Smith v. Henry
Smith v. Henry
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 San Francisco Division 12 MARK SMITH, Case No. 22-cv-03093-LB
13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 14 v. DISMISS
15 ARLENE HENRY, et al., Re: ECF No. 39 16 Defendants. 17 18 The plaintiff, who represents himself and is proceeding in forma pauperis, sued Arlene Henry, 19 Jones Memorial Homes Inc., “Rosie,” and Alton Management Corp., alleging that the defendants 20 are preventing him from accessing his mail. Liberally construed, the operative complaint claims 21 violations of federal statutes regarding the mail, breach of contract, violation of the HUD Model 22 Lease for Subsidized Housing, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and violation of the Fair 23 Housing Act.1 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and lack 24 of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).2 The 25 court previously granted the motion on the ground that the federal claims were not plausibly 26 27 1 Second Am. Compl. (SAC) – ECF No. 22. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 1 pleaded and the court thus did not have supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims. The court 2 also ordered supplemental briefing on the status of the parties’ then-ongoing eviction proceeding 3 in state court.3 4 The defendants then filed their supplemental brief. They point out that the parties entered into 5 a settlement agreement under which the plaintiff was to vacate the premises by September 29, 6 2023, and that on October 19, 2023, the San Francisco County Superior Court issued a judgment 7 of possession against the plaintiff. The defendants thus contend that the plaintiff cannot plausibly 8 plead any federal claim and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his claims.4 The plaintiff’s 9 responsive brief was due on November 2, 2023, but was not filed. 10 First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because this case was commenced before 11 the state-court proceedings ended and concerns alleged injuries that weren’t caused by the state- 12 court judgment. Dang v. Oakland Police Dep’t, No. C 13-4155 PJH,
2014 WL 793613, at *7 13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) (the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars ‘cases brought by state-court loser 14 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 15 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review of those judgments’”) (quoting Exxon 16 Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284(2005)). 17 Second, the issue then is whether the plaintiff’s remaining federal claims (for violations of a 18 HUD lease and the Fair Housing Act) are viable. 19 As a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s claim for an injunction is rendered 20 moot by the state-court judgment of possession. Harris v. Itzhaki,
183 F.3d 1043, 1050(9th Cir. 21 1999). 22 As for any claims for monetary damages, the HUD-lease claim is not viable for the reasons 23 explained in the prior order. (The plaintiff did not submit any lease as ordered by that order, and in 24 25 26 27 3 Order – ECF No. 66. The court incorporates that order by this reference. 4 Defs.’ Suppl. Br. – ECF No. 67; Goins Decl. – ECF No. 67-2 at 2–3 (¶¶ 5–9); Settlement Agreement, 1 any case the defendants submitted the only purportedly relevant lease, which was the plaintiff’s 2 mother’s and never gave the plaintiff a right to possession.)5 3 The court also dismisses the Fair Housing Act claim with prejudice. For one thing, the plaintiff 4 did not oppose the defendants’ supplemental brief on the issue. Also, as the defendants contend, 5 the plaintiff never engaged in protected activity (as required for a Fair Housing Act retaliation 6 claim) because he was a squatter rather than a tenant. 7
42 U.S.C. § 3617is the provision of the Fair Housing Act that makes it unlawful to “coerce, 8 intimidate, threaten, or interfere with” any person exercising their rights under the Act. Courts 9 recognize retaliation claims under § 3617. Walker v. City of Lakewood,
272 F.3d 1114, 1128(9th 10 Cir. 2001). To establish a claim of Fair Housing Act retaliation, a plaintiff must show (among other 11 things) that he engaged in a protected activity.
Id.The “protected activities” covered by § 3617 12 consist of exercising or enjoying, or aiding others in the exercise or enjoyment of, rights protected 13 by other provisions of the Fair Housing Act. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc.,
356 F.3d 1058, 1063(9th 14 Cir. 2004). Here, the issue is whether the defendants interfered with “the provision of services or 15 facilities in connection” with the “rental of a dwelling.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 16 The plaintiff was not a tenant or prospective tenant, but a squatter. Thus, the defendants could 17 not have violated § 3604(b): there was no “rental of a dwelling” or contemplation of one. There was 18 only a denial of a mailbox to a squatter. Lowe v. UHF Magnolia Trace LP, No. 3:14-CV-1460-M- 19 BK,
2015 WL 9690254, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2015) (the plaintiff was not “discriminated 20 against in the privileges of rental because she was not a tenant”), R. & R. adopted, No. 3:14-CV- 21 1460-M-BK,
2016 WL 126393(N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016). The court thus dismisses the operative 22 complaint with prejudice. 23 24 25 26
27 5 Order – ECF No. 66 at 7; Lease, Ex. 1 to Goins Decl. – ECF No. 39-1 at 3–15. The court considers the lease under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Knievel v. ESPN,
393 F.3d 1068, 1076(9th ] This disposes of ECF No. 39. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: November 3, 2023 LAE 4 LAUREL BEELER 5 United States Magistrate Judges 6 7 8 9 10 1]
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Reference
- Status
- Unknown