1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ROSETTE NORRIS, Case No. 19-cv-03303-EMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 10 ANDREW SAUL, Docket No. 28 11 Defendant.

12 13 14 Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. 15 Having reviewed the papers submitted, and all other evidence of record, the Court hereby 16 GRANTS the motion. 17 Plaintiff initiated her lawsuit in June 2019. In October 2019, she filed a motion for 18 summary judgment, arguing that the ALJ erred in denying her disability benefits under the Social 19 Security Act. In December 2019, the parties stipulated to voluntary remand pursuant to sentence 20 six of

(g). 21 On remand, an ALJ found Plaintiff disabled. Past due benefits totaled $42,235. The 22 Social Security Administration withheld $10,558.75 from the past due benefits for payment of 23 attorney’s fees. This amount was 25% of the past due benefits. 24 Subsequently, the ALJ awarded Plaintiff’s counsel $5,394 in fees for work done at the 25 administrative level. Counsel now seeks the balance – $5,164.75 – for work done in this 26 litigation. Plaintiff and her counsel had a contingent fee agreement under which she agreed to pay 27 counsel up to 25% of her past due benefits. 1 “court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, 2 not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by 3 reason of such judgment”). The Court has considered the reasonableness of the requested fee in 4 light of Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.C. 789, 807 (2002) (holding that “§ 406(b) does not 5 displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully 6 representing Social Security benefits claimants in court”; although Congress has stated that 7 agreements providing for fees in excess of 25% of the past-due benefits are not enforceable, within 8 the 25% boundary, a court must assess whether the fees sought are reasonable for the services 9 rendered), and Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) (noting that a court 10 must “begin . . . with the fee agreement” and then determine “whether the amount need be 11 reduced, not whether the loadstar [sic] amount should be enhanced”; faulting the lower court for 12 resting on lodestar calculations and rejecting the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 13 agreements). Here, counsel does not seek more than 25% of the past-due benefits. The contingent 14 fee agreement between Plaintiff and her counsel provides for fees up to 25% of past-due benefits. 15 There does not appear to be a basis to adjust fees downward – e.g., because of substandard 16 representation, improper delay of the case, or a windfall. See

. 17 The Court also considers the lodestar calculation “but only as an aid in assessing the 18 reasonableness of the fee.”

(emphasis in original). If the Court were to award the fee request 19 in full ($5,164.75), counsel’s de facto hourly rate would be approximately $157. Even if the Court 20 were to discount the hours claimed by counsel by about 25% (e.g., because the hours claimed are 21 excessive or represent administrative tasks), the de facto hourly rate would be about $207 (i.e., 22 $5,164.75/25 hours). Such a rate would still be reasonable given the work performed and the 23 success achieved. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 1 Taking into account all of the above, the Court grants the fee request in full. Counsel is 2 awarded $5,164.75 in fees pursuant to § 406(b). 3 This order disposes of Docket No. 28. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: May 2, 2022 8 9 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27