Pinuelas v. Saul

United States District Court for the Southern District of California

Pinuelas v. Saul

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTINA P., Case No. 20-cv-734-MMA (BLM)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of [Doc. No. 25] Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 19 20 On April 16, 2020, Christina P. (“Plaintiff”) filed this social security appeal 21 challenging the denial of her “application for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance 22 benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income benefits.” Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1. The 23 Court referred all matters arising in this social security appeal to the assigned Magistrate 24 Judge for report and recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(B) and 25 Civil Local Rule 72.1. See Doc. No. 5. On March 10, 2021, the Court granted the 26 parties’ joint motion to remand the action to the agency for further administrative 27 proceedings pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g). See Doc. No. 21. Plaintiff 28 now requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $14,939.38 pursuant to the Equal Access to 1 Justice Act (“EAJA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d). See Doc. No. 25. The Commissioner has 2 not filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion. See CivLR 7.1.e.2, 7.1.f.3. The Court found 3 the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 26. 5 The EAJA allows a prevailing party to seek attorneys’ fees from the United States 6 within thirty days of final judgment. See

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d). “A sentence four remand 7 becomes a final judgment, for purposes of attorneys’ fees claims brought pursuant to the 8 EAJA,

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d), upon expiration of the time for appeal.” Akopyan v. 9 Barnhart,

296 F.3d 852, 854

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Shalala v. Schaefer,

509 U.S. 292

, 10 297 (1993)); see also

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d)(2)(G); Melkonyan v. Sullivan,

501 U.S. 89

, 11 102 (1991) (“In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment 12 . . . is entered by the court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer 13 appealable.”). If one of the parties is the United States, either party may file a notice of 14 appeal within sixty days of the order appealed from. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). “A 15 plaintiff who obtains a sentence four remand is considered a prevailing party for purposes 16 of attorneys’ fees.” Akopyan,

296 F.3d at 854

(citing Shalala, 509 U.S. at 301–02). 17 / / / 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 27 28 1 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action for the 2 || purposes of attorneys’ fees, the motion is timely, and the amount of fees is reasonable.! 3 || Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's unopposed motion for an attorneys’ fees 4 ||award of $14,939.38 pursuant to the EAJA. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 || Dated: July 27, 2021 8 ANMidel (hillr 9 Hon. Michael M. Anello 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 ' Counsel seek attorneys’ fees based on 71.9 hours and the EAJA statutory rate, adjusted for the cost of living, of $207.78. See Doc. No. 25-1 at 4; Deane Decl., Doc. No. 25-2 [| 4, 6. The Court notes that 9] || four attorneys performed work on behalf of Plaintiff. See Doc. No. 25-1 at 5; Deane Decl., Exh. B, Doc. No. 25-2 at 6. However, only one attorney provides information detailing her experience. See Dean 22 || Decl., Doc. No. 25-2 4] 2-4. No information is provided regarding the experience of the other three named attorneys. Cf. “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and 23 documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 437

(1983); Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

690 F.3d 1132, 1135

(9th Cir. 2012) (“This court applies the principles set forth in Hensley—and other cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988—to determine 25 || what constitutes a reasonable fee award under the EAJA.”). Despite the oversight in not providing justification for their rate, the Court takes judicial notice of the attorneys’ several years of experience, 26 || counsel provide billing records, and counsel do not seek a rate in excess of the statutory rate—as modified by cost of living, see Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice, U.S. Courts 27 || for the Ninth Circuit (first citing

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d)(2)(A); then citing Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428

28 F.3d 870, 876-77

(9th Cir. 2005); and then citing 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited July 26, 2021).

Reference

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