1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JENKINS NEFERTITI, Case No.: 23-CV-1150 JLS (JLB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) DENYING WITHOUT 13 v. PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 14 SECURITIES EXCHANGE DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT COMMISSONS “ACT”, 15 PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS; Defendant. (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT 16 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S 17 COMPLAINT; AND (3) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 18 PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR 19 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

20 (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3) 21 22 23 24 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Jenkins Nefertiti’s Complaint (“Compl.,” 25 ECF No. 1), Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 26 (“IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2), and Request for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 3). Having 27 carefully considered Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff’s motions, and the applicable law, the 28 Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s IFP Application, DISMISSES 1 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint, and DENIES WITHOUT 2 PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel. 3 IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 4 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 5 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $402.1 6

(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee 7 only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(a)(1). 9 Section 1915(a)(1) provides: 10 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or 11 proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, 12 by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay 13 such fees or give security therefor. 14

15 As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant IFP 16 status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See Cal. 17 Men’s Colony v. Rowland,

(9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically 18 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 19 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds 20 by

(1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where 21 it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 22 Escobedo v. Applebees,

(9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont 23 de Nemours & Co.,

(1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to 24 obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States,

(9th Cir. 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. See 27

(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 28 Dec. 1, 2020)). The additional $52 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 1 1960). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 2 particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo,

. 3 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP Application is either inaccurate or evidence of Plaintiff’s vast 4 wealth. Plaintiff claims to have received an average monthly income of $33,250 over the 5 past twelve months, and Plaintiff expects to receive more than $6.75 billion next month. 6 IFP Appl. at 1. Plaintiff also claims to have $5 million in cash. Id. at 2. On the other hand, 7 Plaintiff purportedly has more than $500 million in expenses each month, including $8,000 8 for laundry and dry-cleaning, $50,000 for transportation, and $500 million in “Inport- 9 Export Port-Fees.” Id. at 4–5. 10 If the Court were to accept the validity of such figures, Plaintiff clearly would have 11 the ability to “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 12 F.3d at 1234. But such figures are not credible. It is simply beyond belief that any 13 individual pays $500 million in import-export fees every month, or that one’s income could 14 increase by more than 20 million percent month-to-month. Consequently, the Court is 15 unable, based on the information provided, to determine whether Plaintiff would be unable 16 to afford the necessities of life should they be required to pay the filing fee. 17 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s IFP Application. Said denial, however, is 18 WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff refiling an IFP motion that cures the above-noted 19 deficiencies. 20 MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 21 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. 22 Servs.,

(1981). Nonetheless, under

(e)(1), district courts 23 have some limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil 24 litigant. Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). This 25 discretion may be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell 26 v. Brewer,

(9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances 27 requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an 28 evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the 1 legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789

, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The decision to request counsel pursuant to § 1915(e)(1) 3 first requires that the plaintiff has been determined eligible to proceed pursuant to the IFP 4 statute due to his indigency.” Moses v. U.S. Dist. Ct. S. Dist. of Cal., Civil No. 15-CV- 5 01793 BEN (RBB),

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (citing Agyeman, 6 390 F.3d at 1103). 7 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the standards for appointment of 8 counsel under

(e)(1). First, “[a]s Plaintiff has not been afforded IFP 9 status, [Plaintiff] is not entitled to appointment of counsel.” Moses,

, 10 at *2. Second, while the Court harbors concerns about Plaintiff’s ability to articulate their 11 claims, the likelihood of Plaintiff’s success on the merits remains unclear in light of the 12 Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Supra p. 3. Accordingly, at this early stage of 13 litigation, the Court finds that neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional 14 circumstances warrant appointment of counsel. The Court DENIES WITHOUT 15 PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Request for the Appointment of Counsel. Should circumstances 16 change, Plaintiff may be permitted to file another motion for appointment of counsel. 17 CONCLUSION 18 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 19 1. Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is DENIED WITHOUT 20 PREJUDICE; 21 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 22 PREJUDICE for failure to prepay the filing fee mandated by

(a); 23 3. Plaintiff is GRANTED an additional thirty (30) days from the date on which 24 this Order is electronically docketed to either (1) pay the entire $402 statutory and 25 administrative filing fee, or (2) file a new IFP Application alleging that they are unable to 26 pay the requisite fee. Should Plaintiff fail to either pay the filing fee or file a new IFP 27 Motion, the Court will convert this dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint into dismissal of 28 this civil action without prejudice; and 1 4. Plaintiff's Request for the Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 3) is DENIED 2 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: July 17, 2023 psi L. Lo meeaitie- 5 on. Janis L. Sammartino 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28