1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 EUREKA DIVISION 7 8 MILOEDU, INC., Case No. 21-cv-09261-JST (RMI)

9 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 10 v. FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

11 LYBROAN DENNIS JAMES, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 82 12 Defendants.

13 14 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion (dkt. 82) seeking attorneys’ fees due to 15 certain discovery misconduct committed by Defendants and their counsel. The court will not 16 repeat the essence of the now-adjudicated discovery disputes (see Ltr. Br. (dkt. 80) at 1-5), nor is it 17 necessary to repeat the court’s previous findings that those disputes were entirely the consequence 18 of the unreasonable positions, frivolous objections, and baseless arguments advanced by 19 Defendants and their counsel (see Order of August 8, 2022 (dkt. 81) at 1-8). Instead, the court will 20 only reiterate its previous findings that Defendants and their counsel had engaged in a pattern of 21 willful obstructionism and bad faith in advancing a series of frivolous objections and arguments 22 designed to delay, hinder, and frustrate the course of discovery in this case – for which an award 23 of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff was clearly warranted (see id. at 7-8). As to the determination of a 24 reasonable sum, the court entertained a full round of briefing from the Parties (see dkts. 82, 83, 25 85). The matter now having been briefed, the court finds that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 26 Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the matter is suitable for disposition without oral 27 argument. 1 occasioned by the obstructionist tactics employed by Defendants and their counsel. See generally 2 Pl.’s Mot. (dkt. 82); see also id. Exh. 2, Hayes Decl. (dkt. 82-2) at 12-13. As to the number of 3 hours spend, and the hourly rates involved, Plaintiff claims the following:

4 the time that was spent related to [Plaintiff’s] attempts to obtain compliance with the Court-ordered inspection protocol, i.e., those 5 entries that are visible on the attached invoices . . . since April 14, 2022, Mr. Logan recorded 22.8 hours, Mr. Humphrey recorded 22.7 6 hours, and [Mr. Hayes] recorded 20.1 hours. Mr. Logan’s hourly rate was $435. $435 multiplied by 22.8 hours is $9,918. Mr. Humphrey’s 7 hourly rate was $670. $670 multiplied by 22.7 is $15,209. [Mr. Hayes’s] hourly rate was $775. $775 multiplied by 20.1 is 8 $15,577.50. The sum of these three amounts is $40,704.50. [Plaintiff’s counsel have] extended MILO a 5% courtesy discount on 9 the relevant invoices for April, May, June, and July time, and [counsel] anticipate [that they] will do the same on the invoice for 10 August time, when it is issued. With that discount applied, the amount MILO has incurred related to []its attempts to obtain compliance with 11 the Court-ordered inspection protocol is at least $38,669, which is the amount being requested by MILO. 12 Id. 13 Further, having reviewed the Declaration of Douglas Gold (dkt. 82-1), the court finds that 14 Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are eminently reasonable and well within the range of rates 15 charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience who practice in this court. 16 Defendants’ response in opposition is threadbare and conclusory to the point where it 17 warrants no serious discussion at all. See Defs.’ Opp. (dkt. 83) at 2. Indeed, Defendants do little 18 more than citing (without any discussion) to a patently inapplicable statute and irrelevant court 19 case (which amounts to yet another round of frivolous argument by Defendants and their counsel 20 for the reasons stated by Plaintiff – see Pl.’s Reply (dkt. 85) at 2-3). Otherwise, in substance, 21 Defendants’ opposition consists of only a single conclusory assertion to the effect that $38,699.00 22 is excessive – again, with no explanation at all. See Defs.’ Opp. (dkt. 83) at 2. 23 The undersigned disagrees. As mentioned previously, the court has already found (dkt. 81 24 at 7-8) that Defendants and/or their counsel shall be liable for Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in 25 connection with Plaintiff’s efforts to ferret through Defendants’ boilerplate objections and the 26 preparation and filing of the letter brief (dkt. 80) which brought this matter to the court’s attention; 27 and that all that remained in this regard, were determinations as to the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s 1 suitable target for the attorneys’ fee award – to wit, Defendants or their counsel. As mentioned 2 above, the court finds that the hourly rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable, as are the 3 number of hours expended in ferreting through Defendants’ frivolous and boilerplate objections 4 and bringing the matter to the court’s attention. As to the suitable target for this fee award, 5 Plaintiff submits that Defendants and their counsel should be jointly and severally liable for 6 paying the fee award (Pl.’s Mot. (dkt. 82) at 3-4), while Defendants and their counsel chose to 7 disregard or decline the court’s invitation to express an opinion on that subject (see generally 8 Defs.’ Opp. (dkt. 83) at 2). 9 As to the reasonableness of the fee request, “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, courts use the two-step 10 lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney fee awards under fee-shifting statutes . . . [and] 11 [a]fter calculating the ‘lodestar figure’ by ‘multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party 12 reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, a court then considers whether 13 ‘it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure.’” Leong v. Havens, No. 18- 14 cv-05751-JST,

, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019) (citing Morales v. 15 City of San Rafael,

(9th Cir. 1996)). Having undertaken such an approach to 16 evaluating the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s fee request (as to the reasonableness of the hourly rates 17 and the number of hours expended), the court finds (as did the court in Leong) that “the parties 18 have identified no justification for adjusting the lodestar figure, and the court therefore does not 19 reach the second step of the analysis.”

As to the propriety of jointly and severally targeting 20 defense counsel (along with Defendants) with the fee award – the court will note that, “[i]n 21 addition to Rule 11, federal courts have broad inherent powers to sanction parties, counsel, and 22 firms that engage in conduct which abuses the judicial process.” DNA Sports Performance Lab, 23 Inc. v. Major League Baseball, No. C 20-00546 WHA,

, at *16-17 24 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2020) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger,

, 137 S. 25 Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017)). “And one permissible sanction is an assessment of attorney’s fees — an 26 order, like the one issued here, instructing a party that has acted in bad faith to reimburse legal fees 27 and costs incurred by the other side.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

,

they are intended to compensate. Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp.,

1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). “District courts wield significant discretion in determining appropriate 3 sanctions.” DNA Sports Performance Lab, Inc.,

, at *17. 4 In light of the above, the court finds as follows: (1) Plaintiffs fee request for the sum of 5 $38,699.00 is reasonable because it is premised upon a reasonable expenditure of time, multiplied 6 || by reasonable hourly rates, and that it was necessarily occasioned by the bad faith conduct, willful 7 obstructionism, and frivolous objections and arguments advanced by Defendants and their 8 || counsel; and, (2) that Defendants and their counsel shall be jointly and severally liable for the 9 || payment of that sum because Defendants and their counsel have equal shares of responsibility for 10 || the bad faith obstructionism and frivolous argumentation and objections that have operated to 11 waste a great deal of Plaintiffs time while also abusing the judicial process and wasting the 12 court’s time. 5 13 Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for the award of $38,669.00 — to be paid jointly and 14 severally by Defendants and their counsel — is GRANTED. Defendants and/or their counsel are 3 15 herewith ORDERED to tender payment of that sum to Plaintiff no later than two weeks from the a 16 || date of this order. IT IS SO ORDERED. || Datea: August 24, 2022 19 Mt Z 20 ROBERT M. ILLMAN United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28