1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JANINE NARETTO, et al., Case No. 21-cv-10027-EMC

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 10 CITY OF PETALUMA, et al.,

11 Defendants.

12 13 14 A. Background 15 On October 5, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary 16 restraining order, temporarily enjoining Defendants from “closing the encampment at issue, 17 evicting campers therefrom, seizing and disposing of their property, and/or arresting them for 18 violating the anti-camping ordinance.” Docket No. 7. The Court subsequently extended the TRO, 19 Docket No. 25, and then converted the TRO to a preliminary injunction, Docket No. 45. The 20 Court has continued to monitor the status of the preliminary injunction through periodic status 21 conferences and evidentiary hearings; Defendants’ request to dissolve the preliminary injunction 22 remains under advisement since December 17, 2021. See Docket Nos. 53, 59, 69. The Court set a 23 hearing on May 12, 2022 to decide whether to dissolve the injunction. Docket No. 69. 24 At the hearing on May 12, the parties stated appearances. The Court emphasized that in 25 determining whether to dissolve the injunction, the Court must look at the facts as they exist now, 26 and, specifically, who has standing at this stage in the litigation to seek preliminary injunctive 27 relief. 1 B. Applicable Law 2 “A party seeking modification or dissolution of an injunction bears the burden of 3 establishing that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision or dissolution of the 4 injunction.” Sharp v. Weston,

(9th Cir. 2000). The inquiry under Sharp has 5 two parts. The court must first address whether the party seeking dissolution of the injunction has 6 established “a significant change in facts or law.” Sharp,

. If this showing has 7 been made, the court must then address whether this change “warrants. . . dissolution of the 8 injunction.” See

“This latter inquiry should be guided by the same criteria that govern the 9 issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Karnoski v. Trump,

(9th Cir. 2019). In 10 seeking dissolution of a preliminary injunction, however, the burden with respect to these criteria 11 is on the party seeking dissolution. See Alto v. Black,

(9th Cir. 2013). 12 C. Significant Changes in Facts 13 Each of the six plaintiffs named in the initial complaint and FAC have either left the 14 encampment (Ms. Gossage), obtaining individualized housing on their own (Ms. Chomwangnapi 15 and Mr. Drake), or have been provided individualized housing placements by the City (Mr. 16 Erickson, Ms. Naretto and Mr. Holdway). The Court recognized that the claims of the Named 17 Plaintiffs were moot, and dismissed them from the case. Docket No. 69. 18 The Court also dismissed organizational plaintiff HA! for failure to allege facts sufficient 19 to support either associational or organizational standing.

The Court, however, granted 20 Plaintiffs leave to amend, and in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, they allege one new 21 individual Plaintiff (Todd Simone), and added facts to support HA!’s organizational standing. See 22 Docket No. 70 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 76-82. 23 Defendants note that in the seven months that the Court’s injunction has been in place, the 24 City has dealt with over 140 calls for police service and over 30 calls for fire service at Steamer 25 Landing Park. Docket No. 71 at 3. There are also continuing concerns about pollution of the 26 adjacent river. 27 D. Defendant’s Burden 1 preliminary injunction “should be guided by the same criteria that govern the issuance of a 2 preliminary injunction.” Karnoski,

. To succeed on a motion for preliminary 3 injunction, a party must show that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim; (2) 4 they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief; (3) the balance of hardships tips in their 5 favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555

, 20 (2008). The four-part test is also satisfied if "serious questions going to the merits [are] 7 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor" so long as there is also a 8 likelihood of irreparable harm and an injunction would be in the public's interest. All. for the Wild 9 Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 The Court issued its preliminary injunction based on the conclusion that the six Named 11 Plaintiffs had raised serious questions going to the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim under 12 Martin v. City of Boise,

(9th Cir. 2019), and that the balance of hardships tipped 13 sharply in their favor. See Docket No. 45. 14 At this juncture, however, none of the Named Plaintiffs remain in the case. Thus, the basis 15 underlying the Court’s injunction is no longer present. Only two plaintiffs remain in the Second 16 Amended Complaint; the evidence does not warrant extending the injunction as to those plaintiffs. 17 First, the allegations of harm to Plaintiff Homeless Action! for the most part do not relate 18 to that which would be incurred if unhoused individuals were evicted from Steamer Landing Park. 19 Much of it pertains to the resources directed to unhoused persons whether or not they are camped 20 at Steamer Landing. To the extent there is reference to an increased burden in responding to the 21 needs of unhoused persons if they are dispersed from Steamer Landing, HA! does allege some 22 harm connected with that which would be incurred if the injunction were dissolved, that may be 23 enough to establish organizational standing to sue under Article III, but it does not establish 24 irreparable injury. At the very least, it is not enough to establish the balance of hardships tips 25 sharply in its favor especially in view of the law enforcement and health problems identified by 26 the City. 27 Second, based on the evidence in the record, Plaintiff Todd Simone has not made a 1 evidence in the record suggests that Mr. Simone was previously provided shelter that was 2 adequate under Martin, but Mr. Simone was unable to adhere to the rules required to maintain that 3 shelter through no fault of the City. Thus, even if Mr. Simone might suffer irreparable injury, he 4 is not entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time on this record. 5 E. Dissolution of the Injunction 6 The Court asked Defendants what steps they would take in the event that the preliminary 7 injunction were dissolved. Defendants represented that they would provide notice to encampment 8 residents of the dissolution of the injunction and then work with community partners to conduct 9 comprehensive outreach to offer housing alternatives to each resident of the encampment over the 10 course of approximately 1-3 weeks. Defendants represented that they would make diligent efforts 11 to transition encampment residents into shelter or other housing alternatives. Defendants stated 12 they would make use of an assessment tool for individuals with disabilities to evaluate the needs 13 of residents and work to find accommodations or services that meet those resident’s needs. 14 The Court ORDERS the preliminary injunction at Steamer Landing Park shall be 15 dissolved effective as of June 10, 2022. This will allow sufficient time for encampment residents 16 to prepare and ensure Defendants have sufficient time to carry out the outreach steps to 17 encampment residents that they represented to the Court. 18 Defendants are ORDERED to submit a status report and updated chart detailing their 19 outreach efforts and offers of housing to encampment residents by June 3, 2022. A further status 20 conference is set for June 10 at 3:30 p.m. 21 The Court extended the deadline for Plaintiffs to respond Defendants’ motion to dismiss 22 the Second Amended Complaint to June 6, 2022. Defendants’ reply brief is due June 16. 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 Dated: May 16, 2022 27 ______________________________________