Theresa Brooke v. Chateau Property Holdings LLC

United States District Court for the Central District of California

Theresa Brooke v. Chateau Property Holdings LLC

Trial Court Opinion

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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 Case No.: 2:23-cv-07306-MEMF-JC 12 THERESA BROOKE,

13 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE COURT SHOULD N OT DECLINE TO 14 v. EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S 15 STATE LAW CLAIMS CHATEAU PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC, 16 Defendant. 17

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21 On September 4, 2023, Plaintiff Theresa Brooke filed a Complaint against Defendant 22 Chateau Property Holdings LLC, asserting: (1) a claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged 23 violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12010–12213, and (2) a 24 claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”),

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 25

51–52, et seq. The Complaint alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over the ADA claim pursuant 26 27 28 1 to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and

42 U.S.C. § 12188

, and that the state law claims are brought “pursuant to

2 Arroyo v. Rosas, [where] supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate.”

Id. at ¶¶ 3-6

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3 Principles of pendent jurisdiction have been codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute,

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28 U.S.C. § 1367

. The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when

5 deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in

6 each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

7 and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

522 U.S. 156, 173

(1997) (emphasis added)

8 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343, 350

(1988)).

9 California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for a limited group of lawsuits

10 brought under the Unruh Act. See

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55

(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading

11 standard requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant

12 case to file a verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the

13 specific barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff

14 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§ 425.50(a). A “high-frequency

15 litigant fee” is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t

16 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints

17 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately

18 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation”

19 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant

20 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing

21 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 22

23 1 Although no citation is included for this case, the Court interprets this to be referencing Arroyo v. 24 Rosas,

19 F.4th 1202

(9th Cir. 2021). However, the Court notes that Arroyo actually stands for the 25 proposition that it is proper for a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim.

Id. at 1213

(“The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this 26 extraordinary situation threatens unusually significant damage to federal-state comity and presents ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of §1367(c)(4).”). Rather, the Ninth Circuit only 27 held that the district court abused its discretion in denying supplemental jurisdiction after summary judgment, when it had “effectively completed its adjudication of [the] entire case,” which is not the 28 I | §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 2 | is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 3 | isa plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 4 | high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 5 | individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 6 | individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 7 In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court 8 || should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367

(c). In 9 | responding to this Order to Show Cause: 10 1. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause 11 with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court 12 to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by 13 California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). This includes, but is not limited 14 to: 15 a. the number of construction-related accessibility claims filed by Plaintiff in the twelve 16 months preceding the filing of the present claim; and 17 b. the number of construction-related accessibility claims in which Plaintiff's counsel 18 has represented high-frequency litigant plaintiffs in the twelve months preceding the 19 filing of the present claim. 20 Plaintiff shall file a Response to this Order to Show Cause by no later than fourteen days 21 | from the date of this order. The failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause 22 | may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 23 | the Unruh Act claim pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367

(c). 24 IT ISSO ORDERED. 25 f= 26 Dated: November 2, 2023 27 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 28 United States District Judge

Reference

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