(PC) Vega v. Solano County Jail

8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ELISSIA SALUD VEGA, No. 2:23-CV-1074-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER SOLANO COUNTY JAIL, et al., 15 Defendants.

17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.

19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.

23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) the Solano County Jail; and (2) Officer A. Merrick. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to the complaint occurred at the Solano County Justice Center. See id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that she was involved in an altercation with another inmate when she was shot twice by Officer Merrick with a taser. See id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that, while a verbal altercation was taking place Officer Merrick stood by and did nothing to diffuse the situation, which escalated to a physical altercation and Officer Merrick deploying the taser. See id. Plaintiff also claims that, after being shot with the taser, she failed to receive adequate medical attention. See id. at 4. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, between April 18, 2023, and April 27, 2023, she was denied access to basic hygiene items.

19 See id. at 5. Plaintiff does not name any specific officers alleged to have failed to provide medical attention or basic necessities.

22 II. DISCUSSION 23 The Court finds that in Claim I of his pleading, Plaintiff states a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Merrick based on being shot with a taser and failing to prevent the physical altercation. The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s medical care and conditions- of-confinement claims fail to establish a causal link to any named defendant. The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish municipal liability against Solano County, which maintains the Solano County Jail.

1 A. Causal Link 2 In her second claim, Plaintiff alleges that, after being shot with a taser by Officer Merrick, she did not receive adequate medical attention. In her third claim, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied basic hygiene items between April 18, 2023, and April 27, 2023.

5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

11 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

16 Here, Plaintiff’s second and third claims are defective because she does not allege who violated her rights. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.

18 B. Municipal Liability 19 Plaintiff names as a defendant the Solano County Jail, which is administered by Solano County.

21 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

23 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 27 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. See id. 3 Plaintiff’s claim against Solano County cannot proceed as currently pleaded because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to indicate that her rights were violated due to implementation of any municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.

8 III. CONCLUSION 9 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 11 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 16 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 21 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

22 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

26 / / / / / / / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

4 | Dated: July 24, 2023 Svc > DENNIS M. COTA 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1]