Case 5:21-cv-01544-CJC-PVC Document 13 Filed 06/02/22 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:104

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEVIN LEE RINTYE, Case No. EDCV 21-1544 CJC (PVC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, 13 v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED 14 TRENT ALLEN, Acting Warden,1 STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 Pursuant to

, the Court has reviewed the Petition (“Pet.,” Dkt. No. 19 1), all of the records and files herein, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 20 (Dkt. No. 11), and Petitioner’s objections (“Obj.,” Dkt. No. 12). After having made a de 21 novo determination of the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which the 22 objections were directed, the Court concurs with and accepts the findings and conclusions 23 of the Magistrate Judge. 24 25 In his objections, Petitioner argues that his Petition is timely because of “new 26 evidence” that he didn’t discover until early 2021 when the San Bernardino Public 27 1 Trent Allen, Acting Warden at Salinas Valley State Prison, where Petitioner is currently 28 incarcerated, is substituted for the Respondent identified as “Warden of California Health Care Facility” in the Petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Case 5:21-cv-01544-CJC-PVC Document 13 Filed 06/02/22 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:105

1 Defenders Office prepared a “Franklin Social History Report and Mitigation Packet,” 2 identifying mitigation factors related to Petitioner’s youth when he was convicted and 3 sentenced.2 (Obj. at 2, 4–6). He contends that “the law prevented petition from being 4 able [to] file under the grounds of the newly recognized (by California law) Franklin 5 mitigation.” (Id. at 4–5). 6 7 Petitioner was 16 years old when he killed his therapist (who was allegedly 8 sexually abusing him). (Pet. at 17; Obj. at 2). In December 2007, he pled guilty to 9 voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to a 16-year determinate term. (Pet. at 17). 10 Five years later, in Miller v. Alabama,

(2012), the Supreme Court 11 determined that the federal Constitution prohibits a mandatory life without parole 12 (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile offender who commits homicide. Thereafter, the 13 California Supreme Court ruled that the Miller ruling applied to sentences that were the 14 functional equivalent of LWOP. People v. Caballero,

(2012) 15 (finding that Miller applies to a sentence of 110 years to life). Further, “[d]efendants who 16 were sentenced for crimes they committed as juveniles who seek to modify life without 17 parole or equivalent de facto sentences already imposed may file petitions for writs of 18 habeas corpus in the trial court in order to allow the court to weigh the mitigating 19 evidence in determining the extent of incarceration required before parole hearings.”

20 at 295–96. 21 22 In 2014, the California legislature passed statutes to bring juvenile sentencing in 23 conformance with Miller and Caballero and to expand their application to determinate 24 sentences. As relevant here, California Penal Code (“P.C.”) § 3051(b)(1) states that “A 25 person who was convicted … when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for 26 which the sentence is a determinate sentence shall be eligible for release on parole at a 27 2 Although the objections do not set forth the date that Petitioner became aware of the 28 Franklin report, his Petition states that “on 3-9-2021, I [Petitioner] received a completed “Franklin mitigation” from the Public Defender’s Office.” (See Pet. at 8).

2 Case 5:21-cv-01544-CJC-PVC Document 13 Filed 06/02/22 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:106

1 youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 15th year of incarceration.” The Parole 2 Board is required to “give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared 3 to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased 4 maturity of the prisoner.” P.C. § 4801(c). In People v. Franklin,

(2016), 5 the California Supreme Court ruled that because P.C. § 3051 “provides juvenile offenders 6 with an opportunity for parole at least by their 25th year of incarceration, [it] renders moot 7 an assertion that ‘an otherwise lengthy mandatory sentence’ was imposed in violation of 8 Miller.” Cornejo v. Lizzaraga, No. 2:18 CV 0571,

, at *20 (E.D. Cal. 9 Feb. 17, 2021) (citing Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th at 278–82), report and recommendation 10 adopted, No. 2:18 CV 0571,

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2021). Franklin 11 reiterated that juvenile offenders must have an adequate opportunity to make a record of 12 factors, including youth-related factors, and must have a “meaningful opportunity to 13 obtain release” at a parole hearing which must give “great weight to youth-related 14 mitigating factors.”

. 15 16 Because Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate 16-year term, his sentence does 17 not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s Miller decision and thus, no federal constitutional 18 right is implicated. And, even if Miller applied, Petitioner does not explain why he waited 19 until December 2020 to file his first habeas petition—over eight years after the Miller 20 decision was issued. Petitioner argues that he did not discover the factual predicate of his 21 claims until the Franklin mitigation report was issued on his behalf in early 2021. (Obj. at 22 2, 4–6). But presumably Petitioner has been long aware of his own youth-related factors 23 that could mitigate the length of his sentence. And, the Franklin decision was decided 24 more than four years prior to Petitioner filing his first habeas petition. 25 26 Petitioner acknowledges that the Franklin mitigation procedures are required by 27 California law, not the federal constitution. (Obj. at 4–5). Thus, to the extent Petitioner is 28 attacking the application of California’s sentencing laws, his claim is not cognizable in

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1 || federal habeas. Crawford v. Small,

(9th Cir. 2004); see 28 U.S.C. 2 || § 2254(a); Pulley v. Harris,

(1984). In any event, for someone like 3 || Petitioner who was sentenced prior to the Miller, Caballero, and Franklin line of cases, 4 || the Franklin mitigation factors are reviewed at a parole hearing, not by way of a habeas 5 || petition. Consistent with P.C. § 3051’s requirement that Petitioner be given a youth 6 || offender parole hearing during his 15th year of incarceration, Petitioner was eligible for a 7 || parole suitability hearing in June 2020. See CDCR Public Inmate Locator System, 8 || available at https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/ (CDCR Inmate No. G0O1258) (“[Petitioner] 9 || 1s eligible for a parole suitability hearing as a youth offender because he or she committed 10 || his or her controlling offense while under the age of 26.”) (last viewed May 31, 2022). 11 || However, Petitioner voluntarily waived his right to the June 2020 hearing, and the next 12 || hearing is tentatively set for July 28, 2022, at which time the Parole Board is required to 13 || give great weight to factors specific to youth offenders, which are presumably delineated 14 |] in the Franklin mitigation report prepared on Petitioner’s behalf. See id. In sum, the 15 || Franklin mitigation report neither renders the Petition timely nor provides any reason for 16 || federal habeas relief. 17 18 IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is denied and Judgment shall be entered 19 || dismissing this action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve 20 || copies of this Order and the Judgment herein on Petitioner at his current address of record. 21 22 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 23 24 |} DATED: June 2, 2022 Lo /. fe 7 CORMAC J. GARNEY 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28