1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 OLINDA V. CORTEZ, Case No. 3:19-cv-03446-LB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING THE 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Re: ECF No. 26 15 Defendant. 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 The court previously granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the 19 action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings.1 On remand, the plaintiff 20 received a past-due benefits award.2 Her counsel now seeks fees of $12,446.50, which is within 21 the 25-percent limit in

(b) and the representation agreement with his client.3 The 22 court can decide this matter without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The court 23 grants the motion. 24 25

26 1 Order – ECF No. 22. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 27 2 Notice of Award – ECF No. 26-3 at 3–5. 1 STATEMENT 2 The Commissioner withheld 25% of the retroactive benefits, or $12,446.50.4 The plaintiff’s 3 attorney has already received $3,600.00 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 4 (EAJA).5 5 The plaintiff has a fee agreement with her lawyer that provides for a 25-percent contingency 6 fee of the award as of the final decision.6 The plaintiff’s attorney seeks $12,446.50 in fees, which 7 is within 25 percent of $71,949.84. The Commissioner filed a response to the plaintiff’s motion 8 asking the court to consider the reasonableness of the fee award and order the plaintiff’s counsel to 9 refund the EAJA fees to the plaintiff.7 The plaintiff’s counsel agreed that he will refund the EAJA 10 fees.8 11 ANALYSIS 12 Under

(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social 13 security] claimant . . . , the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable 14 fee” for the claimant’s counsel, which can be no more than 25 percent of the total of past-due 15 benefits awarded to the claimant.

(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if 16 the court’s judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court 17 has rendered a judgment favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ 18 and remanding for further consideration, the court may calculate the 25-percent fee based upon 19 any past-due benefits awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th 20 Cir. 2009) (en banc). 21 In considering a motion for attorney’s fees under § 406(b), the court must review counsel’s 22 request “as an independent check” to ensure that the contingency fee agreement “yield[s] 23 reasonable results.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002). Section 406(b) “does 24

25 4 Notice of Award – ECF No. 26-3 at 3–5. 26 5 Order – ECF No. 25. 6 Fee Agreement – ECF No. 26-5. 27 7 Response – ECF No. 28. ] not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs 2 || courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” /d. at 808-09. To evaluate 3 || the reasonableness of a fee request under § 406(b), the court considers the character of the 4 || representation and the results achieved. /d. at 808; see also Crawford,

. This 5 includes analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less than 25 percent in 6 || fees; any delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether the 7 || benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the risk counsel 8 assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford,

-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 US. at 9 808). If an attorney “is responsible for delay . . . a reduction [of fees] is in order so that the 10 || attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in 11 court.” Gisbrecht,

(cleaned up); see also Crawford,

. 12 The court must offset an award of § 406(b) attorney’s fees by any award of fees granted under E 13 the EAJA. Gisbrecht,

; Parrish vy. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

, 14 |} 1218 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 15 The 25-percent contingency-fee agreement is within § 406(b)(1)(A)’s ceiling, and the amount 2 16 is reasonable. i 17 CONCLUSION Z 18 The court finds that a fee award of $12,446.50 is reasonable under § 406(b). The plaintiff's 19 || counsel must refund the plaintiff the EAJA fees, which results in a net (remaining) fee award of 20 || $8,846.50. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: May 27, 2022 Li EC 23 LAUREL BEELER 24 United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28