1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 YIXIN WANG, et al., 10 Case No. 21-cv-02820-RS Plaintiffs, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 REMAND FCA US LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiffs Yixin Wang and Joseph McCarthy purchased a new, or nearly new, 2018 18 Chrysler Pacifica, manufactured by defendant FCA US, LLC, and sold by defendant Fremont 19 Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Fremont”) for a contract price of $24,070.98. They allege the vehicle 20 thereafter suffered numerous defects and recalls, requiring multiple trips to Fremont’s repair shop. 21 Plaintiffs contend the repairs were not successful, and that the vehicle continues to have a “stalling 22 defect” that presents a safety risk. Plaintiffs allege defendant FCA was aware of the stalling defect 23 in similarly equipped 2018 Chrysler Pacificas, but concealed the problem and continued selling 24 the vehicles. 25 Plaintiffs filed this suit in Alameda County Superior Court, advancing claims under the 26 Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act,

et seq. and under state law. Defendants 27 removed, asserting the Magnuson-Moss claim gives rise to federal question jurisdiction. As 1 to be enforced in federal court if the amount in controversy is at least $50,000.

2310(d)(3)(B). 3 Plaintiffs now move to remand, contending defendants have not met their burden to 4 establish the requisite amount is in controversy. The motion will be granted. 5 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would 8 have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v.

U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed 10 in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). If it appears at any time 11 before final judgment that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must 12 remand the action to state court.

(c). 13 The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Provincial 14 Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the 15 party seeking to establish federal jurisdiction must meet this burden “by a preponderance of the 16 evidence.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting McNutt v. General 17 Motors Acceptance Corp.,

(1936) (emphasis omitted)). “The removal statute is 18 strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of 19 remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 Gaus, at 566. 21

22 III. DISCUSSION 23 The complaint alleges plaintiffs “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an 24 amount that is not less than $25,001.00.” Complaint, para. 14. Presumably this allegation was 25 intended to establish the matter as an “unlimited civil case” under the rules of the state court. 26 While the allegation is consistent with an amount in controversy of at least $50,000, standing 27 1 alone it does not establish jurisdiction exists here. Defendants therefore rely on the following 2 assumptions: 3 1. Plaintiffs’ “actual damages” are the $24,070.98 price they paid for the vehicle, given 4 that they seek restitution. 5 2. Because plaintiffs seek civil penalties in an amount twice their actual damages, that 6 amount should be calculated as an additional $48,141.96. 7 3. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, which potentially could be nine times the purchase 8 price. 9 Thus, in defendants’ view, the amount in controversy easily exceeds the jurisdictional 10 minimum because the “actual damages” plus civil penalties alone total over $72,000. Punitives 11 push the amount to nearly $290,000, not even counting plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees, costs, 12 and possible other damages mentioned in the prayer of the complaint. 13 The flaw in defendants’ analysis is that they have not established with any degree of 14 certainty the amount of actual damages in controversy. Relying merely on the purchase price of 15 the vehicle is insufficient, given that even if restitution were granted, a mileage offset would be 16 necessary. See

(d)(2)(C). Defendants are effectively treating the 17 complaint’s allegation of damages in excess of $25,001 as if that were the actual damages, which 18 could then be doubled to arrive at statutory penalties, and multiplied by nine to estimate punitive 19 damages. 20 Such a reading of similar damages allegations has routinely been rejected. See, e.g., 21 Feichtmann v. FCA US LLC,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2020)(“Moreover, in 22 the Motion For Remand, Plaintiff clarifies that the ‘damages’ allegation in the Complaint refers 23 collectively to actual damages and civil penalties."); Steeg v. Ford Motor Company,

2121508, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2020) (same); Vallejo v. General Motors, LLC,

1164949, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2020) (“the Court construes paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs’ 26 Complaint to encompass all of their requested recovery, not just the actual damages that they seek. 27 Accordingly, that allegation does not demonstrate that more than $75,000 is in controversy, even 1 when coupled with Plaintiffs’ request for a civil penalty”). 2 Furthermore, even if defendants had established the amount of actual damages in 3 controversy with more certainty, their assumption that double that amount in civil penalties should 4 automatically be included is not tenable. See Makol v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, 5

, at *3 (N.D. Cal., June 28, 2018) (“[T]he civil penalty under California Civil 6 Code § 1794(c) cannot simply be assumed . . . . [I]nstead of simply assuming a penalty will be 7 awarded, the defendant must make some effort to justify the assumption by, for example, pointing 8 to allegations in the Complaint suggesting award of a civil penalty would be appropriate, and 9 providing evidence—such as verdicts or judgments from similar cases—regarding the likely 10 amount of the penalty.” (citations omitted)). Defendants’ unsupported assumptions regarding 11 punitive damages are similarly flawed. 12 Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, defendants are not to be faulted for not making a more 13 robust showing in their notice of removal that the jurisdictional minimum was satisfied. When first 14 filing a notice of removal, a defendant “need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in 15 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC 16 v. Owens,

, 89, (2014) (citing

(a)). That said, “[e]vidence establishing 17 the amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) . . . when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, 18 the defendant’s allegation.” Id. Because defendants did not meet that burden here, the motion to 19 remand must be granted. 20 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 This action is hereby remanded to Alameda Superior Court. 23 24 25 26 27 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 3 Dated: February 15, 2022 4 RICHARD SEEBORG 5 Chief United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

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