1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARIUS LACEY, Case No. 21-cv-0107-BAS-DEB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION FOR 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 15 Defendants. FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 3); 16

17 (2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF 18 No. 2); AND 19 (3) DISMISSING ACTION UNDER 20

(e)(2) 21 22

23 Plaintiff Darius Lacey is proceeding pro se—without an attorney. He filed a 24 complaint on January 20, 2021, against the State of California and “George Bailey 25 (Bankers).” (ECF No. 1.) In his three-page complaint, Plaintiff raises incomprehensible 26 allegations about certain human trafficking operations in San Diego and Los Angeles, 27 being poisoned while incarcerated at the George F. Bailey Detention Facility in San Diego, 28 1 and his inability to access his benefits.

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to proceed 2 in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion for appointment of counsel. 3 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, 4 DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE his Complaint as frivolous or for failing to state a 5 claim, and DENIES AS MOOT the motion for appointment of counsel. 6 7 ANALYSIS 8 Under

, a litigant who because of indigency is unable to pay the 9 required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to proceed 10 without making such payment. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 US. 319, 324 (1989). The 11 Court makes two determinations before allowing a litigant to proceed IFP: First, whether 12 the litigant cannot pay the filing fee,

(a)(1); and second, whether the action 13 is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 14 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915(e)(2)(B). 16 Here, the first inquiry suggests that Plaintiff is financially eligible for IFP status. 17 Plaintiff states that he is unemployed and receives $900 in disability benefits, pays $1,700 18 in rent or mortgage payment, and has no assets. (IFP Mot. ¶¶ 1–2, 4–5, 8.) However, 19 before allowing the Complaint to be served, the Court must screen the Complaint under 20

(2)(2)(B) and must dismiss an action where the plaintiff is proceeding 21 IFP if the court determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a 22 claim on which relief may be granted.”

(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). This standard 23 grants the court “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations 24 and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 25 U.S. at 327. Consequently, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a 26 determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the 27 plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). 28 1 To determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same 2 standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter,

, 20 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Barren v.

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). “Dismissal is proper only if it is clear 5 that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle 6 him to relief.” Watison,

. The Court “take[s] as true all allegations of 7 material fact stated in the complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to 8 the plaintiff.”

The Court construes pro se complaints liberally. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

, 342 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). 10 Clearly baseless factual allegations include those “that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and 11 ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328). 12 Accordingly, “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise 13 to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially 14 noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. at 33. These outlandish claims are those 15 “with which federal district judges are all too familiar.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. District 16 courts have dismissed as frivolous an assortment of complaints containing clearly baseless 17 factual allegations. See, e.g., Suess v. Obama, No. CV 17-01184-JAK (DTB),

1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (conspiracy involving former President Barack 19 Obama, the CIA, and the FBI); Demos v. United States, No. CIV. 10-6299-TC,

4007527, at *2 (D. Ore. Oct. 8, 2010) (kidnapping involving law enforcement officers 21 disguised as pirates). 22 Here, Plaintiff alleges that young African American men were trafficked and 23 disappeared from Los Angeles County. (Compl. ¶ II.1.) He then alleges that he developed 24 cancer and serious infections because he was poisoned while detained at the George Bailey 25 Detention Facility in San Diego. (Id. ¶ II.2.) He also alleges that he was not provided 26 housing amidst the current pandemic. (Id.) Lastly, he alleges that certain people blocked 27 him from accessing his benefits. (Id. ¶ III.) The Complaint does not specify what relief 28 the Court can grant Plaintiff. 1 Having reviewed the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court concludes that 2 ||his allegations are factually frivolous and do not state a plausible claim. See 28 U.S.C. 3 1915(e)(2)(B)G)-1)._ Because the Complaint is frivolous, the Court does not grant 4 ||Plaintiff leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) 5 ||C‘When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no merit 6 || to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). The Court thus denies 7 Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and dismisses Plaintiff’s action with prejudice under 28

(e)(2)(B)W)-il). See Howze v. Tanaka, 585 F. App’x. 379, 379-80 (9th Cir. 9 2014) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff 10 leave to proceed IFP because his claims were either frivolous or lacked merit); Ingram v. 11 || City of Sacramento, 564 F. App’x. 321 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s dismissal 12 ||of the action as frivolous because the complaint contained “indecipherable facts and 13 || unsupported legal assertions”); Martin v. Sias,

(9th Cir. 1996) (affirming 14 || dismissal of the complaint as frivolous). 15 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP 18 || (ECF No. 3). The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Complaint under

(e)(2)(B)G@)-(1). Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 20 |}2) is DENIED AS MOOT. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 / yy 23 ||DATED: January 26, 2021 ( itl A (pha □ 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 _A-