Daniel Alcala v. Ventura County Sheriff

United States District Court for the Central District of California

Daniel Alcala v. Ventura County Sheriff

Trial Court Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-03482-PA-AFM Document 10 Filed 07/14/22 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:29

1 2 3 JS-6 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL ALCALA, Case No. 2:22-cv-03482-PA (AFM) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 13 v. 14 VENTURA COUNTY SHERIFF, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On May 19, 2022, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action 18 pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983

while detained at the Ventura County Todd Road Jail 19 in Ventura, California. (ECF No. 1.) On May 26, 2022, plaintiff was granted leave 20 to proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee, and the assigned Magistrate 21 Judge ordered plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $6.91 by no later than 22 June 26, 2022. (“IFP Order,” ECF No. 4.) 23 In the caption of the Complaint, plaintiff lists the “Ventura County Sheriff” as 24 the only defendant, but the body of the pleading fails to name any defendants. (ECF 25 No. 1 at 1, 3-4). Further, the pleading does not list any incident date or raise any 26 specific claim against any identified defendant, and plaintiff does not set forth any 27 facts to support his conclusory allegations that unspecified individuals discriminated 28 Case 2:22-cv-03482-PA-AFM Document 10 Filed 07/14/22 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:30

1 against him at an unspecified time and subjected him to cruel and unusual 2 punishment. Rather, plaintiff merely alleges that he was held “in cell [sic] where 3 toilet over-flowed” and “after that three inmates seriously assaulted [plaintiff,] which 4 resulted in [him] being rehoused in protective custody.” (Id. at 3, 5.) Plaintiff seeks 5 monetary damages. (Id. at 6.) 6 The Notice of Assignment (ECF No. 3) was returned as undeliverable because 7 plaintiff’s name on the Complaint did not match the name under which he was 8 booked at the Ventura County Jail. The Court corrected plaintiff’s name and, on 9 June 8, 2022, mailed another copy of the Notice of Assignment and the Magistrate 10 Judge’s IFP Order. On June 14, 2022, the Notice of Assignment was again returned 11 as undeliverable, and on June 23, 2022, the IFP Order was returned as undeliverable 12 and unable to be forwarded. Both of these mailings were stamped with the notation: 13 “Return to Sender Not in Custody.” (ECF Nos. 7-8.) On July 13, 2022, another order 14 (ECF No. 6) mailed to plaintiff was returned as undeliverable. 15 Local Rule 83-2.4 of the Central District of California requires that the Court 16 be notified within five (5) days of any change in a party’s address. Further, Local 17 Rule 41-6 sets forth the procedure for dismissal of an action when, as here, mail sent 18 to a pro se plaintiff is returned as undeliverable. Local Rule 41-6 provides: 19 A party proceeding pro se must keep the Court and all other parties informed of the party’s current address … and e-mail address. If a Court 20 order or other mail served on a pro se plaintiff at his address of record 21 is returned by the Postal Service as undeliverable and the pro se party has not filed a notice of change of address within 14 days of the service 22 date of the order or other Court document, the Court may dismiss the 23 action with or without prejudice for failure to prosecute. 24 Here, mail directed by the clerk to plaintiff’s address of record has been 25 returned as undeliverable on four occasions, and the Court has not been notified of a 26 new address for plaintiff. The service date of the last item to be returned as 27 undeliverable was June 8, 2022. (See ECF Nos. 6, 8). Plaintiff has been provided 28 with significantly longer than the fourteen days specified by Local Rule 41-6, and he

2 Case 2:22-cv-03482-PA-AFM Document 10 Filed 07/14/22 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:31

1 has failed to comply with the requirement of the Local Rules of the Central District 2 of California that a pro se plaintiff keep the Court informed of a current address. 3 DISCUSSION 4 The Court possesses the inherent power to dismiss, sua sponte, for lack of 5 prosecution any action which has remained dormant because of the inaction or 6 dilatoriness of the party seeking relief. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,

370 U.S. 626

, 7 630-31 (1962). The Ninth Circuit has cited the following factors as relevant to the 8 Court’s determination whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute: “(1) the 9 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage 10 its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 11 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” 12 Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439, 1440

(9th Cir. 1988). 13 In the present case, plaintiff has not provided the Court with his current address 14 as required by the Local Rules, and it is not possible for the Court to communicate 15 with plaintiff because all orders have been returned as undeliverable. In addition, 16 plaintiff has failed to submit the partial filing fee as ordered by the Court. In light of 17 these facts, the first two factors from Carey – the public interest in expeditious 18 resolution of litigation and the need to manage the Court’s docket – weigh in favor 19 of dismissal. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s orders and rules, despite 20 being warned of the consequences and granted sufficient time in which to do so. 21 Plaintiff’s conduct prevents the Court from moving this case towards disposition and 22 indicates that plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently. 23 The third factor – prejudice to defendants – also weighs in favor of dismissal. 24 A rebuttable presumption of prejudice to defendants arises when a plaintiff 25 unreasonably delays prosecution of an action. See In re Eisen,

31 F.3d 1447

, 1452- 26 53 (9th Cir. 1994). Nothing suggests that such a presumption is unwarranted in this 27 case. 28

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1 The fourth factor — public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits — 2 || ordinarily weighs against dismissal. However, it is plaintiff's responsibility to 3 || comply with the Local Rules and Court orders and to avoid dilatory tactics. Morris 4 || v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,

942 F.2d 648, 652

(9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has not 5 || discharged this responsibility, despite having been granted sufficient time in which 6 || to do so. In these circumstances, the public policy favoring resolution of disputes on 7 || the merits does not outweigh plaintiffs failure to comply with the Court’s orders and 8 || rules. 9 The fifth factor — availability of less drastic sanctions — also weighs in favor of 10 || dismissal. Without the Court being able to communicate with plaintiff and without 11 || 1ts orders being deliverable to plaintiff, other sanctions would not be effective. 12 In sum, these factors all weigh in favor of dismissal of this case. 13 IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that the action be dismissed without prejudice 14 || for failure to prosecute. 15 16 || DATED: July 14, 2022

8 Thy Age 19 UNITED STAWES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Reference

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