(PC) Madrid v. Anglea

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ALEJANDRO MADRID, Case No. 1:19-cv-00894-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO H. ANGLEA, ET. AL., DISMISS CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY 15 Defendants. WITH COURT ORDERS1 16 FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 17 (Doc. No. 26) 19 This matter comes before the Court upon periodic review. As more fully set forth below, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and timely comply with the Court’s order directing that he file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). (Doc. No. 26).

23 I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 24 Alejandro Madrid, a state prisoner, initiated this action proceeding pro se by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 1, 2019. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff accompanied This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022).

1 his complaint with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). On November 27, 2019, the Court issued its first screening order. (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on January 29, 2020. (Doc. No. 14). On April 14, 2020, the Court issued its second screening order noting that the SAC stated a plausible Eighth Amendment medical claim against Defendants Smith and St. Clair, but no other claims. (Doc. No. 16 at 6). The Court warned Plaintiff about Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requiring a short and plain statement of fact to support the claims, advised Plaintiff about § 1983 generally, and explained the differences between official verses individual capacity liability and supervisory liability. (Id. at 2-6).

9 Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint (“SAC”) on June 16, 2020. (Doc. No. 17). The SAC consists of 283 pages including attachments.

11 On August 24, 2022, the Court issued a third screening order finding the SAC deficient and violative of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. (Doc. No. 26 at 3-6). The Court directed Plaintiff to file a third amended complaint by delivering it to correctional officials for mailing no later than September 26, 2022. (Id. at 6, ¶1). The Court again explained that the SAC violated Rule 8 for many reasons, including an excessive attachment of exhibits. The Court warned Plaintiff that his failure to timely file a TAC or move for an enlargement of time to do so would result in the recommendation that this case be dismissed for failure to comply with the Court Order and prosecute this action. (Id. at 6). On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time. (Doc. No. 27). Despite it being illegible and untimely, the Court liberally construed the motion as seeking an extension of time to file a third amended complaint and afforded Plaintiff a further thirty-day extension of time to comply with the Court’s Order dated August 24, 2022. (Doc. No. 28). The Court ordered Plaintiff to deliver his third amended complaint to correctional officials for mailing no later than November 18, 2022. (Id. at 2, ¶2).

24 The Court again warned Plaintiff that if he failed to timely comply with the order dated October 18, 2022, the Court would recommend that this case be dismissed for his failure to prosecute this action. (Id., ¶3). Plaintiff has not timely complied with either the Court’s Orders dated August 24, 2022 and October 18, 2022.

28 //// 1 II. APPLICABLE LAW 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. 4 P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he consensus among our sister circuits, with which we agree, is that courts may dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain circumstances.”). Local Rule 110 similarly permits the court to impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with any order of the court.

9 Involuntary dismissal is a harsh penalty, but it “is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 11 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). Before dismissing an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, the court must consider: (1) the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage a docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendant; (4) public policy favoring disposition on the merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. See Applied Underwriters, 913 F.3d 15 at 889 (noting that these five factors “must” be analyzed before a Rule 41 involuntary dismissal) (emphasis added); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing five factors and independently reviewing the record because district court did not make finding as to each factor); but see Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing the same five factors, but noting the court need not make explicit findings as to each) (emphasis added); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of pro se § 1983 action when plaintiff did not amend caption to remove “et al” as the court directed and reiterating that an explicit finding of each factor is not required by the district court).

23 III. ANALYSIS 24 The undersigned considers each of the above-stated factors and concludes dismissing this case is warranted. The expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990–91 (9th Cir. 1999).

27 Turning to the second factor, the Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” due to delays in filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and operates under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial Emergency in the Eastern District of California. The Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). Delays have the inevitable and inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Finally, the fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”).

24 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s August 24, 2022, Order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action. (Doc. 26 at 3, ¶2). Additionally, the Court’s | October 18, 2022, Order repeated that warning. (Doc. 28 at 2, 92). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate || warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a | dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby | addressing the fifth factor.

5 Considering these factors and those set forth supra, as well as binding case law, the | undersigned recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local | Rule 110.

8 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 9 The Clerk of Court assign this case to a district judge.

10 It is further RECOMMENDED: 11 This case be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute this action and | the Clerk be directed to terminate any motions and close this case.

13 NOTICE TO PARTIES 14 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written || objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s | Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, | 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

22 Dated: _ December 6, 2022 oe Zh. Sareh Back 23 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE