1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARASH SHAFIHIE Case No.: 3:23-cv-1218-JO-WVG CDCR No. BU-5269 12 ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT vs. PURSUANT TO 14

(e)(2)(B)(iii) WELLS FARGO BANK; FEDERAL 15 BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;

16 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; CHRISTOPHER WRAY; MERRICK 17 GARLAND; LINDA LOPEZ, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff Arash Shafihie is a state prisoner incarcerated at California Health Care 24 Facility (“CHCD”) in Stockton, California. Proceeding pro se, he filed a civil rights action 25 pursuant to

, along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 26 (“IFP”). Dkt. 1, 2. District Judge Lopez, the judge initially assigned to this matter, granted 27 Plaintiff’s IFP motion. Dkt. 4. Upon screening his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 28 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, she dismissed his claims for failing to state a claim but granted 1 leave to amend. Id. In response, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that 2 no longer named any of the original defendants or realleged any of his original claims. 3 Dkt. 5. Instead, his pleading names Judge Lopez as the sole Defendant and seeks monetary 4 damages against her for dismissing his complaint and thereby violating his constitutional 5 rights.1 Id. at 7. District Judge Lopez recused herself from this action and the matter was 6 reassigned to the undersigned on August 14, 2023. Dkt. 6. 7 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court screens his First Amended Complaint. 8 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that he fails to state a legally valid claim 9 and dismisses his case with prejudice. 10 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO

(e) AND § 1915A(b) 11 A. Legal Standards 12 Pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), the Court must screen a 13 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, 14 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 15 Lopez v. Smith,

, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 16

(9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has 17 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the 18 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 19 Watison v. Carter,

(9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a 20 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible 21 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22

23 1 Plaintiff claims against Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 24 Department of Justice, Christopher Wray, and Merrick Garland are deemed waived. In the July 24, 2023 25 Order granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, he was specifically instructed that his amended complaint “must be complete by itself without reference to his original Complaint” and 26 “[d]efendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint will be considered waived.” ECF No. 4 at 10 citing S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 27 Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend 28 1 While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 2 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a 3 claim.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully- 4 harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss 5 v. U.S. Secret Service,

(9th Cir. 2009). 6 B. Judicial Immunity 7 Plaintiff alleges that Judge Lopez violated his due process and equal protection rights 8 “by dismissing [his] action against Wells Fargo Bank prejudicially.... ” FAC at 3. His 9 claims based on orders she issued in his case fail because Judge Lopez enjoys judicial 10 immunity for those official actions. 11 Judges enjoy immunity for “judicial acts” performed in the course of their work. 12 Lund v. Cowan,

, 971 (9th Cir. 2021), cert denied,

(2022). As 13 such, they cannot be subject to liability for action taken within the jurisdiction of their 14 courts. Schucker v. Rockwood,

(9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 15 Otherwise, “[s]ubjecting judges to liability for the grievances of litigants would destroy 16 that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” Lund, 17 5 F.4th at 971 (citation omitted). To determine whether an act is judicial, a court must 18 consider whether “ ‘(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred 19 in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before 20 the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation 21 with the judge in his or her official capacity.’ ” Id. (quoting Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260

, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001)). 23 Here, Judge Lopez is protected by judicial immunity because Plaintiff challenges 24 conduct that constitutes a “judicial act.” Plaintiff’s complaint centers on Judge Lopez’s 25 order dismissing his case after screening his complaint. As the judge presiding over this 26 matter, she performed a “normal judicial function”— one that is required by law—when 27 she issued a screening order determining whether Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a 28 claim.

(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) (requiring courts to screen a prisoner’s 1 IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to 2 state a claim, or seeks damages from immune defendants). Based on the above, the Court 3 concludes that judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for damages against Judge 4 Lopez. 5 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 6 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC in its entirety because its 7 claims are barred by judicial immunity. Because further amendment cannot cure the legal 8 bar of judicial immunity, the Court dismisses this case without leave to amend. See 9 Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of 10 amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. 11 Calderon,

(9th Cir. 1995)). 12 The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: October 3, 2023 15 16 17 Hon. Jinsook Ohta United States District Judge 18

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