1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN MICHAEL SHEA, Case No.: 23-CV-596 JLS (MSB) Booking No. 22740067, 12 ORDER (1) DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. v. § 1915A(b); AND (2) DENYING 14 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA LACADARIOOS, et al., 15 PAUPERIS AS MOOT Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 John Michael Shea (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the George Bailey Detention 21 Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 22 complaint pursuant to

(“Compl.,” ECF No. 1.). Plaintiff has also filed a 23 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

(a) (“IFP 24 Mot.,” ECF No. 2.). 25 I. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 26 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, obligates the 27 Court to review complaints filed by anyone “incarcerated or detained in any facility who 28 is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 1 terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 2 soon as practicable after docketing” and regardless of whether the prisoner prepays filing 3 fees or moves to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The Court is required to dismiss 4 those complaints, or any portion of them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state 5 a claim upon which relief may be granted” or which “seek monetary relief from a defendant 6 who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2); Resnick v. Hayes,

, 446–47 7 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 The standard for determining whether a prisoner has failed to state a claim upon 9 which relief can be granted under § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 10 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” 11 Wilhelm v. Rotman,

(9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a 12 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 13 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell 14 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not 15 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,

. “Determining whether a 17 complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 18 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

19 Title

“creates a private right of action against individuals who, 20 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 21 Devereaux v. Abbey,

(9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 22 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 23 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor,

, 393–94 (1989) (quotation marks 24 omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a 25 right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 26 was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 27

(9th Cir. 2012). 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege the deprivation of, or even identify, a 2 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Specifically, Plaintiff has 3 not set forth any coherent factual allegation against any named Defendant. Moreover, the 4 Complaint presents no factual allegations which plausibly allege that the Defendants were 5 acting under color of state law. See Iqbal,

(“Threadbare recitals of the 6 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to 7 state a § 1983 claim). 8 In addition, “a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal 9 conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. . . . [The] 10 term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal 11 conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams,

, 12 325 (1989). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, courts need not accept 13 the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations” to 14 determine whether they are “‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional.’” Denton v. 15 Hernandez,

, 32–33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28). 16 There are no discernible allegations in the Complaint and the Court finds that the 17 Complaint as a whole rises to the “level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton, 18

. As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint requires dismissal without leave to amend 19 as frivolous. See Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting 20 that if a claim is classified as frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the underlying 21 action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Conclusion and Order 2 Good cause appearing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint as frivolous 3 for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without leave to amend, 4 DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as moot; and CERTIFIES that 5 |}an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and therefore could not be taken in good 6 || faith pursuant to

(a)(3). The Clerk shall close the file. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: April 12, 2023 . tt f Le 9 on. Janis L. Sammartino 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28