1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL PECTOL, Case No. 22-cv-04657-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 9 v. AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 10 BRENT PECTOL, Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 2 11 Defendant.

12 13 Plaintiff Michael Pectol, representing himself, has filed a complaint against Defendant 14 Brent Pectol. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 15 No. 2. 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 The Court may authorize the commencement of a civil action in forma pauperis if it is 18 satisfied that the would-be plaintiff cannot pay the filing fees necessary to pursue the action. 28

(a)(1); Escobedo v. Applebees,

(9th Cir. 2015). Having 20 reviewed Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the full amount of 21 fees, costs, or give security. See Escobedo,

(“An affidavit in support of an IFP 22 application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford 23 the necessities of life.”). Nevertheless, the Court finds that the action is legally frivolous and fails 24 to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Court accordingly DENIES the motion to 25 proceed in forma pauperis. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Section 1915(e)(2) mandates that the Court review an in forma pauperis complaint before 1 n.8. The Court must dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 2 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 3 relief. See

(e)(2); Barren v. Harrington,

(9th Cir. 1998); 4 Calhoun v. Stahl,

(9th Cir. 2001). 5 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 6 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter,

(9th Cir. 8 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127–31 (9th Cir. 2000)). The complaint must 9 include a “short and plain statement,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “sufficient factual matter, 10 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff must provide the grounds that entitle him to relief. 12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). 13 Because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court construes the complaint liberally and affords him the 14 benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t,

(9th Cir. 1988); 15 cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). The Court is not, 16 however, required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions 17 of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

(9th 18 Cir. 2001). 19 III. DISCUSSION The Court finds the complaint insufficient under

and Federal Rule of 20 Civil Procedure 8. The complaint is devoid of any factual allegations, stating only that the case is 21 “actionable in civil and criminal areas” and that judges previously assigned to his case may be 22 “added to insurgent lists.” See Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff asserts this Court has federal question 23 jurisdiction, but cites no federal statutory or constitutional provision. 24 Instead, Plaintiff references case numbers for several of his prior suits, including ones 25 dismissed by this Court and others against the same Defendant. See, e.g., Case Nos. 18-cv-00717- 26 HSG, 21-cv-09489-HSG, 22-cv-4604-EJD. Plaintiff also attaches more than one hundred pages of 27 1 charging documents from Hawaii, and medical records. But Plaintiff cannot rely on attachments 2 as a substitute for meeting the pleading requirements. Nor can Plaintiff file a new case that 3 incorporates allegations from his prior cases by reference to evade the dismissal of those cases. 4 This Court and others have already dismissed the referenced cases without leave to amend as 5 frivolous and for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Pectol v. Pectol, No. 18-cv-00717-HSG, Dkt. 6 No. 43; Pectol v. Pectol, No. 22-cv-4604-EJD, Dkt. No. 11. 7 To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue judges or court staff who have worked on his cases, it 8 is “well settled that judges are generally immune from suit for money damages” for judicial acts. 9 Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap,

, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court 10 for Dist. of Nevada,

(9th Cir. 1987) (“Court clerks have absolute quasi- 11 judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an 12 integral part of the judicial process.”). To the extent Plaintiff references criminal violations, he 13 cannot pursue those in a civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Aldabe v. Aldabe,

(9th Cir. 14 1980) (affirming dismissal of claims brought under criminal provisions that “provide[d] no basis 15 for civil liability”). 16 In sum, even liberally construed, the complaint fails to provide the required short and plain 17 statement containing sufficient factual matter to support a cognizable complaint. See Brazil v. 18 United States Dep’t of Navy,

, 199 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although a pro se litigant . . . may 19 be entitled to great leeway when the court construes his pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless 20 must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it 21 allegedly did wrong.”). 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 Though a pro se plaintiff is generally entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and 24 an opportunity to amend, the Court need not grant leave to amend where it “determines that the 25 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez,

26 (quotations omitted). Here, the complaint appears to be an attempt to either revive Plaintiff’s prior 27 cases or sue court personnel for their involvement. In light of Plaintiff’s several cases filed against 1 sufficient complaint but has failed to do so, the Court is convinced Plaintiff cannot cure the 2 || identified defects. The Court thus DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO 3 AMEND. The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close the case. 4 || Plaintiff's motion for restraining order is terminated as moot. Dkt. No. 6. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: 12/15/2022

nado S. GILLIAM, JR. / 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12

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