Jerome Daroya v. Mary Josephine Daroya-Lushina
Trial Court Opinion
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:203
'O' JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CV 22-02695-RSWL-JC x JEROME DAROYA,
Plaintiff,
ORDER re: Defendants’ v. Motion to Dismiss [23]
MARY JOSEPHINE DAROYA- LUSHINA; and DOMINICK RAMOS,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Jerome Daroya (“Plaintiff”) initiated this Action [1] on April 22, 2022, against Defendants Mary Josephine Daroya-Lushina and Dominick Ramos (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendants for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), along with state law claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, constructive trust, and
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 2 of 23 Page ID #:204 violation of the California Business and Professions Code. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike (“Motion”) [23], made pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (6), and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike the new plaintiffs and claims added in the SAC and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s RICO claim without leave to amend. Because the only federal claim is subject to dismissal, the Court declines to address the merits of Plaintiff’s state law causes of action.
I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Plaintiff Daroya alleges the following in his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”):
Upon the death of their father, Plaintiff Daroya and Defendant Mary Daroya-Lushina (“Daroya-Lushina”)
1 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant violated Rule 7-3 because “Defendants’ counsel did not even attempt to meet and confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel until October 6, 2022 . . . .” Plfs.’ Opp’n to Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Plfs’ Second Am. Compl. (“Opp’n”) 6:21- 23, ECF No. 26. Regardless of whether this constituted a violation of Rule 7-3, Plaintiffs were clearly not prejudiced because they were able to fully respond to Defendants’ Motion. See generally Opp’n. Thus, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the Motion’s merits. See CarMax Auto Superstores Cal. LLC v. Hernandez, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 3 of 23 Page ID #:205 inherited a property located at 21610 South Perry Street, Unit 15 in Carson, California (“the Property”). SAC ¶ 16, ECF No. 20. On or about September 30, 2020, Plaintiff Daroya and Defendant Daroya-Lushina created a limited liability company known as Cookie and Kuya Enterprises, LLC (“CKE”), to hold their joint interest in the Property. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff Daroya and Defendant Daroya-Lushina each owned a 50% membership interest in CKE. Id. ¶ 17.
In 2021, Defendants jointly undertook a fraudulent scheme to deprive Plaintiff Daroya of his interest in CKE, to sell the Property, and to divert the proceeds from the sale to themselves and away from Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 21. On September 23, 2021, Ramos electronically filed a fraudulent Statement of Information with the California Secretary of State. Id. ¶ 23. This Statement of Information contained numerous falsehoods, including an altered mailing address for CKE and a statement that Defendant Daroya-Lushina was its sole manager. Id.
Around the same time, Defendants contacted Opendoor, a company that makes cash offers for properties. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Defendants submitted fraudulent documents to Opendoor, including a copy of CKE’s Operating Agreement showing that Plaintiff Daroya had a 5% ownership interest in CKE rather than his actual 50% ownership interest. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
Defendants submitted further documentation suggesting
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 4 of 23 Page ID #:206 that Plaintiff Daroya had surrendered all interest in CKE. Id. Defendant Daroya-Lushina proceeded to sell the Property to Opendoor for $496,000 and did not provide any share of the proceeds to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
Additionally, Defendant Daroya-Lushina falsely identified herself as the sole officer and director of Jose K. Daroya, CPA APC (“APC”), a company created by their father prior to his passing. Id. ¶¶ 34.
Defendants allegedly obtained at least $16,879 through a Paycheck Protection Program loan and $86,000 in Economic Injury Disaster Loans on behalf of APC. Id. ¶ 33. Lenders are now seeking to collect payments for these loans from Plaintiff Daroya and his associated businesses. Id. ¶ 34. Defendants also attempted to fraudulently obtain a loan in the name of one of Plaintiff Daroya’s business clients, causing the client to terminate his business relationship with Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 35.
Lastly, Defendant Daroya-Lushina falsely identified herself as the sole director and officer of JLA, a financial services firm owned by several shareholders, including Plaintiff Daroya and Defendant Daroya-Lushina. Id. ¶¶ 14, 36. Defendant Daroya-Lushina also changed JLA’s mailing address to her own address, and received checks made payable to JLA. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. Defendants then forged endorsements on these checks and deposited them into their own accounts. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 5 of 23 Page ID #:207 Daroya discovered that Defendants accessed JLA’s website through the electronic submission of false information, changed the name of JLA’s website, and changed access passwords to prevent Plaintiff Daroya and others from accessing the site. Id. ¶ 39.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff Daroya filed his Complaint [1] on April 22, 2022, and filed his FAC [12] on June 20, 2022. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [13] on July 11, 2022, which this Court granted [19] with leave to amend on August 16, 2022. Plaintiff then filed his SAC [20] on September 16, 2022. Defendants filed the instant Motion [23] on October 10, 2022. Plaintiff opposed [26] the Motion on October 18, 2022, and Defendants replied [27] on October 24, 2022.
II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard
1. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Rule 12(f) provides that a court may, by motion or on its own initiative, “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi- Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 6 of 23 Page ID #:208 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). “Motions to strike are generally disfavored.” Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Sapiro v. Encompass Ins., 221 F.R.D. 513, 518 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Courts have long disfavored Rule 12(f) motions, granting them only when necessary to discourage parties from making completely tendentious or spurious allegations.”).
“In ruling on a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), the court must view the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1245 (C.D.
14 Cal. 2011). “[B]efore granting such a motion . . . , the court must be satisfied that there are no questions of fact, that the [claim or] defense is insufficient as a matter of law, and that under no circumstance could [it] succeed.” Id. (citing Tristar Pictures, Inc. v. Del Taco, Inc., No. CV 99–07655 DDP(Ex), 1999 WL 20
26 WL 1502704, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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2. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of one or more claims if the pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 9 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Dismissal is warranted for “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
13 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). A court must presume that all material allegations in the complaint are true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1991). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
27 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The question is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 8 of 23 Page ID #:210 plaintiff is entitled to present evidence to support the claims. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 3 167, 184 (2005) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 4 232, 236 (1974)).
3. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a litigant to seek dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a court has supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that form part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when all claims over which it has original jurisdiction have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This decision should be informed by the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996).
B. Analysis
1. Motion to Strike The Court granted Defendants’ previous motion to dismiss with leave to amend, and Plaintiff Daroya submitted a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) shortly thereafter. Plaintiff amended his Complaint to alter the preexisting claims and to add three new plaintiffs, a RICO conspiracy claim, two more conversion claims, and an interference with prospective economic advantage
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 9 of 23 Page ID #:211 claim. See generally SAC. Defendants argue that these new parties and allegations are “outside the scope of the Court’s Order and an impermissible attempt to change factual allegations without leave of Court as required under Rule 15.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and to Strike (“Mem.”), 4:3-9, ECF No. 23-1. In response, Plaintiff Daroya argues that adding additional plaintiffs cured the deficient RICO claim, and thus falls within the scope of the Court’s August 16, 2022 Order. Opp’n 7:13-8:12. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs concede that, “[a]dmittedly, Plaintiffs should have filed a motion requesting leave from the Court to add additional claims,” but contend that their failure to request leave “was harmless and should not lead to dismiss of the claims.” Id. 8:9-12.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within “(A) [twenty-one] days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, [twenty-one] days after service of a responsive pleading or [twenty-one] days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in April 2022, and more than twenty-one days have passed since Plaintiff served Defendants in May 2022. See generally Compl., ECF No 1; Proof of Service Upon Def. Mary Josephine Daroya-Lushina, ECF No. 9; Proof of Service Upon Def. Dominick Ramos, ECF No. 10. Plaintiff
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 10 of 23 Page ID #:212 then filed a First Amended Complaint in June 2022, before Defendants filed their initial Motion to Dismiss in July 2022. See generally First Am. Compl., ECF No. 12; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 13. Since Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint once as a matter of course, he requires leave of this Court for further amendments.
In Wehlage v. EmpRes Healthcare Incorporated, the court granted the defendants’ initial motion to dismiss with leave to amend, directing the plaintiff to only “add alter ego allegations” to one specific claim to show she had standing. 821 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The plaintiff proceeded to amend her complaint to add new plaintiffs and defendants. Id. There, the court held that the plaintiff, who could no longer amend as a matter of course under Rule 15, had exceeded the scope of the court’s order. Id. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike the added parties and claims. Id.
Similarly, in Gerritson v. Warner Brothers Entertainment Incorporated, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim with leave to amend to remedy specified deficiencies in her preexisting claims. 116 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1110-19, 1123-25 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiff thereafter amended her complaint to include new claims, which the court dismissed as exceeding the scope of its order. Id. at 1124-25; see, e.g., DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10–CV–01390–
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 11 of 23 Page ID #:213 LHK, 2010 WL 4285006, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010) (“In cases like this one . . . where leave to amend is given to cure deficiencies in certain specified claims, courts have agreed that new claims alleged for the first time in the amended pleading should be dismissed or stricken”); Kennedy v. Full Tilt Poker, No. CV 09–07964 MMM (AGRx), 2010 WL 3984749, *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (noting that the court had stricken a third amended complaint because plaintiffs' new claims and the addition of new defendants “exceeded the authorization to amend the court granted” and plaintiffs had not sought leave to add new claims or defendants as required by Rule 15).
In its August 16, 2022 Order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his RICO claim and instructed that Plaintiff “could allege new facts to cure the deficiencies” in his RICO claim. See Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Plf’s First Am. Compl. (“Order”) 12:19-13:7, ECF No. 19. Just as in Wehlage and Gerritsen, Plaintiff was not granted leave to add new parties and claims to his action and is attempting to amend his Complaint without leave of the Court. Plaintiff, however, contends that adding new plaintiffs is tantamount to alleging new facts to cure his lack of standing. Opp’n 7:13-8:12. But this interpretation of the August 16, 2022 Order and the meaning of “allege new facts,” is too much of a stretch. Had the Court intended to grant Plaintiff leave to add new parties,
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 12 of 23 Page ID #:214 the Court would have specified as such, rather than directing Plaintiff to “allege new facts.” Order 13:4- 6. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s amendments exceed the scope of the Court’s August 16, 2022 Order and the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike the added plaintiffs and claims. Plaintiff’s new factual allegations pertaining to his RICO claim are not stricken.
2. Motion to Dismiss — RICO Claim The RICO statute makes it unlawful for any person to conduct or participate in an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 12
Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining RICO claim because the SAC fails to allege: (1) the requisite predicate acts; (2) a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) a pattern of racketeering; and (4) an enterprise. See Mem. 6:11- 10:27. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s RICO claim fails because the SAC does not allege a cognizable RICO injury that was proximately caused by a pattern of predicate acts. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 13 of 23 Page ID #:215 Motion as to Plaintiff’s RICO cause of action.
a. Enterprise An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “Under RICO, two types of associations meet the definition of enterprise: The first encompasses organizations such as corporations and partnerships, and other legal entities. The second covers any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” Shaw v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 220 F. 13 Supp. 3d 1046, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452
15 U.S. 576, 581–82 (1981)).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the SAC alleges three theories of enterprises. See Opp’n 13:22-14:18, ECF No. 26. First, it alleges that Daroya-Lushina and Ramos acted through CKE, which the Court previously found to be a sufficiently alleged enterprise. Id. at 14:10-12; Order 7:22-8:7. Second, it alleges the existence of an enterprise consisting of Defendant Daroya-Lushina, Defendant Ramos, CKE, and JLA. Id. at 14:13-16. Third, Plaintiff argues that in the alternative, two separate enterprises existed consisting of Defendants and CKE, and Defendants and JLA. Id. at 14:15-18. The Court analyzes the allegations pertaining to each potential enterprise in turn.
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As before, with regard to Defendants’ alleged infiltration of CKE, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the existence of an enterprise. A RICO enterprise must be “an entity separate and apart from the pattern of [racketeering] activity in which it engages.” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. The SAC describes CKE as a legitimate LLC, which Defendants infiltrated and conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. See SAC ¶ 17. CKE therefore existed separately from the alleged racketeering activity for which it was used, and thus constitutes a RICO enterprise. See United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Energy Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356, 362-64 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff’s second argument that Defendant Daroya- Lushina, Defendant Ramos, CKE, and JLA constitute an enterprise is equivalent to alleging an association-in- fact enterprise since Plaintiff does not contend that these entities and individuals are a legal entity. And Plaintiff’s allegations of this association-in-fact enterprise are insufficient.
An association-in-fact enterprise is “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” Turkette, 452 U.S. 25
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 15 of 23 Page ID #:217 not allege any relationship between CKE and JLA. While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Daroya-Lushina and Defendant Ramos used both entities to commit racketeering activity, the acts involving each entity were completely unrelated to one another. The two companies therefore had no common purpose, and they were not associated together to form “a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate acts.” See Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 552 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff therefore fails to allege the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise.
Finally, with regard to Defendants’ alleged infiltration of JLA, Plaintiff has adequately alleged the existence of an enterprise. Just as with CKE, the SAC described JLA as a legitimate corporation, which Defendants infiltrated and conducted a pattern of racketeering activity through. See SAC 14, 36-39. JLA therefore existed separately from the alleged racketeering activity for which it was used, and thus constitutes a RICO enterprise. See United Energy Owners Comm., Inc., 837 F.2d at 362-64.
Since Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the existence of enterprises through CKE and JLA only, the Court analyzes the predicate acts discussed in the SAC pertaining solely to CKE and JLA.
b. Injury Caused by Predicate Acts A RICO claim requires a pattern of two or more predicate acts that cause injury to the plaintiff’s
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 16 of 23 Page ID #:218 business or property. Living Designs, 431 F.3d at 361. A predicate act is “any act indictable under any of the statutory provisions listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).” In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 918 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Here, the predicate acts Plaintiff alleges are mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See SAC ¶ 46.
i. CKE Enterprise
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed mail and wire fraud through the CKE enterprise for essentially two purposes. First, Ramos engaged in a wire fraud to falsely identify Daroya-Lushina as the sole manager of CKE. SAC ¶ 23. Second, Defendants jointly engaged in mail or wire fraud to sell the Property, which was CKE’s main asset, and to collect the proceeds of the sale for themselves. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30. In turn, Plaintiff suffered two distinct injuries. The first act of wire fraud deprived Plaintiff of his rightful interest in CKE. Id. ¶ 21. The sale of the Property deprived Plaintiff of his rightful share in the proceeds of the sale. Id.
The Court previously noted that “[w]hile Plaintiff’s first injury — loss of membership interest in CKE — may be a cognizable RICO injury, this harm arose from a single act of wire fraud.” Order 9:26-28. Indeed, the single predicate act that Plaintiff alleged in his First Amended Complaint was insufficient to
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 17 of 23 Page ID #:219 establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (“[A] ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity.”).
Now, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that while he “specifically identif[ies] falsified documents and communications in a good faith effort to comply with Rule 9(b),” Plaintiff currently does not have in his “possession, custody and/or control all of the relevant [e-mails], communications, and/or false documents that [he] believe[s] were circulated/transmitted by and between Defendants and various third parties in furtherance of their fraudulent scheme.” SAC ¶ 22. Plaintiff remarks that, regardless, he is informed and believes that Defendants were each “responsible for sending multiple communications and submitting multiple documents” to perpetuate their fraudulent scheme, “but cannot identify with certainty which was personally responsible for sending each such communication or document until certain discovery is permitted.” Id.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff proceeds to plead that on or about April 20, 2022, “Defendants filed an additional false Statement of Information with the California Secretary of State,” which Plaintiff believes Defendants submitted “electronically through the internet.” Id. at 24. But it is unclear how this act causes Plaintiff harm. By April 20, 2022, Defendants had already filed an allegedly false Statement of Information with the
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 18 of 23 Page ID #:220 California Secretary of State that deprived Plaintiff of his interest in CKE. See SAC ¶ 21, 23 (Explaining that on September 23, 2021, Defendants caused a false Statement of Interest to be filed, effectively depriving Plaintiff of his interest in CKE). Thus, once again, the merit of Plaintiff’s RICO claim turns on whether Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ other predicate acts — related to the sale of the Property — caused a cognizable RICO injury.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not, and Plaintiff’s RICO claim therefore fails. Because this conclusion is dispositive, the Court does not reach Defendants’ other arguments as to the merits of the RICO claim.
To allege a cognizable RICO injury, Plaintiff must show “a harm to a specific business or property interest” that was caused directly by Defendants’ RICO violation. In re ZF-TRW Airbag Control Units Prods. Liab. Litig., No. LA ML19-02905 JAK (FFMx), 2022 WL 20
As discussed in the August 16, 2022 Order, under California law, “members of [an] LLC hold no direct
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 19 of 23 Page ID #:221 ownership interest in the company’s assets.” PacLink Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 3 436, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, “the members cannot be directly injured when the company is improperly deprived of those assets.” Id. That deprivation “constitutes an injury to the company itself,” and any action brought by an individual member must be derivative in nature on the company’s behalf. Id. Here, Plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of his fair share of the proceeds is only incidental to the injury caused to CKE itself. See PacLink, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12 441. Because the injury alleged in the SAC was one to the LLC and not to Plaintiff directly, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert it. See Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that shareholder plaintiff lacked RICO standing where RICO claims were based on injury to corporation). While Plaintiff amended his Complaint to include CKE and two other entities as plaintiffs, perhaps in an attempt to establish standing, this Court did not grant leave to add parties and has stricken the added parties. Accordingly, Plaintiff still bears the burden of pleading he has standing. Plaintiff has therefore failed to assert a cognizable RICO injury caused by the predicate acts committed by Defendants in selling the Property.
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ii. JLA Enterprise Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants used JLA to commit predicate acts causing him injury. Plaintiff contends that Defendants committed theft, fraud, wire and/or mail fraud through JLA. SAC ¶ 46. To support these claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants electronically filed a false Statement of Information with the California Secretary of State identifying Daroya-Lushina as the sole director and officer of JLA and altering JLA’s mailing address. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff contends that as a result, “at least several checks made payable to JLA from JLA’s clients” were improperly forwarded to Defendants, at which time Defendants forged endorsements on those checks and deposited the funds into their own accounts. Id. ¶ 38. Finally, Defendants allegedly changed the passwords to JLA’s websites and altered the sites through “the electronic submission of false information.” Id. ¶ 39.
Just as with CKE, any injury caused by these activities was sustained by JLA, not by Plaintiff in his personal capacity. See Sparling, 864 F.2d at 640-41. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege a pattern of predicate acts causing him injury.
In sum, while Plaintiff may have properly alleged the existence of enterprises and the requisite number of predicate acts, Plaintiff has failed to allege that those acts caused harm to Plaintiff’s business or property. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a civil
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 21 of 23 Page ID #:223 RICO claim.
3. Supplemental Jurisdiction Defendants further request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Mot. 13:14-14:14. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Here, Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action are state law claims within the Court’s discretionary supplemental jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff’s federal RICO conspiracy claim is stricken, and his federal RICO claim is subject to dismissal, the Court declines to address the Motion’s arguments as to Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff failed to amend the FAC to properly state a federal claim for relief, so the Court dismisses the remaining state law claims. See Nguyen v. Global Equip. Servs. & Mfg., Inc., No. 18-cv-01824-NC, 2018 WL 10758158, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018).
4. Leave to Amend “The court should give leave [to amend] freely when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with ‘extreme liberality.’” United States v.
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 22 of 23 Page ID #:224 Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). Against this extremely liberal standard, the Court may consider “the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff requests leave to amend to include new claims or parties, or to cure the SAC’s deficiencies. See Opp’n 16:11-19. Plaintiff amended his Complaint as a matter of course and the Court already granted Plaintiff leave to amend his FAC to state a cognizable RICO claim. Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to refine his claim, yet still has not stated a plausible claim for relief. See Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s RICO claim without leave to amend.
III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion to Strike the new plaintiffs and claims added in the SAC and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s RICO claim without leave to amend.
Because the only federal claim is dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
Case 2:22-cv-02695-RSWL-JC Document 29 Filed 12/12/22 Page 23 of 23 Page ID #:225 over Plaintiff’s state law causes of action.
Accordingly, the Court does not address the merits of Plaintiff’s state law causes of action. Therefore, there are no claims remaining and the Court closes this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 12, 2022 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ /S_/_ R_O_N_A_LD_ _S_.W_._ L_E_W_ ________
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.