1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ASHLEY DIGGS, Case No. 22-cv-01285-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND AND GRANTING MOTION 9 v. TO DISMISS

10 SECURITAS SECURITIES SERVICES Re: Dkt. Nos. 4, 7 USA, INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Ashley Diggs’ motion to remand and 14 Defendant Securitas Securities Services USA, Inc.’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 4, 7. The Court 15 finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed 16 submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons detailed below, the Court DENIES the motion 17 to remand and GRANTS the motion to dismiss. 18 I. MOTION TO REMAND 19 In March 2022, Defendant timely removed this case to federal court based on diversity of 20 citizenship. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff has moved to remand this case to Santa Clara Superior 21 Court. Dkt. No. 7. 22 “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a 23 State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 24 removed” to federal court.

(a). District courts have original jurisdiction over 25 civil actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds 26 $75,000. See

(a)(1). To properly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the defendant 27 bears the burden of proving that the parties in the action are completely diverse, meaning that 1 & through Mills,

(9th Cir. 2018). 2 Here, Plaintiff argues that “[r]emand is required because Securitas is a ‘Forum 3 Defendant.’” Dkt. No. 7 at 1. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant “has its principal place of 4 business in California . . . .”

Plaintiff therefore suggests that complete diversity does not exist. 5 See

(c)(1) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by 6 which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business.”). 7 Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that she is a citizen of California.

And in the complaint, she 8 provided a California address for herself. See Dkt. No. 1-6 , Ex. D (“Compl.”). However, 9 Plaintiff offers no support for her argument that Defendant’s principal place of business is in 10 California. 11 In contrast, Defendant explains that it is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and its 12 principal place of business is in Parsippany, New Jersey. See Dkt. No. 13-1 at ¶¶ 3–4. Defendant 13 has explained that it is headquartered in New Jersey, and that is where its high-level officers such 14 as the CEO and COO “direct, control, and coordinate core activities and administrative functions 15 of the company including, but not limited to, its business operations, finance, sales, real estate, 16 purchasing, payroll, IT, data protection/cyber security, technology & development, and human 17 resources, and serves as the company’s ‘nerve center’ of overall direction, control and 18 coordination.”

. Although Plaintiff had an opportunity to file a reply brief in support of 19 her motion to remand she did not do so. The Court therefore has no reason to believe that 20 Defendant’s representations about its principal place of business are inaccurate. The Court 21 accordingly DENIES the motion to remand. 22 II. MOTION TO DISMISS 23 Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Dkt. No. 4. Defendant contends 24 that Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim for relief.

As Defendant notes, “[t]he 25 Complaint lacks basic information regarding Plaintiff’s employment, including her job title, 26 location worked, and the reason for her employment ending, if it ended, and Defendant’s conduct 27 as it relates to the claims asserted.” See

. The Court agrees. 1 A. Legal Standard 2 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state 3 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

, 570 4 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court 5 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 6 v. Iqbal,

(2009). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept 7 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable 8 to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,

(9th 9 Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 10 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

, 988 12 (9th Cir. 2001)). 13 Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). 14 “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 15 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (quotation 16 omitted). However, even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential 17 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 18

(9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure,” 19 Ghazali v. Moran,

(9th Cir. 1995), which require “a short and plain statement of 20 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 21 B. Discussion 22 Plaintiff’s complaint simply alleges that from approximately July 2019 to July 2020 she 23 “was continually subjected to unlawful employment practices, hostile environment, retaliated 24 against on several occasions, sexually harassed and treated differently than other employees 25 because of her race.” See Compl. From this language, the Court assumes that Plaintiff intends to 26 assert causes of action for (1) hostile work environment/sexual harassment; (2) racial 27 discrimination; and discriminatory retaliation. It is not enough, however, to identify the causes of 1 • To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must 2 show: (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct based on her protected 3 characteristics; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was 4 sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment 5 and create an abusive work environment. See Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349

, 642 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004). 7 • To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) she was 8 a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position sought or was 9 competently performing the position held, or that he or she was capable of 10 performing the essential functions of the job either with or without reasonable 11 accommodation; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the 12 adverse employment action occurred under circumstances suggesting a 13 discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

, 802 14 (1973); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1996). 15 • To prove a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, Plaintiff must show: 16 (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subsequently subjected to 17 an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected 18 activity and the employer’s action. See Dawson v. Entek Int’l,

, 936 19 (9th Cir. 2011). “The causal link can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such 20 as the employer’s knowledge of the protected activities and the proximity in time 21 between the protected activity and the adverse action.”

22 23 Here, the complaint does not provide any facts in support of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff 24 does not allege that she was Defendant’s employee or what position she allegedly held with 25 Defendant. She does not allege that she is a member of a protected class. She does not allege that 26 she was competently performing her position, and does not allege any facts suggesting that she 27 was terminated under circumstances giving rise to racial discrimination. In opposition, Plaintiff 1 No. 15. However, “district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 2 the sufficiency of a complaint” on a motion to dismiss. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899

, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). To the extent that Plaintiff has specific facts about the nature of her 4 || claims against Defendant—including what happened and why she believes Defendant 5 discriminated against her—she must include this information in her amended complaint. 6 |) I. CONCLUSION 7 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to remand and GRANTS the motion to 8 || dismiss. Despite the deficiencies in the complaint that the Court identified above, the Court 9 cannot say at this stage that amending the complaint would be futile. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 10 ||

(9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s 11 deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 12 || F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without 5 13 || leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 14 || cured by amendment.”) (quotations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff shall file any amended 3 15 || complaint by no later than November 7, 2022. Failure to file an amended complaint by this a 16 || deadline may result in the dismissal of the action in its entirety without further leave to amend. In 3 17 addition, Plaintiff's amended complaint will be dismissed if she does not correct the deficiencies 18 || the Court has identified in this order. 19 The Court notes that the Legal Help Center provides free information and limited-scope 20 || legal advice to pro se litigants in civil cases. Services are provided by appointment only. An 21 appointment may be scheduled by calling (415) 782-8982 or emailing FedPro@ sfbar.org. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: 10/6/2022 24 Abpepured 3 Mb). 95 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge 26 27 28