1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARIE ENCAR ARNOLD, Case No. 22-cv-09188-DMR

8 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT 9 v. PURSUANT TO

(E)

10 UNITED STATES MARSHAL SERVICE, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 Pro se Plaintiff Marie Encar Arnold filed a complaint and an application for leave to 13 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on December 30, 2022. [Docket Nos. 1, 3.] On January 3, 14 2023, the Honorable Laurel Beeler granted Plaintiff’s IFP application and noted that it would 15 determine separately whether the complaint should be served. [Docket No. 7.] Judge Beeler 16 subsequently referred this case to the undersigned to determine whether it is related to Arnold v. 17 United States Marshals Service, Case No. 21-cv-09738 DMR (the “2021 case”). [Docket No. 15.] 18 On February 15, 2023, the court determined that this case is related to the 2021 case and it was 19 reassigned to the undersigned.1 [Docket No. 16.] 20 Having reviewed the complaint, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim on 21 which relief may be granted pursuant to

(e). Plaintiff must file a first amended 22

23 1 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the 2021 case on June 6, 2022, after she filed an amended complaint in accordance with a court order granting her IFP application and screening the 24 complaint. The instant case is one of three that Plaintiff filed against the United States Marshal 25 Service (USMS) and related defendants in 2022. Plaintiff filed Arnold v. United States Marshals Service, Case No. 22-cv-7470 SK on November 25, 2022 and voluntarily dismissed the complaint 26 after the court denied her IFP application. Plaintiff filed the instant case and Arnold v. United States Marshals Service, Case No. 22-cv-9186 on December 30, 2022. The court found that Case 27 No. 22-cv-9186 is related to the 2021 case and it was reassigned to the undersigned in January 1 complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified in this screening order by May 10, 2023. 2 I. DISCUSSION 3 As noted, Judge Beeler found that Plaintiff satisfied the economic eligibility requirement 4 of

(a) and granted the application to proceed IFP. 5 The court’s grant of Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, however, does not mean that 6 she may continue to prosecute the complaint. A court is under a continuing duty to dismiss a case 7 filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous 8 or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief 9 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the 10 court dismisses a case pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same 11 complaint by paying the filing fee. This is because the court’s section 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is 12 not on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Denton v. 13 Hernandez,

(1992). 14 To make the determination under

(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether there is 15 an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin 16 v. Murphy,

(9th Cir. 1984). Courts have the authority to dismiss 17 complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 18

. A court can also dismiss a complaint where it is based solely on conclusory 19 statements, naked assertions without any factual basis, or allegations that are not plausible on their 20 face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); see also Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam). 22 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than 23 those drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), a complaint, or 24 portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to set forth “enough facts 25 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

, 26 554 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] district court should not dismiss a pro se 27 complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 1 2012) (quotations omitted). 2 Here, Plaintiff sues the United States Marshal Service, United States Marshal Agent 3 George Nichols, and United States Marshal Agent Russell Slope. The 53-page complaint is very 4 difficult to understand. It first describes an April 22, 2021 incident. Plaintiff alleges that on that 5 date, she filed pleadings at the Clerk’s Office at the United States District Court in San Francisco, 6 California. After leaving the Clerk’s Office, she traveled to the cafeteria in the same building 7 where Defendant Nichols approached her table and talked to her. Compl. 4. She alleges that 8 Defendant Nichols “stat[ed] out loud” “criminal defense,” which was “reckless imposing as 9 Attorney breaching information to criminal defense during duties,” and that Defendants violated 10 her right to privacy and various other rights. However, the complaint does not contain an 11 explanation of how these rights were violated by Nichols’s alleged statement or provide any other 12 details about his alleged conduct. Id. at 4-5. She also alleges that Defendant Slope “committed 13 neglected adverse Plaintiff’s complaint in his scope of practice” and references a prohibition on 14 “United States Marshals or Deputy Marshal” practicing law but does not explain the allegations or 15 significance of any such prohibition. Id. at 5. The remaining allegations in the complaint are 16 extremely vague, and include allegations of tampering with evidence, “being spied on her emails 17 on and harassed”; cyberhacking; breach of her phone, emails, computer, and medical records; and 18 “looting” of Plaintiff’s cars and property. The complaint also includes allegations about Plaintiff 19 “getting jabs with electronic harassment microchips” to induce heart attacks and abuse of 20 Plaintiff’s daughters via “high voltage shocks” and needles. Plaintiff asks that the court award her 21 $10 billion and “protection for the U.S. Government or job position Federal Protective Services.” 22 [Docket No. 1-2 at ECF p. 12-13.] 23 The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are too vague and insubstantial to satisfy Federal 24 Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a plaintiff must make “a short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Further, a “complaint must 26 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 27 face.” Iqbal,

. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 1 standard as it does not contain “sufficient factual matter” to state any claims against Defendants. 2 || Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed. 3 || IL | CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons above, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 5

(e). Plaintiff must file a first amended complaint addressing the deficiencies 6 || identified in this order by May 10, 2023. If she does not file a timely first amended complaint, the 7 court will recommend that her action be dismissed. Plaintiff's motions to extend the deadline to 8 serve Defendants with the summons and complaint and to reschedule the initial Case Management 9 Conference (Docket Nos. 20, 21) are denied as moot. The initial Case Management Conference 10 || will be reset by the court if appropriate after the court resolves its review of the case under 28 11 US.C. § 1915(e). 12 The court refers Plaintiff to the section “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s website,

13 located at https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, as well as the Court’s Legal Help Centers for 14 || unrepresented parties. Parties may schedule an appointment by calling 415-782-8982 or emailing □ 15 || [email protected]. AES DISTR 2 aby OC ey 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. G& DIV Simms $0 ORDERS 1g || Dated: April 12, 2023 SIV: . D> < | Aetptee Ss 20 oN sii Nee Fite Judge/& □□ 21 LS LY . 22 VO STRICS 23 24 25 26 27 28