Barnes v. AKM Foods Inc.

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- AMANDA BARNES, No. 2:22-cv-00311 WBS CKD 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT HILLANDALE AKM FOODS INC. dba FLAMES ENTERPRISES, LLC’S MOTION TO RESTAURANT & TAPHOUSE; DISMISS HILLANDALE ENTERPRISES, LLC, 17 Defendants.

19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Plaintiff Amanda Barnes (“plaintiff”) brought this action against AKM Foods Inc. dba Flames Restaurant & Taphouse (“Flames”) and Hillandale Enterprises, LLC (“Hillandale”) alleging (1) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; (2) violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code §§ 51-53; and (3) denial of full and equal access to public facilities, California Health & Safety Code § 19955. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).)

28 Defendant Hillandale now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to the extent it alleges barriers in the exterior area of the business complex, or in the alternative order plaintiff to show cause why she has standing. (Docket No. 17.)1 I. Factual and Procedural Background 6 Plaintiff is substantially limited in her ability to walk and must use a wheelchair for mobility. (Compl. ¶ 8.)

8 Plaintiff also uses a trained service dog. (Id.) Hillandale owns and operates the real property, a business complex, within which Flames is located. (Id. ¶ 7.) Flames, and the surrounding business complex, is a public accommodation. (Id. ¶ 9.)

12 Plaintiff lives within approximately 15 miles of Flames. (Id. ¶ 10.) On or about December 11, 2021, plaintiff visited Flames and alleges she encountered the following barriers. (Id.) 15 First, the complaint alleges that plaintiff parked in a designated accessible parking space in the complex’s parking lot, but the route of travel from the parking space to the accessible Flames entrance was “a very long distance and contained excessive slopes, making it difficult and strenuous [for plaintiff] to maneuver her wheelchair.” (Id. ¶ 10(a).)

21 Second, the complaint alleges that upon entering Flames with her service dog, plaintiff was told “by a man that appeared to be the owner or manager” that she could not bring her service dog inside Flames. (Id. ¶ 10(b).) The complaint alleges that Defendant Hillandale and plaintiff request that the court take judicial notice of numerous photographs. (Docket Nos. 18, 23.) The court does not rely on these documents, and therefore, the request is denied as moot.

1 despite providing her service dog’s identification card, the man refused to allow plaintiff and her service dog to be inside the restaurant. (Id.) Plaintiff decided to leave Flames but the man would not return her service dog’s identification card until approximately 15 minutes later. (Id.) 2 6 The complaint alleges that plaintiff was and continues to be deterred from visiting Flames, but plans to return to Flames once the barriers are removed. (Id. ¶ 12.)

9 II. Discussion 10 Standing pertains to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Article III and may be challenged in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) at any time, which defendant Hillandale has done here. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

15 Article III standing requires that a plaintiff “have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). “The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. When the “case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element.” Id. (quotation marks and Flames is defending and indemnifying Hillandale regarding the allegation about the service dog and any further allegations that arise about the interior of Flames in this action. (Joint Status Report at 2 (Docket No. 13).) The only allegations against Hillandale at issue in this motion relate to the ADA compliant accessible parking and route of travel.

28 (Compl. ¶ 10(a).)

1 alterations omitted).

2 Although the court has the discretion to review evidence beyond the complaint when deciding a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court will not exercise its discretion to do so in these circumstances. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”) (emphasis added). The parties’ arguments, based upon their experts’ opinions, about whether Hillandale can provide a closer accessible parking space to Flames and remove the excessive slopes is a factual question going to the merits of plaintiff’s claim, which is best decided at a later stage once discovery commences, not at the time of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

17 Hillandale argues the complaint fails to allege facts in support of an injury because despite the accessible parking space being far from the Flames entrance and containing excessive slopes, plaintiff was still able to get to Flames and was denied entry for a different reason. (Def.’s Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 11-12 (Docket No. 17-1).)

23 “Under the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an accessibility barrier violating its provisions, it is not necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely preclude the plaintiff from entering or using the facility in any way.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). “Rather, the barrier need only interfere with the plaintiff’s ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the facility,” and the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) “establish[] the technical standards required for ‘full and equal enjoyment.’”

4 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).

5 To suffer an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing, plaintiff need only “encounter[] or become aware of alleged ADA violations that deter [her] patronage of or otherwise interfere with [her] access to a place of public accommodation.”

9 Id. (quoting Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s suit must be “limited to barriers related to [her] particular disability.” Id. 12 Plaintiff alleges she encountered the following ADA barrier at the Hillandale business complex: the “route of travel from [p]laintiff’s parking stall to the [Flames] entrance was a very long distance and contained excessive slopes, making it difficult and strenuous to maneuver her wheelchair.” (Compl. ¶ 10(a).) An ADA barrier exists when there is a violation of the ADAAG, and the ADAAG provides, in relevant part, rules pertaining to the permitted length of the accessible route from a parking space to an entrance and the slopes within that route. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947; 36 C.F.R., pt. 1191, App. B § 208.3.1; 36 C.F.R., pt. 1191, App. D § 403.3.

23 Plaintiff need not “identify what was difficult, how [the route of travel] was strenuous, and whether she had a manual and/or electric wheelchair.” (See Def.’s Mot. at 2.)

26 Regardless of whether plaintiff overcame the excessive slopes and distance, plaintiff sufficiently pleads an injury which relates to her disability because the barrier need not “completely preclude plaintiff from entering” Flames. See Chapman, 631 F.3d 2 at 947. It need only be noncompliant with the ADAAG, and the complaint alleges that the route of travel from the parking space to Flames is noncompliant. See id.; (Compl. ¶ 10(a).)

5 Hillandale cites to Johnson v. Reimal Family Limited Partnership, No. 20-cv-01192, 2021 WL 428631 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2021), in support of its motion. However, Johnson is distinguishable because that court determined the alleged barriers had been removed and therefore that plaintiff’s ADA claim was moot. See Johnson, 2021 WL 428631, at *3-5. Here, Hillandale presents no evidence that the alleged barriers have been removed. To the contrary, Hillandale agrees that excessive slopes exist in the 201 feet long route of travel from the accessible parking space to Flames.

15 The complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support the “injury in fact” requirement for standing because plaintiff encountered accessibility barriers at the business complex owned by Hillandale. (Compl. ¶ 10(a).) Therefore, plaintiff has standing to bring her ADA claim.3 Plaintiff also has standing to bring her Unruh Act and Health and Safety Code claims because she sufficiently alleges that she encountered accessibility barriers at the business complex in violation of the ADA. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 shall also constitute a violation of [the Unruh Act].”); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05CV1216, 2005 WL 3477841, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2005) (“The ADA, . . ., Unruh Act and California Health and Safety Code all address essentially the same rights of being free from discrimination based on physical disability and having full access to accommodations generally available to the public . . . . Therefore the requirements of standing are satisfied as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.”). nen ee nen ene nen nnn nnn ann on i nn nnn nn ne on nn 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Hillandale’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 17) be, and the same hereby is, | DENIED.

4 | Dated: August 9, 2022 otto A, hh be WILLIAM B. SHUBB 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE