9 means[2]; or

10 (B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who— 11 (i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade 12 secret;

13 (ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge of the trade secret was— 14 (I) derived from or through a person who had used 15 improper means to acquire the trade secret;

16 (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the 17 use of the trade secret; or

18 (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the 19 secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or 20 (iii) before a material change of the position of the person, 21 knew or had reason to know that—

22 (I) the trade secret was a trade secret; and

23 (II) knowledge of the trade secret had been acquired by accident or mistake. 24 25

(5). 26 2 The DTSA defines “improper means” to include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 27 inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other 1 Here, Warren has not presented factual allegations supporting a conclusion that the 2 photograph at issue in any case was a “trade secret” as defined by the DTSA. Nor has he alleged 3 that any defendant “misappropriated” anything. He alleges only that each defendant “was 4 proposed a Non-Disclosure ‘equivalent’ Agreement . . . to receive payment to control information 5 pertaining to” a photograph, with no allegation that any defendant even agreed to such a proposal, 6 much less that they acquired, disclosed, or used any trade secret. 7 Warren is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his complaint should not be 8 dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 9 C. Warren Has Not Established Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants 10 Personal jurisdiction depends on both substantive law and constitutional due process 11 considerations. “Where . . . there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, 12 the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Dole Food Co., Inc. 13 v. Watts,

(9th Cir. 2002). “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional 14 statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state 15 law and federal due process are the same.” Dole Food,

(citing Cal. Civ. Proc. 16 Code § 410.10). 17 “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, that defendant 18 must have at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the exercise of 19 jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 20 1110−11 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

(1945)). “In judging minimum 21 contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 22 litigation.’” Calder v. Jones,

, 788 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,

, 23 204 (1977)). 24 Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. 25 Augusta Nat’l Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has explained that a 26 “court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to 27 hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 1 Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

(2011) (citing Int’l Shoe,

). On the 2 other hand, “[s]pecific jurisdiction . . . depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the 3 underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State 4 and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”

(alteration in original; citation omitted). 5 Thus, “[i]n contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to 6 adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes 7 jurisdiction.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Each defendant Warren has sued is located in New York. He alleges no connection 9 between the defendants and California, much less connections related to the claims he asserts. 10 Accordingly, there is no indication that any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this 11 Court, and Warren is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why these cases should not be dismissed for 12 lack of personal jurisdiction. 13 D. Warren Has Not Shown That Venue Is Proper 14 Cases in federal court must generally be brought in either the district where a defendant 15 resides (if all defendants reside in the same state) or the district where a substantial part of the 16 events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(b). As discussed above in the context 17 of personal jurisdiction, Warren has not alleged any connection to this district either with respect 18 to the defendants’ residence or with respect to the events giving rise to his claims. Warren is 19 therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why these cases should not be dismissed, or perhaps 20 transferred to a different district, for improper venue. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons discussed above, Warren is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his 23 complaints should not be dismissed, by filing in each case he would like to pursue either an 24 amended complaint or a response arguing why his current complaint is sufficient, no later than 25 January 14, 2022. 26 Any amended complaints must include the caption and civil case number and the words 27 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely ] Warren’s original complaints by reference, but instead must include all of the facts and claims 2 || Warren wishes to present and all of the defendants he wishes to sue in the case at issue. See 3 || Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

(9th Cir. 1992). 4 Warren is encouraged to contact the Federal Pro Bono Project’s Pro Se Help Desk for 5 assistance as he continues to pursue these cases. Lawyers at the Help Desk can provide basic 6 || assistance to parties representing themselves but cannot provide legal representation. Although in- 7 || person appointments are not currently available due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, 8 || Warren may contact the Help Desk at (415) 782-8982 or [email protected] to schedule a 9 || telephonic appointment. 10 IT ISSO ORDERED. 1] Dated: December 17, 2021 a 12 CZ JQSEPH C. SPERO 13 ief Magistrate Judge

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