1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER HAWKINS, Case No.: 22-CV-1726 TWR (DEB) Booking #22723786, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. PURSUANT TO

(a) 14 AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR JONATHAN ALLOS, Officer 7743; FAILING TO PREPAY FILING 16 PHILLIP CLAY, Officer 5969; and FEES REQUIRED BY BLASIE SCHRADER, Police Officer, 17

(a) Defendants. 18 (ECF No. 2) 19 20 Plaintiff Christopher Hawkins, while detained at the San Diego Central Jail 21 (“SDCJ”) and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 22 § 1983. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000,000 in general and punitive damages 23 and an “immediate TRO preventing contact” based on claims that San Diego Police 24 Officers unlawfully detained and falsely arrested him on August 24, 2019. (Id. at 1‒6.) 25 Hawkins has not prepaid the $402 civil filing fee required by

(a), 26 but instead has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 28 / / / 1 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $402. See

(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook,

(9th Cir. 1999). However, if the 7 plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing, he may be granted leave to proceed IFP but will 8 nevertheless remain obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. 9 Paramo,

(9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his case is ultimately 10 dismissed, see

(b)(1)–(2); Taylor v. Delatoore,

(9th 11 Cir. 2002). A “prisoner” is defined as any person who at the time of filing is “incarcerated 12 or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 13 delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, 14 pretrial release, or diversionary program.”

(h); Taylor,

. 15 Prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of the[ir] 16 trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) . . . for the 6-month period 17 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.”

(a)(2). From the 18 certified trust account statement, the court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the 19 average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months or (b) the average monthly 20 balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has 21 no assets. See

(b)(1), (4); Taylor,

. Then, the institution 22 having custody of the prisoner collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 23 preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 24 these payments to the court until the entire filing fee is paid. See

(b)(2). 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. 27 See

(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2020)). The additional $52 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 While Hawkins has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to

(a), 2 he has not attached a certified copy of his SDCJ Inmate Trust Account Activity Report for 3 the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. (See generally ECF 4 No. 2); see also

(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. Section 1915(a)(2) clearly 5 requires that prisoners “seeking to bring a civil action . . . without prepayment of fees . . . 6 shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) 7 . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added). 9 Without his certified trust account statements, the Court is unable to assess the 10 appropriate amount of the initial filing fee which may be statutorily required to initiate the 11 prosecution of Hawkins’s case. See

(b)(1). 12 II. Conclusion and Order 13 For this reason, IT IS ORDERED that: 14 (1) Hawkins’ Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is DENIED and the action is 15 DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to prepay the filing fee required by

1914(a). 17 (2) Hawkins is GRANTED forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order in 18 which to re-open his case by either: (1) paying the entire $402 statutory and administrative 19 filing fee in one lump-sum, or (2) filing a renewed Motion to Proceed IFP, which includes 20 a prison certificate and/or a certified copy of his SDCJ Inmate Trust Account Statement 21 for the 6-month period preceding the filing of his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2(b). 23 (3) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to provide Hawkins with a Court- 24 approved form “Motion and Declaration in Support of Motion to Proceed IFP” for his use 25 and convenience. However, if Hawkins neither pays the $402 filing fee in full nor 26 sufficiently completes and files a renewed Motion to Proceed IFP, together with a certified 27 copy of his 6-month trust account statements within 45 days, this case will remain 28 / / / 1 || dismissed without prejudice pursuant to

(a), and without any further Order 2 || of the Court.? 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 : Dated: November 8, 2022 —— (2 [ 5 59) D we 6 Honorable Todd W. Robinson 4 United States District Judge 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ? Hawkins is cautioned that if he chooses to proceed further by either prepaying the full $402 civil filing fee or submitting a properly supported renewed Motion to Proceed IFP, his Complaint will be reviewed 25 || before service and may be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and/or

(e)(2)(B), regardless of whether he pays or is obligated to pay filing fees. See Lopez v. Smith,

, 1126- 26 || 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that

(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or 27 || seeks damages from defendants who are immune); see also Rhodes v. Robinson,

(9th 28 Cir. 2010) (discussing similar screening required by

(a) of all complaints filed by prisoners “seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”’).