(PC) Adams v. Dahl

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PAUL ADAMS, Case No. 1:20-cv-00852-JLT-CDB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DISCOVERY AND 13 v. SCHEDULING ORDER AND STAYING CASE DAHL, et al., (Docs. 58) 15 Defendants.

16 ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE RESPONSE TO MOTION TO COMPEL (Doc. 57) FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 21 Plaintiff Paul Adams is a parolee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on First and Eighth Amendment claims raised against Defendants Dahl, Rios, and Kendrick in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (See Docs. 7, 10, 11.)

25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On February 23, 2023, the Court entered a discovery and scheduling order setting the exhaustion motion deadline for June 23, 2023. (Doc. 53.) The Court ordered the parties to by Defendants, the Court modified the discovery and scheduling order and extended the exhaustion motion deadline by 45 days (e.g., to be filed by August 7, 2023). (Docs. 55, 56).

3 On April 19, 2023, Defendant Kendrick propounded on Plaintiff requests for production under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Alcheck Decl. Doc. 57-1.) Defendants made a single request for all documents that support Plaintiff’s assertion that he exhausted available administrative remedies related to allegations in the complaint. (Doc. 57-2 at 4.) On June 9, 2023, Defendants’ counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff informing him that Defendants had not received his responses to the discovery and extending his time to respond until June 30, 2023. (Doc. 57-1 at 2.) Plaintiff failed to respond to the requests for production. On July 19, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to compel Plaintiff to respond to the outstanding discovery.

11 (Doc. 57.) The motion to compel currently is pending and Plaintiff’s response/opposition is not due until after the deadline for Defendants to file any exhaustion motion. See Local Rule 230(l).

13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Pursuant to Rule 16(b)(3)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, district courts must enter scheduling orders to establish deadlines for joinder of parties, amending the pleadings, discovery, and filing of motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate case management problems. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). Parties must “diligently attempt to adhere to that schedule throughout the subsequent course of the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999).

21 The scheduling order “controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d). “A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Under Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard, the inquiry focuses on the moving party’s diligence and the reasons for seeking modification. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “If the party seeking the modification ‘was not diligent, the inquiry should end’ and the motion to modify should not be granted. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609).

1 Defendants argue: “The Court should temporarily stay discovery until it resolves Defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment [sic] . . . . The Court can issue a protective order forbidding or limiting discovery . . . .” (Doc. 58 at 2.) Defendants urge the Court to apply a two-part test used to “evaluat[e] the need for discovery while a potentially dispositive motion is pending.” (Id.) (citing Lumber Co. v. Nat’l Union of Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA, 220 F.R.D. 6 349, 351–52 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Mlejnecky v. Olympus Imaging Am., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-02630 JAM KJN, 2011 WL 489743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011). First, the “pending motion must be potentially dispositive of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the issue at which discovery is directed.” Pacific Lumber, 220 F.R.D. at 352. Second, “the court must determine whether the pending dispositive motion can be decided absent additional discovery.” Id. In Lumber Co. and Mlejnecky, the pending motions were dispositive motions, and the defendants sought a stay of discovery pending resolution of the motions.

13 Defendants further argue: “Defendant’s pending motion to compel discovery, if granted, could dispose of the entire case. . . . Specifically, if the Court grants Defendants’ motion to compel, and Plaintiff fails to comply, Defendants would be entitled to move for terminating sanctions.” (Doc. 58 at 3) (citing Doc. 57; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). In this manner, Defendants attempt to characterize the pending motion to compel as a dispositive motion.

18 However, the docket reflects no pending dispositive motion, either based on non- exhaustion of administrative remedies or on the merits. Defendants have only filed a discovery motion––one seeking production of discovery rather than one seeking to prevent or limit it.

21 Defendants’ hypothetical situation is based on a presumption that the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to compel, Plaintiff will fail to comply or produce evidence of exhaustion, and the Court will grant any motion for summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. The Court is unwilling to make these inferences as a basis for staying the case.

25 Nonetheless, under the present posture of the case, the Court finds a stay appropriate to allow the parties to complete exhaustion-related discovery. District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to stay a case. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “[T]he disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Id. In determining whether to enter a stay, the court must consider the competing interests at stake, including (1) “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay,” (2) “the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward,” and (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. 7 Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). Each of these facts weigh in favor of granting a stay until exhaustion-based issues and related, open discovery requests are resolved. Additionally, staying the case at this juncture would further the goal of efficiency for the court and litigants. Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988).

11 III. CONCLUSION 12 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 13 1. Defendants’ motion to vacate the discovery and scheduling order (Doc. 58) is 14 GRANTED; 15 2. The Discovery and Scheduling Order, as amended (Doc. 53, 56) is VACATED; 16 3. This action is STAYED pending further order of the Court; 17 4. Within fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Order, Plaintiff shall 18 file one of the following: 19 a. Response to Defendants’ motion to compel (Doc. 57); 20 b. Notice of non-opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel and statement 21 that he has responded to or will respond to Defendant Kendrick’s request 22 for production of documents within fourteen days; or 23 c. If Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, notice of voluntary 24 dismissal.

25 /// /// /// | Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order may subject him to the Court’s imposition of | sanctions, including recommend dismissal of this action for failure to obey a court order | and failure to prosecute.

4 | IT IS SO ORDERED. ° Dated: _ August 1, 2023 | Ww KD Ke 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE