(PC)Helm v. Madera County California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JACOB CURTIS-ALLEN HELM, Case No. 1:23-cv-00487-ADA-EPG (PC) Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 13 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION v. BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE 14 A CLAIM, FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, MADERA COUNTY CALIFORNIA, et al., AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A 15 COURT ORDER Defendants.

16 (ECF Nos. 1, 10).

17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS Plaintiff Jacob Curtis-Allen Helm1 is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this apparent civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this action on March 30, 2023. (ECF No. 1). The complaint is now before this Court for screening. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered torture while confined at Madera County Jail.

On June 21, 2023, the Court screened the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 10). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days from the The Court proceeds under the presumption that Plaintiff is one person, Jacob Curtis Allen Helm.

28 However, it notes that Plaintiff could be using alternative names, Jacob Curtis, aka Allen Helm; or there could be two separate Plaintiffs, Jacob Curtis and Allen Helm.

1 date of service of the order to file an amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id. at 5-6). And the Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.” (Id.).

4 The thirty-day deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons below, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court will also recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order.

9 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 10 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6), the Court may screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

15 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 24 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

26 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff’s complete factual allegations are as follows: 3 Methods of torture were used upon Jacob Curtis-Allen Helm and other inmates of Madera County Jail, perpetual mental assaults, isolation, torture, obfuscation techniques, coercion and duress of Jacob Curtis.

6 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 7 A. Section 1983 8 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 9 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 10 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 12 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

13 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

19 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”

4 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

6 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 10 658, 691, 695 (1978).

11 B. Rule 8 Requirement of Short and Plain Statement 12 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a).

13 As set forth above, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint is not required to include detailed factual allegations, it must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). It must also contain “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.

22 Plaintiff’s complaint does not include any factual allegations. It does not describe anything any person did to Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff claims that he suffered from torture at Madera County Jail, he does not explain what he means by this, or who did what to him. His complaint fails to give notice to any Defendant what Plaintiff believes they did wrong against his constitutional rights.

27 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY 28 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this case and to comply with the Court’s screening order.

2 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the 3 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring 5 disposition of cases on their merits.

6 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 7 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).

8 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”

9 Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

11 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .” Id. Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Court’s screening order. This failure to respond is delaying the case and interfering with docket management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

17 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

22 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Considering Plaintiff’s incarceration, it appears that monetary sanctions are of little use. And given the stage of these proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available.

1 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this factor weighs || against dismissal. Id. 3 After weighing the factors, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate.

4 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that: 6 1. This action be dismissed for failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, and 7 failure to comply with a court order; and 8 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States district judge || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen || (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file || written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file || objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. || Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 || (9th Cir. 1991)).

18 IT IS SO ORDERED. '9 | Dated: _ August 7, 2023 [sf ey — 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE