Marshall v. Saul
Marshall v. Saul
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 C.J.M., Case No. 19-cv-06862-SVK
8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 10 KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
42 U.S.C. § 406(B) 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 27
12 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 22, 2019, seeking review of a decision by the 14 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff’s application for disability 15 benefits. Dkt. 1. All Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 11, 12. 16 After Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 21), the Parties stipulated to remand the 17 case to the agency for further proceedings, and the Court granted the stipulation. Dkt. 22, 23. The 18 Court subsequently granted the Parties’ stipulation to award Plaintiff $7,000.00 in attorney’s fees 19 under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (“EAJA”). Dkt. 25, 26. 20 Now before the Court is a motion for payment of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff’s counsel 21 pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. 27 (the “Motion”). The Motion states that on remand, 22 Plaintiff was awarded $67,033.00 in past-due Social Security disability benefits in a Notice of 23 Award dated August 28, 2021. Dkt. 27-1 ¶ 5 and Ex. C. Plaintiff had a retainer agreement with 24 the Law Office of Judith S. Leland, which provided for payment of a contingent attorney fee of 25 25% of past due benefits if approved by the Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. 27-1 ¶ 4 26 and Ex. B (the “Retainer Agreement”). Judith Leland passed away on January 19, 2021, several 27 months before Plaintiff received the award of past-due benefits. Dkt. 27-1 ¶ 1. The present 1 state that they are trustees of the estate of Judith Leland and are also licensed to practice law in 2 California.
Id.¶ 2 and Ex. B (Certificate of Trustee). The Trustees signed the Retainer 3 Agreement along with Judith Leland. Dkt. 27-1 at Ex. B. One of the Trustees, Moselle C. Leland, 4 also appeared along with Judith Leland on behalf of Plaintiff in this Court prior to remand. See, 5 e.g., Dkt. 1, 21. 6 The Motion seeks “$15,758.25, which amount constitutes 25% of the past-due benefits less 7 fees already paid through the Social Security Administration.” Dkt. 27-1 ¶ 14. The Trustees state 8 that if these fees are awarded, the previously-awarded EAJA fees of $7,000 will be refunded to 9 Plaintiff.
Id. ¶ 6. The Motion is supported by a declaration of the Trustees that sets forth Judith 10 Leland’s experience and qualifications and includes the billing records for this case.
Id.¶¶ 7-11 11 and Exs. E and F. 12 The Commissioner has not filed an opposition or other response to the Motion. The Trustees served a copy of the Motion on Plaintiff (Dkt. 28), who also has not filed an opposition 13 or other response. 14 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 15 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act provides that “[w]henever a court renders a 17 judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by 18 an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 19 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 20 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.”
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award 21 such a fee even if the award of past-due benefits resulted not from the court’s judgment, but from 22 remand proceedings ordered by the court. McCullough v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-00625-BLF, 2018
23 WL 6002324, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018). The attorney’s fees awarded under Section 406(b) 24 are paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded, not by the Government.
Id.25 Attorneys specializing in Social Security cases “routinely enter into contingent-fee 26 agreements specifying that the fee will be 25% of any past-due benefits recovered, thus providing 27 1
2018 WL 6002324, at *1 (citing Crawford v. Astrue,
586 F.3d 1142, 1147(9th Cir. 2009)). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 As required by
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), the Court must determine whether the amount of 4 requested fees is reasonable. The Motion seeks fees in the amount of $15,758.25, whereas in its 5 notice of award, the Social Security Administration represented that it was withholding a slightly 6 higher amount of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits—$16,758.25—which represented 25 percent of 7 past-due benefits, “in case we need to pay your representative.” Dkt. 27-1 at Ex. C. The Motion 8 states that the amount sought represents “25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits less fees already paid 9 through the Social Security Administration.” Dkt. 27-1 ¶ 14. Accordingly, the Court will limit 10 the award of attorney’s fees to the amount stated in the Motion—$15,758.25. 11 Nothing in the record suggests that the performance of Plaintiff’s attorneys was 12 substandard or that they delayed proceedings in an effort to increase the amount of fees awarded. 13 After Plaintiff’s attorneys filed a summary judgment motion on her behalf, the Commissioner 14 stipulated to remand the case. On remand, Plaintiff won a substantial award of past-due benefits. 15 Thus, Plaintiff’s attorneys obtained a favorable result for Plaintiff in an efficient manner. 16 The Trustees state in their declaration that Plaintiff’s attorneys spent a total of 42.78 hours 17 representing Plaintiff before the Social Security Administration but “[t]hose hours are not included 18 in the itemized time in [the billing records attached to the declaration], which is limited to time 19 spent representing Plaintiff in federal court.” Dkt. 27-1 ¶ 11 and Ex. F. The records of attorney 20 time for the district court action reflect 40.35 hours billed by Judith Leland. Dkt. 27-1 at Ex. E. 21 The fee award of $15,758.25 for 40.35 hours of Judith Leland’s time on this district court 22 case translates to an hourly rate of approximately $391. Courts in this circuit have awarded fees 23 under Section 406(b) with effective hourly rates as high as $1,000.00 to $1,500.00. See 24 McCullough,
2018 WL 6002324, at *2 and cases cited therein. In this context, the fees sought in 25 the Motion are reasonable. 26 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the request for $15,758.25 under section 406(b) is 27 reasonable under the facts of this case. Plaintiff’s attorneys are required to reimburse Plaintiff for IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 2 (1) The motion for attorney’s fees under
42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is GRANTED in 3 the amount of $15,758.25; and 4 (2) Plaintiffs attorneys must refund Plaintiff the sum of $7,000.00 previously 5 awarded as EAJA fees. 6 SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: March 1, 2023 8 ° Season vf 10 SUSAN VAN KEULEN United States Magistrate Judge
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Reference
- Status
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