1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAWN-D OMAR W., Case No.: 23-CV-511 JLS (BLM)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS MOOT 14 ALEJANDO MAYORKAS (DHS) and AND PURSUANT TO CIVIL MARK PARAMO (ICE), 15 LOCAL RULE 83.11(b) Respondents. 16 (ECF No. 1) 17

18

19 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Shawn-D Omar W.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 20 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to

(“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). For the 21 reasons that follow, the Court DISMISSES the Petition as moot and pursuant to Civil Local 22 Rule 83.11(b). 23 BACKGROUND 24 The Court incorporates the recitation of this action’s factual and procedural 25 background provided in its July 19, 2023 Order (the “Order,” ECF No. 9 at 1–3) and thus 26 sets forth below only those facts relevant to the present Order. 27 Petitioner filed the instant Petition on March 20, 2023. See generally Pet. According 28 to Petitioner, he is subject to a Final Order of Removal dated September 7, 2022. 1

(c), 11(b). The Petition contends that Petitioner has “been detained a year with no 2 result.”

. The sole relief sought is an order releasing him from Immigration and 3 Custom Enforcement (“ICE”) custody.

4 On April 27, 2023, this Court ordered Respondents Alejandro Mayorkas and Mark 5 Paramo (collectively, “Respondents”) to show cause why the Petition should not be 6 granted. See ECF No. 6. Respondents timely filed their Return in Opposition to Petition 7 on May 24, 2023. See ECF No. 8 (“Opp’n”). Petitioner did not file a Traverse within the 8 time allotted. See generally Docket. 9 Per Respondents, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) moved to reopen 10 Petitioner’s removal proceedings to allow him to reapply for asylum on February 8, 2023. 11 ECF No. 8-1 (“Opp’n Exs.”) at 11. The presiding immigration judge (“IJ”) initially denied 12 the motion because Petitioner opposed reopening the proceedings. See

. Petitioner 13 subsequently changed his mind, see Opp’n at 2, and on April 17, 2023, DHS filed a second 14 motion to reopen, see Opp’n Exs. at 16. The IJ granted the subsequent motion to reopen 15 on April 28, 2023,

, and Petitioner was released from ICE custody on a $1,500 16 bond,

. Respondents thus requested that the Petition be dismissed or denied as 17 moot. 18 The Court then ordered Petitioner to show cause why the Petition should not be 19 dismissed as moot, as it was unclear what further relief the Court could provide in the 20 instant habeas proceeding. See Order at 4. The Order required Petitioner to respond on or 21 before August 21, 2023, but Petitioner did not do so. See generally Docket. On 22 July 31, 2023, the copy of the Order mailed to Petitioner was returned by the United States 23 Postal Service as undeliverable. See ECF No. 10. 24 DISMISSAL DUE TO MOOTNESS 25 I. Legal Standard 26 As explained in the Order, mootness is a legal framework best described as “the 27 doctrine of standing set in a time frame.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t. Servs. 28 (TOC), Inc.,

(2000) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 1

(1997)); see also Abdala v. INS,

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing 2 Friends of the Earth,

). “At any stage of the proceeding a case becomes 3 moot when ‘it no longer present[s] a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the 4 Constitution.’” Abdala,

(quoting Spencer v. Kemna,

, 7 5 (1998)). While deportation or custodial release does not per se moot a habeas petition, the 6 petitioner must demonstrate that some “collateral consequence” remains that can be 7 redressed by the petition. See

at 1063–64 (citation omitted). In circumstances where 8 claims are fully resolved by custodial release, however, a petitioner’s claims are rendered 9 moot because the court can no longer provide the requested relief. See id. at 1065. 10 Accordingly, a petition that challenges only the legality of an allegedly extended or 11 indefinite detention is mooted by the petitioner’s release from custody. See id. 12 II. Analysis 13 The sole relief requested by the Petition is Petitioner’s release from ICE custody 14 after having “been detained a year.” Pet. ¶ 13. Petitioner’s administrative appeal was 15 withdrawn on December 2, 2022, and Petitioner was released from ICE custody shortly 16 after the IJ reopened his immigration proceedings on April 28, 2023. See id. ¶¶ 2, 10(c), 17 11(c)(3); Opp’n Exs. at 9. 18 As Petitioner appears to have been detained for less than the six-month 19 presumptively reasonable removal period after his order of removal became final,1 and 20 because Petitioner has received the release he initially sought via his Petition, it remains 21 22 23 1 As explained in the Court’s prior Order, an alien ordered removed shall be detained by the Attorney General during the “removal period,” which may last up to 90 days, while the government negotiates with 24 foreign governments to secure the alien’s removal. See

(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). “The removal 25 period begins . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final,”

§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), and “[t]he decision of the Immigration Judge becomes final upon waiver of appeal,”

. 26 Certain aliens, including those “who ha[ve] been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period.” 27

(a)(6). The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that such continued detention cannot be indefinite, and that six months constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” See 28 1 unclear to the Court what further relief could be provided in the instant habeas proceeding. 2 See Ying Jiao Ye v. Nordheim, No. 218CV10072 JVS (KES),

, at *3 3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2019) (“[H]abeas petitions that raise claims that are fully resolved by 4 release from custody are rendered moot upon the petitioner’s release.”); see also Abdala, 5 488 F.3d at 1064–65 (citing favorably cases in which petitioners’ release from detention 6 mooted challenges to the legality of extended detention periods). 7 The Court previously informed Petitioner that the Court was inclined to dismiss the 8 instant Petition as moot unless Petitioner could demonstrate otherwise. Order at 4. The 9 Court also made clear that, should “Petitioner fail[] to file a response on or before 10 August 21, 2023, the Court [would] issue a final Order dismissing the Petition as moot” 11 and close this case.

at 4–5. As Petitioner failed to respond to the Order, see generally 12 Docket, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action as moot. 13 DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO CIVIL LOCAL RULE 83.11(b) 14 I. Legal Standard 15 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[f]ailure to follow a district court’s local rules is a 16 proper ground for dismissal.” Ghazali v. Moran,

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing 17 United States v. Warren,

(9th Cir. 1979)). In determining whether to 18 dismiss an action on such grounds, the Court must weigh several factors, including “(1) the 19 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 20 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 21 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”

(quoting 22 Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit has 23 recognized that the first and fourth factors cut in opposite directions. See Yourish v. Cal. 24 Amplifier,

, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the first factor always weighs in 25 favor of dismissal); Hernandez v. City of El Monte,

(9th Cir. 1998) 26 (explaining that the fourth factor always weighs against dismissal). Therefore, the Court 27 considers the substance of factors two, three, and five. 28 / / / 1 II. Analysis 2 This District’s Civil Local Rules require any party appearing pro se to “keep the 3 Court and opposing parties advised as to [their] current address. If mail directed to a pro 4 se plaintiff by the Clerk at the plaintiff’s last designated address is returned by the Post 5 Office, and if such plaintiff fails to notify the Court and opposing parties within 60 days 6 thereafter of the plaintiff’s current address, the Court may dismiss the action without 7 prejudice for failure to prosecute.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 83.11(b). 8 Here, Petitioner has failed to comply with Local Rule 83.11(b). A copy of the Order 9 mailed to Petitioner was returned as undeliverable on July 31, 2023. See ECF No. 10. 10 Under Local Rule 83.11(b), Petitioner was required to provide an updated mailing address 11 to the Court by September 29, 2023. To date, Petitioner has yet to do so. See generally 12 Docket. 13 Further, the Ghazali factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Regarding the first factor, 14 the Court must manage its docket to ensure the efficient provision of justice. Petitioner has 15 had more than 60 days in which to provide the Court with his current address and yet has 16 not done so. The Court cannot continue waiting for Petitioner to take action, and the case 17 cannot move forward when Petitioner fails to prosecute it. As to the third factor, the Court 18 finds no risk of prejudice to Defendants if it dismisses this action. In fact, Defendants have 19 requested the dismissal. Finally, considering the fifth factor, the Court notes that where 20 Petitioner fails to oppose dismissal, it is “unnecessary for the Court to consider less drastic 21 alternatives.” Rodriguez v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 2:16-CV-5962-ODW(SK), 2016

, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 CONCLUSION 2 In light of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this 3 || action as moot and for Petitioner’s failure to notify the Court of his current mailing address. 4 || As this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of the Court SHALL CLOSE the 5 || file. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: October 10, 2023 . tt 8 jen Janis L. Sammartino 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28