1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, Case No. 22-cv-06471-JSC

7 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 8 v. UNRUH ACT CLAIM

9 DAVID CAI, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 8 Defendants. 10

11 12 Richard Sepulveda brings this disability access action regarding architectural barriers at the 13 Lake Merritt Wash House which is owned and operated by Defendants David Cai, Diana Owyang, 14 Cassandra Owyang, T. Owyang, and C.S. Yee. Defendants request the Court decline to exercise 15 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim,

, and dismiss the 16 claim without prejudice to renewal in state court. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 14.) After carefully considering 17 the parties’ briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concludes oral argument is 18 unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the January 19, 2022 hearing, and GRANTS the 19 motion to dismiss. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff avers he visited the Lake Merritt Wash House on three occasions in 2022 for 22 laundry services. (Complaint at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff, who uses a walker for mobility, alleges 23 “Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s access to the Business” and he “is still deterred from 24 returning due to these conditions.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12.) Plaintiff identified architectural barriers 25 including inaccessible restrooms and parking spaces which he “himself encountered…and/or is 26 informed and believes that the architectural barriers [] violate the California Code of Regulations 27 and the Americans with Disabilities Act Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (“ADAAG”) 1 Plaintiff brought this suit seeking both an injunction under the ADA and damages under the Unruh 2 Act. 3 DISCUSSION 4 Where a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the court may exercise 5 supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 6 such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.”

1367(a). Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim “in 8 exceptional circumstances,” when “there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28

(c)(4). A district court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 10 over state law “is informed by the Gibbs values ‘of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” 11 Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting United Mine 12 Workers v. Gibbs,

(1966)). 13 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim based on the Ninth Circuit’s 14 decision in Arroyo v. Rosas,

(9th Cir. 2021). In Arroyo, the Ninth Circuit addressed 15 a district court’s ability, under

(c)(4), to deny the exercise of supplemental 16 jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims brought by “high-frequency litigants.” The panel found 17 California’s heightened pleading standards for Unruh Act claims brought by such plaintiffs — 18 enacted to “balance [the State’s] objectives of allowing monetary relief, avoiding undue burdens 19 on businesses, and realigning undesirable incentives for plaintiffs,” Arroyo,

— 20 created an “exceptional circumstance” for the purpose of supplemental jurisdiction. Because 21 “retention of supplemental jurisdiction over ADA-based Unruh Act claims threatens to 22 substantially thwart California’s carefully crafted reforms in this area and to deprive the state 23 courts of their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms,” the Ninth Circuit 24 concluded the circumstances presented “are ‘exceptional’ in any meaningful sense of the term,” 25 and failing to recognize them as such “would improperly ignore the very substantial threat to 26 federal-state comity that this overall situation presents.”

. 27 District courts follow a two-step inquiry to determine whether to exercise supplemental 1 must: (1) sufficiently explain ‘why the circumstances of the case are exceptional’ under § 2 1367(c)(4); and (2) show that ‘the balance of the Gibbs values provides compelling reasons for 3 declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.’” Vo v. Choi,

, 1171 (9th Cir. 2022) 4 (quoting Arroyo,

). 5 This Court concludes, as have numerous courts before it, the circumstances here are 6 exceptional. See e.g., Johnson v. Kuma Kuma LLC, No. 22-CV-01386-CRB,

, 7 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2022); Johnson v. Constantia Cap. Ltd., No. 22-CV-01456-RS,

3925290, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2022); Garcia v. Maciel, No. 21-CV-03743-JCS,

395316, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2022). Plaintiff concedes he is a “high-frequency litigant,” who 10 filed 30 lawsuits in this District in 2022, and who would otherwise be subject to California’s 11 heightened procedural requirements had this suit been filed in state court. (Complaint at ¶ 70; 12 Dkt. No. 11 at 7.) And, the state law claims animate this lawsuit as he seeks $12,000 in Unruh 13 Act statutory damages, damages he cannot recover under the ADA. So, this case has the same 14 exceptional circumstances Arroyo identified. Further, in contrast to Arroyo, where the district 15 court had already granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on their ADA claim, this case is in its 16 early stages and the merits have not yet been litigated. 17 Plaintiff’s argument that the same level of injunctive relief is not available under state law 18 as is available under federal law is unpersuasive. Defendants’ motion does not target Plaintiff’s 19 request for injunctive relief under the ADA; he may continue to pursue his ADA claim in federal 20 court if he wishes. Regardless, Plaintiff has not shown there is any difference in the injunctive 21 relief available under state and federal law in this case. Plaintiff’s lament that is it unfair to send 22 him to state court because the claim for “statutory damages …can be relatively easily dealt with in 23 the context of a default judgment motion in this case in federal court” does not make sense. (Dkt. 24 No. 11 at 11.) All Defendants have appeared and evidenced their intent to litigate this matter; 25 Plaintiff cannot bring a default judgment motion. Finally, Plaintiff’s contentions that he is not as 26 litigious as other high-frequency litigants, he lives near the businesses he sues, and his conduct 27 shows he is genuinely concerned with improving access for the disabled, are not relevant to the 1 these [] assertions are in fact true would itself run afoul of the Gibbs values—especially comity.” 2 Vo, 49 F 4th at 1173. “If the federal district court is required to adjudicate these threshold matters, 3 it will “deprive the state courts of their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those 4 || reforms.” Jd. at 1174 (quoting Arroyo,

). 5 After balancing the Gibbs values in this case, the Court finds exceptional circumstances 6 || exist to justify declining supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim. Vo,

|) at 1173-74. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim is 10 GRANTED without prejudice to refiling of that claim in state court. The parties shall continue 11 with the General Order 56 procedures. 12 This Order disposes of Docket No. 8.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: January 9, 2023

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLE 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28