1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 WILLIAM N RUIZ, Case No. 13-cv-05704-SVK

8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 9 v. TO COMPEL PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES 10 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Re: Dkt. No. 41 11 Defendant.

12 Plaintiff filed this case on December 10, 2013, seeking review of a decision of the 13 Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s application for Social Security Disability and 14 Social Security Income benefits. Dkt. 1. In November 2014, the Court granted the Parties’ 15 stipulation to reverse and remand the case and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Dkt. 30, 31. 16 On March 27, 2015, the Court awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice 17 Act (“EAJA”) in the amount of $4,811.56. Dkt. 36 (the “EAJA fees award”). On September 29, 18 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees under

(b), on the grounds that 19 Plaintiff ultimately prevailed in the administrative proceedings on remand. Dkt. 37. On 20 October 27, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and awarded Plaintiff $35,000.00 in 21 attorney’s fees under § 406(b)(1)(A). Dkt. 40 (the § 406(b) fee award”).1 22 Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel payment of the § 406(b) fee award. 23 Dkt. 41. The Parties agree that following the filing of the present motion to compel payment, the 24 Commissioner paid the § 406(b) fee award. Dkt. 42-1 ¶¶ 4-5; Dkt. 47-2. The only issue 25 remaining before the Court is whether Plaintiff should be awarded the attorney’s fees he incurred 26 in bringing the motion to compel payment, which total $1,295.99. See Dkt. 47, 47-1. Defendant 27 1 Commissioner of Social Security contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to those fees. Dkt. 42. 2 All Parties have consented the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 6, 11. The Court 3 deems the present motion suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 4 Having reviewed the briefs filed by the Parties, the case file, and applicable law, the Court 5 GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees incurred in bringing the motion to compel payment 6 of attorney fees. 7 The Commissioner concedes that the § 406(b) fee award was not paid until after Plaintiff 8 filed the motion to compel payment, which was approximately four months after the Court issued 9 the order awarding those fees. Dkt. 42 at 2; Dkt. 42-1 ¶¶ 4-5. Moreover, “the Commissioner does 10 not dispute that Plaintiff’s motion was the ‘catalyst’ for the Commissioner’s action to pay 11 Plaintiff’s Counsel’s § 406(b) fees on February 23, 2022.” Dkt. 42 at 4. However, the 12 Commissioner argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees incurred in bringing the motion to compel 13 payment. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff seeks these fees under the EAJA,

(d) (see Dkt. 47 14 at 3), and the Commissioner argues that EAJA fees are available only to the “prevailing party.” 15 Dkt. 42 at 3 (citing

(a), (d)). According to the Commissioner, Plaintiff is not the 16 prevailing party on the motion to compel payment because the Commissioner paid the § 406(b) 17 fee award voluntarily and “was not compelled by a court order or other formal court action to pay 18 the fees.” Id. at 3-4. 19 The Commissioner’s argument ignores the context in which the present motion to compel 20 payment arose. Following Plaintiff’s success in obtaining a reversal and remand in this case, 21 Plaintiff prevailed in the administrative proceedings on remand. The Court then ordered the 22 Commissioner to pay Plaintiff attorney’s fees under § 406(b), and the Commissioner did not do so 23 until Plaintiff brought the motion to compel, despite two previous informal requests from 24 Plaintiff’s counsel. See Dkt. 41-1 and Exs. A and B thereto. By any measure, Plaintiff is the 25 prevailing party in this action, notwithstanding the Commissioner’s ultimate decision to 26 “voluntarily” pay the § 406(b) fee award—which award, of course, resulted from a Court order. 27 See Wilderness Soc. v. Babbitt,

, 386 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[a] party need not obtain formal 1 clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized” 2 (citations omitted, emphasis in original)). 3 The Commissioner also argues that Plaintiff's motion to compel payment is moot because 4 the Commissioner paid the § 406(b) fees. Dkt. 42 at 2-3. According to the Commissioner, the 5 || payment “was not delayed and there was never a basis for the Court to compel immediate 6 || payment.” Jd. at 2. Citing the “record high number of pending claims before the SSA payment 7 || centers and the various steps involved in processing a § 406(b) payment,” the Commissioner 8 || argues that “the agency is not in a position to guarantee [such a] payment within a specified time 9 || period.” Id.; see also Dkt. 42-3 {| 5-7. The Commissioner argues that the Court should have 10 || denied Plaintiff's motion to compel payment of attorney’s fees so as not to, in effect, put Plaintiff 11 “at the head of the queue” before other payments that the Social Security Administration must 12 || process. Dkt. 42 at 2-3. Although it is unfortunate that the Commissioner does not regard the four 5 13 || months that elapsed between the Court’s § 406(b) fee award and payment of the award as 14 || constituting an unusual delay, in light of the Commissioner’s payment of the fee award the Court 3 15 need not consider whether a different deadline would have been appropriate. a 16 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's request for an award under the 3 17 || EAJA of $1,295.99 in attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the motion to compel payment is 18 || GRANTED. 19 SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: April 15, 2022 21 22 Seeson yal 73 SUSAN VAN KEULEN United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28