Case 2:21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document 18 Filed 04/25/22 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:108

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KARNELL LAWSON, Case No. 2:21-cv-02883-SVW (MAA)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 13 v.

14 CHRISTOPHER et al.,

15 Defendants. 16

17 18 I. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 19 On April 2, 2021, Plaintiff Karnell Lawson (“Plaintiff”), a California state 20 inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights 21 pursuant to

(“Section 1983”). (ECF No. 1.) On April 6, 2021, the 22 Court granted Plaintiff’s Request to Proceed Without Prepayment of Filing Fees. 23 (ECF Nos. 2, 4.) 24 On April 21, 2021, the Court issued an Order Dismissing Complaint With 25 Leave to Amend. (ECF No. 6.) On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First 26 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (FAC, ECF No. 14.) 27 On December 16, 2021, the Court issued an Order Dismissing First Amended 28 Complaint With Leave to Amend (“Order”). (Order, ECF No. 15.) The Order Case 2:21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document 18 Filed 04/25/22 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:109

1 dismissed the FAC and ordered Plaintiff to, no later than January 17, 2022, either 2 file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) or advise the Court that Plaintiff no 3 longer intends to pursue this lawsuit. (Id. at 2.) The Court “advised that failure to 4 comply with this order will result in a recommendation that the lawsuit be 5 dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or comply with court 6 orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id.) 7 At that time, Plaintiff’s address on file with the Court was Wasco State Prison 8 (“WSP”), while the address on the FAC was California Substance Abuse Treatment 9 Facility and State Prison (“SATF”). (ECF No. 16.) Thus, on December 16, 2021, 10 the Court issued an order reminding Plaintiff of his obligation, pursuant to Central 11 District of California Local Civil Rule 41-6, to keep the Court apprised of any 12 change of address. (Id.) The Court also ordered Plaintiff to submit a notice of 13 change of address to the Court if Plaintiff no longer was at Wasco, and directed the 14 Clerk to send that order and the Order dismissing the FAC to both Wasco and SATF. 15 (Id.) On December 20, 2021, the Clerk changed Plaintiff’s address on the case 16 docket to SATF. 17 On February 18, 2022, in the absence of a response to the Order, the Court 18 issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), ordering Plaintiff to show cause by March 19 21, 2022 why the Court should not recommend that the case be dismissed for want 20 of prosecution and for failure to comply with Court orders. (OSC, ECF No. 17.) 21 The OSC stated that if Plaintiff filed a SAC or a Notice of Dismissal on or before 22 that date, the OSC would be discharged. (Id.) The OSC “advised that failure to 23 comply with this order will result in a recommendation that the lawsuit be 24 dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or comply with court orders. See Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 41(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 41-1.” (Id.) 26 To date, Plaintiff has failed to file a SAC or respond to the Order or OSC. 27 Indeed, Plaintiff has not communicated with the Court since filing the FAC on 28 /// 2 Case 2:21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document 18 Filed 04/25/22 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:110

1 November 22, 2021. Finally, the Court has not received any document sent to 2 Plaintiff as undeliverable return mail from the U.S. Postal Service. 3 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 District courts may dismiss cases sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for 6 failure to comply with a court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 7 Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

(9th Cir. 2005); 8 see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,

, 629–30 (1962) (holding that the 9 court has “inherent power” to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of prosecution). 10 Unless the Court states otherwise, a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an 11 adjudication on the merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “Dismissal is a harsh penalty and 12 is to be imposed only in extreme circumstances.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine 13 (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 14 USPS,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 15 “A Rule 41(b) dismissal ‘must be supported by a showing of unreasonable 16 delay.’” Omstead v. Dell,

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson 17 v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, the court must weigh 18 the following factors in determining whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is warranted: 19 “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need 20 to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants/respondents; (4) the 21 availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition 22 of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

(9th Cir. 2002). 23 The Ninth Circuit will “affirm a dismissal where at least four factors support 24 dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal.” Dreith v. Nu 25 Image, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 26

, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Finally, “in order to warrant a sanction of 27 dismissal, the party’s violations of the court’s orders must be due to wilfulness or 28 bad faith.” Id. 3 Case 2:21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document 18 Filed 04/25/22 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:111

1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. The Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution and the Court’s 3 Need to Manage Its Docket 4 The first and second factors (the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 5 litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket)1 weigh in favor of dismissal. 6 “Orderly and expeditious resolution of disputes is of great importance to the rule of 7 law.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine,

. “The public’s interest in 8 expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan,

(quoting Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990). In addition, district courts “have an 10 inherent power to control their dockets,” In re: Phenylpropanolamine,

1227 (quoting Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 12 1986)), and “are best suited to determine when delay in a particular case interferes 13 with docket management and the public interest.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 14 (quoting Ash v. Cvetkov,

(9th Cir. 1984)). 15 Plaintiff has failed to file a SAC, has failed to respond to the Order and OSC, 16 and otherwise has not participated in this lawsuit since November 22, 2021. The 17 Court concludes that Plaintiff’s inaction and lack of communication with the Court 18 constitute willful unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Thomas v. Maricopa Cnty. Jail, 19 265 F. App’x. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not abuse its 20 discretion by dismissing pro se prisoner lawsuit for failure to respond to a court 21 order for almost three months). Plaintiff’s noncompliance also interferes with the 22 public’s interest in the expeditious resolution of this litigation and hinders the 23 Court’s ability to manage its docket. See In re: Phenylpropanolamine,

1227 (“[The Ninth Circuit] defer[s] to the district court’s judgment about when a 25 delay becomes unreasonable ‘because it is in the best position to determine what 26 27 1 The first two factors are usually reviewed together “to determine if there is an 28 unreasonable delay.” In re Eisen,

(9th Cir. 1994). 4 Case 2:21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document 18 Filed 04/25/22 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:112

1 period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.”) (quoting 2 In re Eisen,

)). The first and second factors favor dismissal. 3 4 B. Risk of Prejudice to Defendants 5 The third factor (risk of prejudice to the defendants) also weighs in favor of 6 dismissal. “A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff’s actions impair the 7 defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of 8 the case.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine,

(quoting Adriana Int’l 9 Corp. v. Thoeren,

(9th Cir. 1990)). “The law also presumes 10 prejudice from unreasonable delay.”

The risk of prejudice to a defendant is 11 related to a plaintiff’s reason for failure to prosecute an action. Pagtalunan, 291 12 F.3d at 642. “Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in 13 part judged with reference to the strength of the plaintiff’s excuse for the default.” 14 Malone,

. 15 Plaintiff continuously has refused to file a SAC, respond to the Order and 16 OSC, or communicate with the Court, without explanation. As “a presumption of 17 prejudice arises from the plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute,” the third 18 factor favors dismissal. See Hernandez v. City of El Monte,

(9th 19 Cir. 1998). 20 21 C. Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives 22 The fourth factor (the availability of less drastic alternatives) also supports 23 dismissal. “The district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal 24 before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 25 alternatives.” Henderson,

. 26 The Court considered and implemented less drastic alternatives prior to 27 dismissal. The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to respond to the Order and OSC 28 would result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed for failure to 5 Case 2:21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document 18 Filed 04/25/22 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #:113

1 prosecute and/or failure to comply with Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure 41(b). (Order; OSC.) See In re: Phenylpropanolamine,

1229 (“Warning that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can itself 4 meet the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.”). In addition, the Court 5 extended Plaintiff’s deadline to file a SAC or file a Notice of Dismissal from 6 January 17, 2022 to March 21, 2022. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

, 1262 7 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court’s allowance of an additional thirty 8 days for plaintiff to file an amended complaint was an attempt at a less drastic 9 sanction). The fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 10 11 D. Public Policy Favoring Disposition on the Merits 12 As to the fifth factor, “[p]ublic policy favors disposition of cases on the 13 merits.” Pagtalunan,

. However, “a case that is stalled or 14 unreasonably delayed by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines . . . cannot 15 move toward resolution on the merits.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine,

1228. Thus, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to 17 move a case towards disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress 18 in that direction.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). The case has been stalled 19 by Plaintiff’s failure to file a FAC or otherwise respond to the Order or OSC. Still, 20 the public policy favoring the resolution of disputes on the merits is strong and, 21 under the circumstances, outweighs Plaintiff’s noncompliance and inaction. 22 23 E. Dismissal Without Prejudice 24 In summary, Plaintiff’s failure to file a SAC or otherwise respond to the 25 Order or OSC, and failure to otherwise participate in this lawsuit since November 26 22, 2021, constitute willful unreasonable delay. Four of the Rule 41(b) dismissal 27 factors weigh in favor of dismissal, whereas only one factor weighs against 28 dismissal. “While the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits 6 Case 2°21-cv-02883-SVW-MAA Document18 Filed 04/25/22 Page7of7 Page |ID#:114

1 || weighs against [dismissal], that single factor is not enough to preclude imposition 2 || of this sanction when the other four factors weigh in its favor.” Rio Props., Inc. v. 3 || Rio Int’l Interlink,

(9th Cir. 2002). The Court concludes that 4 || dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and to comply with Court orders is 5 || warranted, but, consistent with Rule 41(b) and this Court’s exercise of its 6 || discretion, the dismissal 1s without prejudice. 8 |} IV. CONCLUSION 9 IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that this lawsuit is DISMISSED without 10 || prejudice. No further filings shall be accepted under this case number. I La pf p)Pr 12 || DATED: _ April 25, 2022 NC GPEORL A ERY) 13 STEPHEN V. WILSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 || Presented by: 15

RIA A. AUDERO 17 | UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28