1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LOUREECE STONE CLARK, Case No. 22-cv-02962-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; GRANTING 9 v. REQUEST FOR COPY

10 MARK H. GOLDSTEIN, et al., 11 Defendants. (ECF No. 17)

12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a detainee at Napa State Hospital (“NSH”) who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under

against four 15 Marin County officials --- James H. Kim, Robert Doyle, Jaime Scardina, and Shelly Marie Scott -- 16 - and one other individual, Mark Goldstein. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, 17 and Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 20.) For the reasons explained below, the 18 case is DISMISSED because the amended complaint does not state a claim that is capable of being 19 judicially heard and decided. 20 BACKGROUND The following allegations are set forth in the amended complaint. 21 Plaintiff alleges that on April 2, 2022, Defendant Goldstein and his wife Kristin Goldstein1 22 alerted Defendants Doyle, the Marin County Coroner, and Scardina, the Marin County Sheriff, 23 about what appears2 to have been a dispute with Plaintiff about ownership of real property. (ECF 24 No. 20 at 2-3.) Plaintiff attaches a restraining order that Goldstein obtained against him in Marin 25 County Superior Court. (Id. at 3, 6-11.) Defendant Kim, the Executive Officer of the Marin 26 27 1 County Superior Court, file-stamped and dated the order. (Id. at 3, 6-11.) Plaintiff claims that the 2 restraining order is “false” and was filed because he is Black. (Id. at 3.) He further alleges that 3 the District Attorney of Marin County (who is not a defendant) discriminated against him based on 4 his race and invaded his privacy by filing false criminal charges against him and providing his 5 personal information to Goldstein. (Id. at 3-4.) He alleges that a “racially biased” Marin County 6 Superior Court Judge (who is also not a defendant) found him mentally incompetent and sent him 7 to Napa State Hospital, which caused that the restraining order to be “dismissed” and the criminal 8 charges stayed. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Scott, the Marin County Recorder, 9 recorded a deed of trust for Goldstein to property that Goldstein does not own. (Id.) Lastly, 10 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Kim, Doyle, Scardina, and Scott engaged in a “collective campaign” 11 to give Goldstein “addresses, license plates of disabled [sic], and private information . . . that lead 12 to” his son being shot and killed. (Id. at 4-5.) 13 STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 15 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 17 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 18 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

19 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by litigants unrepresented by an attorney must be liberally construed. 20 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,

(9th Cir. 1990). 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 22 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 23 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 24 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (citations omitted). Although to 25 state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 26 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 27 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 1

(2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to 2 state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”

. 3 DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff cannot sue Defendant Mark Goldstein in federal court under Section 1983 for 5 violating his constitutional rights because Goldstein is not a state actor. To state a claim under 42

, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or 7 laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a 8 person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988). A private 9 individual does not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983, and therefore there is 10 no right to be free from the infliction of constitutional deprivations by private individuals. See 11 Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich,

(9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff makes no allegation 12 that Goldstein was a government official or employee, or that he acted on behalf of any 13 government entity. According to the allegations in the amended complaint, Goldstein is an 14 individual in Marin County with whom Plaintiff had a dispute about real property and who filed a 15 restraining order against him. Accordingly, the claims against Goldstein must be dismissed. 16 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Kim filed “false claims” in the restraining order against 17 him, which is attached to the amended complaint. (ECF No. 20 at 6-11.) The order from the 18 Marin County Superior Court directs Plaintiff to stay away from Goldstein and three family 19 members for a month; the order was signed by a judge (who is not a defendant) and filed-stamped 20 by Kim. (Id. at 6-11.) Plaintiff does not explain what is “false” about this order, nor is any 21 falsehood apparent from the order itself. Moreover, the Court is aware of no authority – and 22 Plaintiff cites none – holding the federal constitution or any federal law requires state court 23 employees to ensure orders contain no falsehoods before filing them, or that such employees are 24 liable for any falsehoods contained in such orders. Consequently, this claim does not state 25 grounds for relief under Section 1983. 26 Plaintiff also claims Kim’s filing the restraining order “shows racial bias.” (Id. at 3.) The 27 Equal Protection Clause prohibits government officials from treating similarly situated people 1 state a claim of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must 2 allege that the defendant state actor acted at least in part because of plaintiff's race. See Furnace v. 3 Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts about 4 Kim’s conduct that, if proven true, would plausibly establish racial discrimination. Plaintiff does 5 not allege Kim treated similarly situated people of other races differently. In addition, Plaintiff 6 does not allege any facts indicating Kim filed the court order, which was on the court’s form and 7 signed by a judge of the superior court, for any reason other than this was part of his job as the 8 court’s Executive Officer. Plaintiff’s allegation that Kim filed it based upon his race is 9 conclusory. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirement of Twombley to allege non- 10 conclusory facts that plausibly show that that Kim filed the restraining order because of Plaintiff’s 11 race, the racial discrimination claim against Kim cannot proceed. 12 Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Kim, Scardina, Doyle, and Scott provided information 13 that led to his son’s being shot also may not proceed because it is not supported by any non- 14 conclusory allegations of fact. Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42

if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately 16 caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & 17 Rehabilitation,

(9th Cir. 2013). In the order dismissing Plaintiff’s prior 18 effort to bring this claim in his original complaint, the Court explained:

19 Parents and children possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in companionship and society with each other. Smith v. City 20 of Fontana,

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina,

(9th Cir. 21 1999) (en banc). … The problem with this claim is that Plaintiff does not describe how each of these Defendants were involved in his 22 son’s death. A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of Section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, 23 participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of 24 which the plaintiff complains. Leer v. Murphy,

(9th Cir. 1988). At the pleading stage, "[a] plaintiff must allege 25 facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights." Barren v.

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not alleged what Defendants Goldstein, Kim, and Scott did or failed to 27 do that caused his son to die, nor has he alleged how his son died. an amended complaint in which he alleges specific facts showing 1 what each of these Defendants did or failed to do, and how those actions or omissions caused his son to die. 2 (ECF No. 15.) The only actions or omissions by Defendants alleged in the amended complaint are 3 they “collectively” provided “addresses, license plates of disabled [sic], and private information,” 4 and he asserts that this led to his son being shot. (ECF No. 20 at 4-5.) Plaintiff does not allege the 5 actions each Defendant took, to whom Defendants provided this information, or who shot his son. 6 As a result, there are not alleged facts plausibly showing that each named Defendant actually and 7 proximately caused his son to be shot. Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege "enough facts to state 8 a claim for relief that is plausible on its face" against Defendants relating to his constitutional right 9 to the companionship of his son. Twombly,

. 10 As noted, Plaintiff also claims Scott improperly recorded a deed of trust for Goldstein for 11 property that Goldstein does not own. The Court is not aware of any authority, and Plaintiff does 12 not cite any, providing that, without more, a county recorder recording a deed of trust on real 13 property for a person who does not own that property violates federal law. Consequently, this 14 claim must be dismissed. 15 Plaintiff was previously granted leave to amend, but his amended complaint either repeats 16 claims from the original complaint with the same deficiencies, for example, the claim for loss of 17 companionship, or adds new claims that, like the claims in his original complaint, are not capable 18 of being judicially heard and decided. Consequently, granting further leave to amend would be 19 futile. See Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer,

(9th Cir. 1994). 20 // 21 // 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons explained above, the case is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim that is 3 capable of being judicially heard and decided. Plaintiff's request (ECF No. 19) for a copy of his 4 || joint case management statement and attachments (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED. The Clerk shall 5 send Plaintiff a copy of docket number 17 including all attachments. 6 The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. This order resolves docket number 17. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: April 5, 2023 9 10 ne JAGQQUELINE SCOTT CORL United States District Judge 12

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