1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 RICHARD LEET, 10 Case No. 22-cv-08957-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 DISMISS COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 16 Plaintiff Richard Leet avers that the County of Santa Cruz (“the County”) either destroyed 17 or rehomed his service dog, Mocha, following his arrest on December 21, 2021. This suit raises 18 four claims for relief, including violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, declaratory 19 relief, administrative and/or alternate mandamus, and negligence. The County moves to dismiss 20 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that, contrary to Plaintiff’s 21 assertion, it is not doing business as the Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter. Pursuant to the Joint 22 Powers Agreement (“JPA”) signed by the County of Santa Cruz, the City of Santa Cruz, the City 23 of Scotts Valley, the City of Watsonville, and the City of Capitola, the Animal Shelter is a 24 separate public entity that “has the authority to incur debts, liabilities, or obligations,” and to “sue 25 and be sued in its own name.” Dkt. 12, Ex. A (“JPA”), at 6.1 The JPA further specifies that “[t]he 26 debts, liabilities, and obligations of the Authority shall not constitute debts, liabilities, and/or 27 1 obligations of any of the Parties.” Id. at 2. 2 This motion is suitable for disposition without oral argument, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and the 3 motion is granted. In light of the allocation of liability described in the JPA, which may properly 4 be considered in reviewing this motion, see United States v. Ritchie,

(9th Cir. 5 2003), the County does not appear to be a proper defendant in this action. Plaintiff argues that the 6 County is jointly and severally liable for the Animal Shelter’s conduct; while this is the default 7 rule, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6508.1, the JPA clearly specifies that liability attaches to the Animal 8 Shelter itself, not to the signatory parties. Plaintiff counters that the JPA includes as parties only 9 the cities listed above — not the County. It is true that the County is not named as a party in the 10 one sentence Plaintiff cites. See JPA, at 1 (“This Agreement, effective June 18, 2002, by and 11 among the Cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz and Scotts Valley (hereinafter referred to as ‘Parties’) is 12 entered into . . .”). However, the conclusion that the County is truly not a party to the JPA is 13 contradicted by both the immediately preceding sentence, see id. (“In order to establish, operate 14 and maintain an animal control and care authority for the Cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz and Scotts 15 Valley, and the County of Santa Cruz the Parties agree to the following[.]”), and by the County 16 representative’s signature at the end of the document, see id. at 12. At best, this renders Plaintiff’s 17 assertion that the County is liable because it is “doing business as County of Santa Cruz Animal 18 Control” implausible. Dkt. 1 ¶ 2. Thus, since all of the averred wrongful conduct flows from this 19 flawed characterization of the County and its relationship to the Animal Shelter, the complaint 20 does not plausibly state a claim. 21 The motion is therefore granted, with leave to amend for Plaintiff to name the Santa Cruz 22 County Animal Shelter as a defendant in this action and/or to describe how the County is liable for 23 the harm averred notwithstanding the JPA. Any amended pleading must be filed within 21 days of 24 the date of this order.2 25

26 2 Plaintiff’s counsel is advised to review this District’s Civil Local Rules before submitting future filings. First, Local Rule 7-3(a) states that an opposition “must be filed and served not more than 27 14 days after the motion was filed” — not 15 days, as Plaintiff’s counsel states without support. Plaintiff is directed to adhere to this timeline in the future. Second, Local Rule 7-3(d) expressly 1 2 || ITISSO ORDERED. 3 4 Dated: March 7, 2023 5 RICHARD SEEBORG 6 Chief United States District Judge 4 8 9 10 11 12

15 16

= 17

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 □□ forbids the filing of Plaintiff’s “sur-reply,” see Dkt. 16, “without prior Court approval.” Civ. L.R. 27 7-3(d). Plaintiff’s counsel neither sought nor received such approval. 28 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS CASE No. 22-cv-08957-RS