1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICAH ANDERSON, Case No.: 3:22-cv-0280-GPC-MDD

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 14 JOHN L. HENNESSY; PICHAI MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA SUNDAR; JOHN KENT WALKER; 15 PAUPERIS ALPHABET INC.,

16 Defendants. AND 17 (2) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 18 COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF 19 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 20 21 On February 28, 2022 Plaintiff Micah Anderson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, 22 filed a Complaint against Defendants John L. Hennessy, Pichai Sundar, John Kent Walker, 23 and Alphabet Inc. (“Defendants”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to 24 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 25 DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s 26 Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 27 \ \ \ 28 \ \ \ 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 4 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 5 $402.1 See

(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 6 prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes,

(9th Cir. 2007); 8 Rodriguez v. Cook,

(9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must submit an 9 affidavit demonstrating his inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit must include a 10 complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets.

(a)(1). The facts as to the 11 affiant’s poverty must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” 12 United States v. McQuade,

(9th Cir. 1981). When a plaintiff moves to 13 proceed IFP, the court first “grants or denies IFP status based on the plaintiff’s financial 14 resources alone and then independently determines whether to dismiss the complaint” 15 pursuant to

(e)(2) (“§ 1915(e)(2)”). Franklin v. Murphy,

, 16 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). IFP status may be acquired and lost during the course of 17 litigation. Wilson v. Dir. of Div. of Adult Insts., No. CIV S–06–0791,

, at 18 *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) (internal citation omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiff has supplied a form application to proceed IFP. ECF No. 2. 20 However, Plaintiff has left the majority of the form blank and does not indicate the amount 21 of any income or expenses.

Plaintiff’s filing does not give the Court adequate 22 information from which to determine whether Plaintiff is unable to pay the $402 filing fee. 23 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis 24 without prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish to proceed in this matter, he must either pay the 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. 27 See

(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 202-)). The additional $52 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 $402 filing fee or provide a completed affidavit that shows his inability to pay the fee. 2 Plaintiff is advised that Civil Local Rule 3.2(a) provides the information required to be 3 included in any affidavit. See Civ. L.R. 3.2(a). The Court will additionally direct the Clerk 4 to provide Plaintiff with a blank copy of the Southern District of California’s “Motion and 5 Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.” 6 II. Sua Sponte Screening 7 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP, pursuant to

(a), is 8 additionally subject to mandatory sua sponte screening. The Court must review complaints 9 filed by all persons proceeding IFP and must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any 10 portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks 11 damages from defendants who are immune. See

(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 12

, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 13 All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 14 the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 15 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 16 mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) 17 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “Determining whether 18 a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 19 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

The “mere 20 possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 21 Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,

(9th Cir. 2009). 22 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 23 veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 24 Iqbal,

; see also Resnick v. Hayes,

(9th Cir. 2000) 25 (“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 26 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 27 plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington,

(9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 28 § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 1 While the court “ha[s] an obligation where the Plaintiff is pro se, particularly in civil 2 rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the Plaintiff the benefit of any 3 doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 4

, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims 5 that were not initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska,

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 7 Moreover, the federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian 8 Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). It possesses only that power authorized by 9 the Constitution or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,

, 10 541 (1986). It is constitutionally required to raise issues related to federal subject matter 11 jurisdiction and may do so sua sponte. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

83, 93–94 (1998); see Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy,

(9th Cir. 13 1990). 14 Here Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to arise from alleged insider trading. See ECF 15 No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the 16 case pursuant to

. See

. However, Plaintiff does not specify any 17 amount in controversy. See

. The Court concludes there is not diversity of 18 citizenship between the parties. See

(a). Additionally, Plaintiff lists the 19 same northern California address for all Defendants, ECF No. 1 at 2, suggesting that venue 20 is not proper in the Southern District of California, but would be more appropriate in the 21 Northern District, see

. If Plaintiff wishes to refile his complaint, in 22 addition to correcting the subject matter jurisdiction deficiency he should reconsider which 23 venue is appropriate for his claim. 24 The Court accordingly DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint because Plaintiff has not 25 demonstrated that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. 26 CONCLUSION 27 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma 28 pauperis and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. l Should Plaintiff wish to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies noted 2 ||above, he must do so within 30 days of the date of this order. The Clerk shall mail to 3 || Plaintiff a blank copy of the Southern District of California’s “Motion and Declaration 4 || Under Penalty of Perjury in Support of Motion to Proceed Jn Forma Pauperis.” 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 ||Dated: August 31, 2022 8 Hon. athe Cee 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28