Flowers v. Maxfield
Flowers v. Maxfield
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 FERDINAND FLOWERS, 11 Case No. 22-cv-04935 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL 13 v.
14 15 CAPT. APRIL MAXFIELD, et al., Defendants. 16
17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently confined at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), 19 filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983against a 20 correctional officer and two mental health care providers at SQSP. Dkt. No. 1. The Court 21 dismissed the complaint with leave to amend to attempt to state sufficient facts to state a 22 cognizable claim. Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiff was also advised of a potential joinder issue.
Id.23 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint which names only one Defendant, Capt. April 24 Maxfield. Dkt. No. 12. 25 26 DISCUSSION 27 A. Standard of Review 1 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 2 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 3 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 4 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 5 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 6 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699(9th Cir. 1988). 7 To state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 8 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 9 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 10 color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48(1988). 11 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 12 Plaintiff claims that he takes medication for his mental health depression, which he 13 asserts is a serious illness. Dkt. No. 12 at 3. He claims the CDCR prisons do not have 14 adequate treatment for sex offenders and programs. Id. at 2. He claims that after he spoke 15 with Defendant Captain April Maxfield, she agreed to check on the process to obtain 16 programs at the state hospitals and respond to him via mail; however, Capt. Maxfield never 17 responded. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also claims that Capt. Maxfield violated his rights by 18 opening his personal confidential mail addressed to CDCR executives. Id. He claims 19 Capt. Maxfield called his mother on March 10, 2022, without permission and discussed the 20 information that was in his confidential mail. Id. 21 The Court notes that Plaintiff added his mother, Ms. Paulette Magee, as an 22 additional plaintiff to this action. Id. at 2. However, it does not appear that Ms. Magee has 23 standing in this matter which involves only allegations of wrongdoing against her son. 24 Even so, the Court need not address this issue as the underlying claims are again 25 deficiently plead and this action will be dismissed as discussed below. 26 1. Mental Health Needs 1 Plaintiff of the legal standard to state a cognizable claim regarding treatment for his mental 2 health needs under the Eighth Amendment. Dkt. No. 10 at 4, citing Helling v. McKinney, 3
509 U.S. 25, 31(1993). A mentally ill prisoner may establish unconstitutional treatment 4 on behalf of prison officials by showing that officials have been deliberately indifferent to 5 his serious medical needs. See Doty v. County of Lassen,
37 F.3d 540, 546(9th Cir. 1994); 6 see also Hoptowit v. Ray,
682 F.2d 1237, 1253(9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care 7 requirements analyzed as part of general health care requirements). A serious medical 8 need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 9 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Doty,
37 F.3d at 546; see, e.g., 10 Capps v. Atiyeh,
559 F. Supp. 894, 916(D. Ore. 1983) (inmate suffers 8th Amendment 11 pain whenever he must endure untreated serious mental illness for any appreciable length 12 of time). Under the Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference requires a showing that 13 prison officials possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
14 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Specifically, it must be shown both that officials were subjectively 15 aware of the serious medical need and failed to adequately respond to that need. Conn, 16 591 F.3d at 1096. Additionally, the officials’ actions must be the cause of the injury 17 suffered as a result of their deliberate indifference. Id. at 1098. 18 Plaintiff’s allegations in the amended complaint are again insufficient to state an 19 Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Maxfield. Even assuming that Plaintiff’s 20 condition constitutes a serious medical need, the allegations against Defendant Maxfield 21 do not indicate that she possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., that she was 22 subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical need and failed to adequately respond to 23 that need. See Conn, 591 F.3d at 1096. He merely complained to her about the lack of 24 adequate programs at SQSP; there is no indication that he made Defendant aware of his 25 serious medical needs and that he was receiving no treatment. Lastly, there is no 26 allegation that Defendant Maxfield’s failure to respond to him resulted in further 1 Plaintiff was already afforded one opportunity to amend, and the Court finds no 2 good cause to grant him another opportunity where the amended complaint contains the 3 same deficiencies as the original. Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc.,
363 F.3d 821, 830(9th Cir. 4 2003) (district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend particularly broad where plaintiff 5 has previously filed an amended complaint); Ferdik v. Bonzelet,
963 F.2d 1258, 1261(9th 6 Cir. 1992). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 7 2. Mail 8 With respect to Defendant Maxfield’s reading of Plaintiff’s mail, the Court found 9 that it was unclear whether the original complaint stated a cognizable claim. Dkt. No. 10 10 at 6-7. 11 Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. 12 Paff,
52 F.3d 264, 265(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 407 13 (1989)). A prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a 14 prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related to 15 legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89(1987). But 16 neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has determined whether prison officials 17 are entitled to read inmates’ outgoing and incoming non-legal mail. Accordingly, Plaintiff 18 was directed that in preparing an amended complaint, he must state sufficient facts 19 showing that Defendant Maxfield had no legitimate penological interest in reading his mail 20 and impinging on his First Amendment rights. Dkt. No. 10 at 7. The amended complaint 21 fails to do so as Plaintiff has provided no additional facts from those alleged in the original 22 complaint to correct this deficiency. 23 Plaintiff was already afforded one opportunity to amend, and the Court finds no 24 good cause to grant him another opportunity where the amended complaint contains the 25 same deficiencies as the original. Wagh,
363 F.3d at 830; Ferdik,
963 F.2d at 1261. 26 Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice 3 || for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. s |] Dated: __May 31, 2023 feliinfhacnan BETH LABSON FREEMAN 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] 12
2B 15
16 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 rder of Dismissal 25 PRO-SE\BLE'CR.22\04935Flowers. dism 26 27
Reference
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