1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 RUBEN LEE CARDENAS, Case No. 1:23-cv-00875-EPG (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 14 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION COALINGA STATE HOSPITAL, et al., BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE 15 A CLAIM, FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, Defendants. AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A 16 COURT ORDER

17 (ECF Nos. 1, 7).

18 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 19 20 Plaintiff Ruben Cardenas is a prisoner or civil detainee1 proceeding pro se and in forma 21 pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to

. Plaintiff filed the 22 complaint commencing this action on June 5, 2023. (ECF No. 1). The complaint is now before 23 this Court for screening. Plaintiff alleges that a doctor at Coalinga State Hospital performed a 24 surgical procedure without his consent. 25 On June 21, 2023, the Court screened the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff failed 26 to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 7). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days from the date 27 28 1 Plaintiff complaint does not state whether he is a detainee or prisoner, but does allege the events took place at Coalinga State Hospital. 1 of service of the order to file an amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wanted to 2 stand on his complaint. (Id. at 9). And the Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply 3 with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.” (Id.). 4 The thirty-day deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or 5 otherwise responded to the Court’s order.2 Accordingly, for the reasons below, the Court will 6 recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court will also 7 recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with 8 a court order. 9 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 10 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 11 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 12 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 13 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 14 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6), the Court may 16 also screen the complaint under

. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 17 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 18 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 19

(e)(2)(B)(ii). 20 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 21 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 22 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 23 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (citing Bell 24 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 25 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

26 (quoting Twombly,

). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 27 28 2 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a change of address form on July 5, 2023, but he listed the same address as his complaint. (ECF No. 8). 1 this plausibility standard.

. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 2 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a 4 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal,

. 5 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 6 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler,

(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 7 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 8 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 9 Plaintiff alleges as follows: 10 Doctor Powers acted unlawfully against Plaintiff’s will in performing surgeries on 11 Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges he suffered chemical castration without prior consent. Defendant 12 Powers did not notify Plaintiff of the outcome of the procedures. Plaintiff says that his right to 13 self-acknowledgement as a human and a patient was violated. He alleges that Dr. Powers was 14 not clear on the benefit of certain medications, which is clearly now unnecessary. Only Dr. 15 Powers and the psychiatrists understood the side effects or purpose of the medications. 16 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 17 A. Section 1983 18 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 19 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 20 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 21 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 22 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 23

. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 24 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 25

(1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,

, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 26 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,

(1979); Hall v. City of Los 27 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada,

, 734 (9th Cir. 28 2012); Anderson v. Warner,

(9th Cir. 2006). 1 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 2 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 3 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 4 2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego,

(9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 5 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 6 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 7 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 8 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs.,

, 1183 9 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy,

(9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 10 causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others 11 which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 12 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson,

). This standard of 13 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 14 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,

(9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 15 of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2008). 16 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 17 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal,

. In other words, there must be an actual 18 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 19 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,

658, 691, 695 (1978). 21 B. Rule 8 Requirement of Short and Plain Statement 22 As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 23 8(a). 24 As set forth above, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a 25 complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 26 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint is not required to include 27 detailed factual allegations, it must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 28 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly, 550 1 U.S. at 570). It must also contain “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 2 and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca,

, 3 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant 4 personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal,

. 5 Plaintiff’s complaint provides almost no information regarding what happened to 6 Plaintiff or what Defendants did that Plaintiff believes violated his constitutional rights. 7 Plaintiff alleges that he received some sort of surgery or medication, that he did not fully 8 consent to some of the treatment, and he did not understand the side effects of certain 9 medication. However, Plaintiff does not describe what happened or who did what in order to 10 understand if Plaintiff has any claims. Plaintiff does not describe what surgery or treatment he 11 received, why he received it, what role Defendant Powers did, or what happened as a result of 12 the surgery. He does not describe what he was told or not told about the medical procedure, or 13 why he believes it was done without his consent. 14 C. Sovereign Immunity 15 Plaintiff names as a defendant the Department of State Hospitals–Coalinga. However, 16 the Eleventh Amendment erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against the state. 17 Wolfson v. Brammer,

, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2010). While “[t]he Eleventh 18 Amendment does not bar suits against a state official for prospective relief,” Wolfson,

at 1065–66, suits against the state or its agencies are barred absolutely, regardless of the form 20 of relief sought, see, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 104

,

(1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical Examiners,

, 740 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, because Coalinga State Hospital is part of the 23 California Department of State Hospitals, which is a state agency, it is also entitled to Eleventh 24 Amendment immunity from suit. 25 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER 26 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute 27 this case and to comply with the Court’s screening order. 28 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the 1 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 2 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring 3 disposition of cases on their merits. 4 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

(9th Cir. 1992)). 6 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’” 7

(quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier,

(9th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, 8 this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 9 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to 10 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the 11 public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to 12 routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .”

Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Court’s 13 screening order. This failure to respond is delaying the case and interfering with docket 14 management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 15 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in 16 and of itself to warrant dismissal.”

(citing Yourish,

). However, “delay 17 inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become 18 stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this 19 case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 20 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to 21 prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of 22 possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory 23 lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce 24 resources. Considering Plaintiff’s confinement, it appears that monetary sanctions are of little 25 use. And given the stage of these proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not 26 available. 27 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this factor weighs 28 against dismissal. Id. 1 After weighing the factors, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate. 2 V. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is respectfully 4 || directed to assign a District Judge to this case. 5 And IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 6 1. This action be dismissed for failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, and 7 failure to comply with a court order; and 8 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States district judge 10 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title

(b)(1). Within fourteen 11 || (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 12 || written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 13 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 14 || objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 15 || Wheeler,

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan,

, 1394 16 || (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. '9 | Dated: _ August 9, 2023 [sf ey — 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28