Case 2:22-cv-04118-FMO-AS Document 14 Filed 07/11/22 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:110 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 22-4118 FMO (ASx) Date July 11, 2022 Title Travonne Borders v. International Paper Company, et al.

Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge Gabriela Garcia None None Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorney Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney Present for Defendant(s): None Present None Present Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action On May 12, 2022, plaintiff Travonne Borders (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against International Paper Company (“International Paper”) and Angie Doe (“Doe”) (collectively “defendants”). (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 3); (Dkt. 3-1, Complaint). On June 15, 2022, International Paper removed the action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to

and 1441. (Id. at ¶ 1). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

(c). In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]”

(a). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). If there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court.1 See Gaus,

(“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”

(c); see Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction “either by 1 An “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),

(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,

, 89,

(2014). CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 4 Case 2:22-cv-04118-FMO-AS Document 14 Filed 07/11/22 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:111 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 22-4118 FMO (ASx) Date July 11, 2022 Title Travonne Borders v. International Paper Company, et al. motion or sua sponte”). The court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff could not have originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction.2 Therefore, removal was improper. See

(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

,

(1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, see

(a), complete diversity must exist between the opposing parties, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,

,

(1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant”), and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See

(a).3 Here, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction because complete diversity does not exist between the opposing parties. Plaintiff appears to be a citizen of California, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 10), and International Paper is a citizen of New York and Tennessee. (Id. at ¶ 13). International Paper asserts that Doe is a sham defendant, and therefore her citizenship should be ignored. (Id. at ¶ 16). “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills,

(9th Cir. 2018); see Allen v. Boeing Co.,

(9th Cir. 2015) (“[J]oinder is fraudulent when a plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action against the [non-diverse] defendant is obvious according to the applicable state law.”). A defendant must show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the plaintiff does not have a colorable claim against the alleged sham defendant. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2007) (“Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”); Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

(C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Demonstrating fraudulent joinder” requires showing that “after all disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities . . . are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff could not possibly recover against the party whose joinder is questioned.”) (emphasis in original). Indeed, “[a] defendant 2 International Paper seeks only to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR). 3 In relevant part,

(a) provides that a district court has diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.]”

(a)(1)-(2). CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 2 of 4 Case 2:22-cv-04118-FMO-AS Document 14 Filed 07/11/22 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:112 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 22-4118 FMO (ASx) Date July 11, 2022 Title Travonne Borders v. International Paper Company, et al. invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden since there is a general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.” Grancare,

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, International Paper contends that Doe was fraudulently joined because plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against Doe. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 19-23). Under the circumstances, defendant has failed to meet its “heavy burden” of showing by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff does not have a colorable claim against Doe. See Grancare,

. It is not enough to argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Doe. In other words, even assuming plaintiff’s claim against Doe was deficiently pled, there exists the possibility that plaintiff could salvage his claim through amendment of the operative complaint. Thus, the court is unable to conclude that Doe is a sham defendant. See, e.g., Chau-Barlow v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,

, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“In order for this Court to find that [certain defendants] are sham defendants, it would have to determine, in essence, that as a matter of law a state court would sustain a demurrer as to all causes of action without leave to amend.”); Vasquez v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding defendants had not met the “heavy burden of persuasion to show to a near certainty that joinder was fraudulent” because plaintiff could amend complaint to state at least one valid claim) (internal quotation marks omitted); Padilla v. AT & T Corp.,

(C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Even if Plaintiff did not plead facts sufficient to state a claim against [an alleged sham defendant], Defendants have not established that Plaintiff could not amend her pleadings and ultimately recover against [that sham defendant.]”). In short, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding the action, see Gaus,

(“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”), the court is not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that International Paper has met its heavy burden of establishing that Doe was fraudulently joined. See Grancare,

(“A defendant invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden since there is a general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hamilton Materials, Inc.,

(“Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). Accordingly, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis. Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

(c). CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 3 of 4 Case 2:22-cv-04118-FMO-AS Document 14 Filed 07/11/22 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:113 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 22-4118 FMO (ASx) Date July 11, 2022 Title Travonne Borders v. International Paper Company, et al. 2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

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