Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:151 JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023

Title: VANESSA M. CERVANTES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL.

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE

Karlen Dubon Not Present Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT: None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT SUA SPONTE

On January 30, 2023, the Court held a Scheduling Conference in this action, during which the Court and counsel conferred regarding jurisdiction. Upon closer review of the pleadings, the Court finds that the amount in controversy falls short of the statutory threshold required under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Accordingly, and for reasons set forth more fully below, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.

I. Background This action concerns Plaintiffs Vanessa M. Cervantes and Blanca Cervantes’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 2017 warranty contract with Defendant FCA US LLC. (“FCA”) regarding a 2017 Jeep cherokee vehicle (“Vehicle”). Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 1-2) ¶ 10. Plaintiffs allege FCA and FCA’s representatives concealed the defective nature of the Vehicle, failed to service or repair the Vehicle, and subsequently failed to replace it. Compl. ¶¶ 21–27. The total sale price for the Vehicle was $24,681.55. Notice of Removal (“Notice”) (Dkt. 1) ¶ 34. Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:152 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023 Page 2

Plaintiffs filed the original action in state court on October 17, 2022. Compl. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on November 22, 2022. Notice. The Court held a scheduling conference on January 30, 2023.

II. Legal Standard “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”

(c). Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed by

, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”

. This statute “is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” and the party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest.,

, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Federal diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.

(a). For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”

(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,

(2005).

Generally, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2008). If the complaint affirmatively alleges an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, the jurisdictional requirement is “presumptively satisfied.”

A plaintiff who then tries to defeat removal must prove to a “legal certainty” that a recovery of more than $75,000 is impossible. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,

(1938); Crum v. Circus Enters.,

(9th Cir. 2000). This framework applies equally to situations where the complaint leaves the amount in controversy unclear or ambiguous. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 1996). Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:153 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023 Page 3

A removing defendant “may not meet [its] burden by simply reciting some ‘magical incantation’ to the effect that ‘the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of [$75,000],’ but instead, must set forth in the removal petition the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

(S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992)). If the plaintiff has not clearly or unambiguously alleged $75,000 in its complaint or has affirmatively alleged an amount less than $75,000 in its complaint, the burden lies with the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka,

(9th Cir. 2010); Guglielmino,

.

While the defendant must “set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum,” the standard is not so taxing so as to require the defendant to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages.” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc.,

(C.D. Cal. 2010) (emphases added). In short, the defendant must show that it is “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum.

Summary judgment-type evidence may be used to substantiate this showing. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co.,

, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2003); Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 1997). For example, defendants may make mathematical calculations using reasonable averages of hourly, monthly, and annual incomes of comparable employees when assessing the amount in controversy in a wrongful termination suit. Coleman, 730 F. Supp. 2d. at 1148–49.

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction in actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

. An action "arises under" the federal law within the meaning of

if: (1) federal law creates the cause of action, or (2) the Plaintiff right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. l, 27-28 (1983).

(d)(l)(B) of the Magnuson- Moss Warranty Act states in part that a consumer who is damaged by a warrantor's failure to comply with a warranty “may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief in an appropriate district court of the United States, subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection.” Paragraph (3) goes on to state that “[n]o claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought under paragraph (l)(B) of this subsection ... if the amount in controversy Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:154 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023 Page 4

is less than the sum or value of $50,000.00 (exclusive of interest and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit ...”

(d)(3)(B).

If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action it takes is ultra vires and void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby,

(2005); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

, 101–02 (1998). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either the parties or the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). If subject matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the court must dismiss the action,

or remand pursuant to

(c). A Court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2002).

III. Discussion Defendant argues that the Court has original jurisdiction in this case for the claims arising under

, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Notice ¶ 18. The Court disagrees.

“No claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought under [the Magnuson-Moss Warrnty Act]... if the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000.00.”

(d)(3)(B). The Court finds that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000 for federal question purposes under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. It is undisputed that the total sale price of the Vehicle is $24,681.55. Notice ¶ 34. Defendant then argues that the Court should include statutory civil penalties (here, $49,363.10) in its calculation of the amount in controversy. Notice ¶ 35.

The Court will not include speculative civil penalties or attorneys’ fees to meet the amount in controversy requirement. See Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia,

(9th Cir. 1998) (“We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”) (emphasis added). The Court finds that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.

Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter. Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:155 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023 Page 5

IV. Disposition For reasons set forth above, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.

The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.

MINUTES FORM 11 Initials of Deputy Clerk: kdu CIVIL-GEN