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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

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11 ESTATE OF GREGORY MARTINEZ et Case № 2:23-cv-05586-ODW (JPRx) al., 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 14 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 15 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., MOTION TO DISMISS [38]

Defendants. 16

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiffs Judy Martinez, individually and as successor-in-interest to Decedent 20 Gregory Martinez, along with Gregory Martinez, Jr., Timothy Martinez, Mathew 21 Martinez, and Aurora England (collectively “Plaintiffs”), bring this wrongful death 22 action against Defendants County of Los Angeles (“County”), the Los Angeles 23 Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”), Sheriff Alejandro Villanueva, in his individual and 24 official capacities, Deputy Corona, Deputy Baltodano, Ramirez-Hernandez,1 and 25 Lieutenant Reedy, in their individual capacities (collectively “Defendants”). (See First 26 Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 34.) The County, LASD, Villanueva, and Baltodano 27 (“Moving Defendants”) move to dismiss certain of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 1 Plaintiffs do not allege Ramirez-Hernandez’s first name, title, or position. 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or 2 “Mot.”), ECF No. 38.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART 3 AND DENIES IN PART the Motion.2 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 All factual references derive from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint or 6 attached exhibits, unless otherwise noted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

, 678 7 (2009) (stating that well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes 8 of a motion to dismiss). 9 A. Factual Background 10 On June 3, 2022, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Gregory Martinez (“Martinez”) 11 was arrested and taken into custody by LASD deputies. (FAC ¶ 20.) Immediately 12 upon arrest, Martinez and his wife, Judy Martinez, informed the LASD deputies that 13 Martinez suffered from serious medical issues, including Alzheimer’s and dementia. 14 (Id.) Martinez and Judy Martinez also advised the arresting LASD deputies that 15 Martinez required his medications. (Id.) The LASD deputies stated that they would 16 take Martinez to the hospital. (Id.) They did not. (Id.) The LASD deputies also did 17 not give Martinez his medications. (Id.) 18 Martinez was then booked into Men’s Central Jail (“MCJ”) and underwent a 19 preliminary medical and psychological screening. (Id. ¶ 21.) Despite his reported 20 medical issues, he was placed in the general population without any designation to 21 alert staff of his medical conditions and the need for additional monitoring or specialty 22 care. (Id. ¶ 22.) Staff at MCJ also did not give Martinez his medications. (Id.) 23 The following morning, June 4, 2022, Martinez’s daughter called LASD and 24 MCJ staff informed her that Martinez had a “difficult night” and they were not 25 equipped to handle him. (Id. ¶ 23.) Accordingly, LASD transferred Martinez to Twin 26 Towers Correctional Facility (“Twin Towers”) that same day. (Id. ¶ 24.) Upon intake 27

28 2 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 at Twin Towers, Ramirez-Hernandez conducted an initial assessment of Martinez, 2 during which Martinez was unable to answer questions due to his dementia. (Id. 3 ¶ 25.) Ramirez-Hernandez concluded that Martinez suffered from dementia and 4 assigned him to a single cell in the Inmate Reception Center (“IRC”). (Id.) 5 On June 5, 2022, Judy Martinez spoke with Twin Towers staff and asked if 6 Martinez was receiving his medications. (Id. ¶ 26.) Staff did not respond. (Id.) Judy 7 Martinez again informed staff that Martinez had Alzheimer’s and dementia and “could 8 not comprehend what was occurring.” (Id.) 9 The next day, on June 6, 2022, Martinez was housed in the IRC cell around 10 3:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 28.) For the next several hours, Deputies Corona and Baltodano 11 conducted Title 15 Safety Checks3 on Martinez, logging him as “laying on 12 floor/breathing.” (Id. ¶¶ 28–29.) At 7:27 p.m., Corona and Baltodano found Martinez 13 unresponsive. (Id.) This prompted Twin Towers staff to address Martinez’s medical 14 needs. (Id.) Martinez had a perilously low blood glucose level of 17.4 (Id. ¶ 30.) 15 Staff administered glucose to Martinez before paramedics arrived to transfer him to 16 LAC-USC Medical Center. (Id.) 17 On June 7, 2022, Judy Martinez received a call from the treating hospital 18 informing her that Martinez was “very sick” and not expected to “live more than a few 19 hours.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Martinez died later that day. (Id.) 20 B. Procedural History 21 Based on the above facts, Plaintiffs filed this wrongful death action against 22 Defendants. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The Court partially granted Defendants’ initial 23 motion to dismiss, and on May 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended 24 Complaint. (Order Mot. Dismiss Compl. (“Prior Order”), ECF No. 33; FAC.) 25 3 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 1027.5 (2024). 26 4 Plaintiffs allege the “base level” for blood glucose is 300, (FAC ¶ 30), but according to the World Health Organization, a normal fasting blood sugar level is between 70–100 mg/dL, World Health 27 Organization, Mean Fasting Blood Glucose, https://www.who.int/data/gho/indicator-metadata- 28 registry/imr-details/2380 (last visited July 29, 2024). Regardless, a blood glucose level of 17 is perilously low. 1 In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs contend Defendants deliberately 2 failed to address Martinez’s health issues and needs, despite receiving information 3 regarding his medical conditions and observing clear signs of his distress. (FAC 4 ¶¶ 27, 34.) Plaintiffs further allege that the County’s “patterns and practices of not 5 conducting proper and timely Title 15 welfare and safety checks” led to Twin Towers 6 staff’s oversight of Martinez’s medical emergency until it was too late. (Id. ¶ 34.) 7 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs assert five causes of action against specific 8 Defendants pursuant to

and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 9 United States Constitution: (1) failure to protect from harm; (2) failure to provide 10 medical care; (3) deprivation of the right to familial relationship with decedent; 11 (4) municipal policies, customs, and practices causing constitutional violations, 12 (Monell5 claim); and (5) supervisory liability—failure to train, supervise, and 13 discipline. (Id. ¶¶ 36–123.) Plaintiffs also assert four causes of action against specific 14 Defendants under California law: (6) negligence—wrongful death; (7) negligence— 15 medical malpractice; (8) violation of California Government Code section 845.6; and 16 (9) violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 (Bane Act claim). (Id. ¶¶ 124–54.) 17 Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first through seventh and ninth 18 causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Mot. 2–3.) The Motion is fully briefed. 19 (Opp’n, ECF No. 39;6 Reply, ECF No. 40.) 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 22 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 23 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

(9th Cir. 1988). To 24 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 25

26 5See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1978). 6 Plaintiffs filed their Opposition one day late. While the Court encourages all parties to meet the 27 mandated deadlines, Defendants do not appear to have been unduly prejudiced by the delay as they 28 were able to file a fulsome and timely Reply. The Court will therefore consider the case on the merits but will be less tolerant of any late filings moving forward. 1 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v.

F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 3 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 4

(2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual 5 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 6

(internal quotation marks omitted). 7 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 8 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 9 experience and common sense.”

. A court is generally limited to the 10 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 11 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 12

(9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept 13 conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. 14 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

(9th Cir. 2001). 15 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 16 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,

1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court 19 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 20 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 21 Co.,

, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly 22 denied . . . if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San 23 Francisco,

(9th Cir. 2011). 24 IV. DISCUSSION 25 Defendants argue the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s first through seventh and 26 ninth causes of action because Plaintiffs fail to state these claims. (Mot. 10.) The 27 Court considers the federal causes of action first before turning to the state law claims. 28 1 A. Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment7—Baltodano 2 Plaintiffs assert their first three § 1983 causes of action for violation of the 3 Fourteenth Amendment—failure to protect, failure to provide medical care, and 4 deprivation of familial relationship with decedent—against Defendants 5 Ramirez-Hernandez, Corona, Baltodano, and Reedy. (FAC ¶¶ 36–74.) However, 6 Ramirez-Hernandez, Corona, and Reedy have yet to be served or appear in the case. 7 As such, Moving Defendants seek to dismiss these causes of action only on behalf of 8 Baltodano. (Mot. 14–16.) The Court focuses its analysis accordingly on Baltodano’s 9 alleged conduct and finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently plead these three causes of action. 10 1. Failure to Protect 11 To state a valid claim for a failure-to-protect violation of the Fourteenth 12 Amendment, Plaintiffs must allege that Baltodano acted with “deliberate 13 indifference.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068 (citing Bell v. Wolfish,

, 535 14 (1979)). To plead deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs must allege four elements: 15 (1) “The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under 16 which the plaintiff was confined”; (2) “Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial 17 risk of suffering serious harm”; (3) “The defendant did not take reasonable available 18 measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances 19 would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences 20 of the defendant’s conduct obvious”; and (4) “By not taking such measures, the 21 defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Id. at 1071. 22 With regard to the first element, Defendants argue that Baltodano “had no 23 involvement or say in [Martinez’s] placement at IRC,” and therefore made no 24 intentional decision regarding Martinez’s conditions of confinement. (Mot. 14.) 25 Defendants are correct to the extent that Plaintiffs allege Ramirez-Hernandez, not 26

7 Plaintiffs bring the first three causes of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Martinez was a 27 pre-trial detainee. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 50.) See also Castro v. County of Los Angeles,

, 28 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that a pretrial detainee may sue for injuries suffered while in custody under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 1 Baltodano, assigned Martinez to IRC. (See FAC ¶ 25.) However, assignment to IRC 2 is just one aspect of Martinez’s confinement. Plaintiffs allege that Baltodano made 3 intentional decisions regarding other conditions of Martinez’s confinement. 4 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Baltodano “failed to conduct proper required 5 welfare and safety checks,” and marked Martinez as “laying on floor/breathing” for 6 several hours while his blood sugar plummeted. (Id. ¶¶ 28–30, 43.) Through these 7 allegations, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Baltodano’s method of conducting 8 welfare checks was an intentional act affecting the conditions under which Martinez 9 was confined. 10 Similarly, regarding the second and fourth Castro elements, the Court finds 11 Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the conditions (here, the method of conducting 12 the welfare checks) put Martinez at risk of suffering serious harm and ultimately 13 contributed to Martinez’s injury, because Martinez was harmed by the delayed 14 intervention. 15 The third element—whether Baltodano failed to take reasonably available 16 measures to lessen the risk, even though a reasonable officer would have been aware 17 of the risk—is a factual question. See Castro,

(stating the 18 determination as to whether a defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable 19 “turn[s] on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” (quoting Kingsley v. 20 Hendrickson,

(2015))). The “mere lack of due care by a state 21 official” does not amount to a constitutional violation; plaintiff must “prove more than 22 negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.”

23 Defendants argue that Baltodano did not know about Martinez’s medical issues, 24 implying that Baltodano’s conduct could not have risen to reckless disregard without 25 such knowledge. (See Mot. 17 (“There are no allegations that Deputy Baltodano 26 knew or should have known of [Martinez’s] alleged medical and mental health 27 needs.”).) The Court rejects this argument. At the pleading stage, it is sufficient that 28 Plaintiffs allege that Martinez’s family members informed LASD and Twin Towers 1 staff multiple times about Martinez’s medical issues and required medications. (See 2 FAC ¶¶ 20, 23, 26.) Whether Baltodano was ever personally aware of this 3 information is a factual question to be resolved at a later stage in the litigation. 4 Moreover, failure-to-protect claims rely on an objective standard for the deliberate 5 indifference determination, making Baltodano’s subjective awareness of Martinez’s 6 medical issues less relevant than Defendants imply. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1069– 7 1071 (holding that, in light of Kingsley, failure-to-protect claims brought under the 8 Fourteenth Amendment should be analyzed under an objective framework). 9 Furthermore, reading the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, 10 Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Baltodano failed to take reasonable measures to abate 11 the risk to Martinez’s health. For example, based on the facts alleged, it is plausible 12 that a reasonable officer should have done more than visually confirm Martinez was 13 breathing, for instance by attempting to speak to him or elicit a response, to ensure he 14 was conscious.8 It is also plausible that Martinez’s difficulty communicating upon 15 intake and his placement in a single IRC cell in light of his medical conditions would 16 put a reasonable officer on notice that simple visual safety checks were insufficient. 17 See, e.g., Sandoval v. County of San Diego,

, 682–83 (9th Cir. 2021) 18 (explaining that a jury may consider the assignment of a detainee to an individual cell 19 upon intake due to observed unusual behavior as an indication that the detainee 20 requires additional observation). Accepting the factual allegations in a light most 21 favorable to Plaintiffs at this pleading stage, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that 22 Baltodano’s actions amounted to reckless disregard, satisfying the third element. See 23 Carrier v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:17-cv-7231-MRW,

, at *4 24 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2019 (emphasizing that the third and fourth Castro factors—the 25 8 Indeed, LASD’s internal manual states a follow-up beyond visual confirmation of wellness can be 26 appropriate where an inmate’s condition is uncertain. See LASD Custody Division Manual, 4-11/030.00 Inmate Safety Checks, https://pars.lasd.org/Viewer/Manuals/14249/Content/12983# 27 (last visited Aug. 13, 2024) (stating “Personnel conducting inmate safety checks, shall look at the 28 inmates for signs of life (e.g. breathing, talking, movement, etc.). . . . Should there be any doubt regarding an inmate’s condition, staff shall attempt to elicit a response from the inmate.”). 1 officers’ knowledge and the reasonableness of their acts—are factual inquiries for the 2 jury). 3 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently plead their first cause of 4 action for failure-to-protect against Baltodano, and therefore DENIES the Motion as 5 to this claim. 6 2. Failure to Provide Medical Care 7 In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Baltodano failed to provide 8 Martinez with adequate medical care while he was in detention. (FAC ¶¶ 49–61.) 9 “Claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care ‘brought by pretrial 10 detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment’ must be 11 evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.” Gordon v. County of 12 Orange,

, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro,

). 13 Therefore, the four-part deliberate indifference test outlined above also applies to 14 Plaintiffs’ medical care claim. See Wilson v. Seiter,

(1991) 15 (“[There is] no significant distinction between claims alleging inadequate medical care 16 and those alleging inadequate ‘conditions of confinement.’ Indeed, the medical care a 17 prisoner receives is just as much a ‘condition’ of his confinement as . . . the protection 18 he is afforded against other inmates.”). 19 As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly support that Baltodano 20 acted with reckless disregard for Martinez’s health by conducting the welfare checks 21 unreasonably and thus delaying medical assistance. As the officer conducting the 22 mandatory safety checks, Baltodano was responsible for detecting and alerting others 23 to Martinez’s medical emergency. Both parties essentially agree that assessing 24 Martinez’s well-being was part of Baltodano’s role; they disagree over whether 25 Baltodano’s actions were timely and appropriate, or, in other words, reasonable. 26 However, as noted, the reasonableness of Baltodano’s actions is a factual question, 27 and not for the Court at this pleading stage. 28 1 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently plead their second cause of 2 action for failure to provide adequate medical care against Baltodano, and therefore 3 DENIES the Motion as to this claim. 4 3. Deprivation of a Familial Relationship 5 Plaintiffs allege in their third cause of action that Baltodano’s conduct deprived 6 Plaintiffs of Martinez’s familial relationship. (See FAC ¶¶ 62–74.) 7 Parents and children have a constitutional right to one another’s companionship, 8 and in cases concerning the medical care of pretrial detainees, courts apply a standard 9 of deliberate indifference. See Wilkinson v. Torres,

(9th Cir. 2010) 10 (“This circuit has recognized that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty 11 interest in the companionship and society of their children.”); Porter v. Osborn, 12

, 1137–1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that an official’s deliberate 13 indifference is sufficient to shock the conscience and can support a Fourteenth 14 Amendment claim); Castro,

(applying the deliberate indifference 15 standard to a prison official’s failure to provide medical care to a pretrial detainee). 16 Accordingly, to analyze Plaintiffs’ claim for deprivation of familial relationship, the 17 Court again applies the deliberate indifference test. 18 For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly support the 19 conclusion that Baltodano’s method of performing the safety checks amounted to 20 deliberate indifference. Moving Defendants argue that Baltodano’s behavior does not 21 “shock the conscious [sic].” (Mot. 17.) However, this a question of fact for resolution 22 at a later stage of litigation—by alleging deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs have 23 already done enough to support their claim at the pleading stage. See Porter,

(explaining that “deliberate indifference” is a “subset” of the type of behavior 25 that “shocks the conscience”). Furthermore, it is entirely plausible that leaving 26 Martinez lying on the ground in his cell for several hours while he loses consciousness 27 due to treatable medical conditions amounts to behavior that shocks the conscience. 28 See Est. of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter,

, 1106–09, 1 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded deliberate indifference 2 that shocks the conscience by alleging that prison officials failed address decedent’s 3 worsening Staphylococcus aureus infection until it was too late). 4 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently plead their third cause of 5 action for deprivation of a familial relationship against Baltodano, and therefore 6 DENIES the Motion as to this claim. 7 B. Municipal Liability, Monell Claim—County & LASD 8 In their fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that the County’s and LASD’s 9 policies, customs, and practices were the moving force behind the violations of 10 Martinez’s constitutional rights, and therefore the County and LASD are liable for 11 Martinez’s death pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services,

(1978). (FAC ¶¶ 75–109.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege 13 Monell liability. (Mot. 18–20.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a Monell 14 claim. 15 To state a claim for Monell liability, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional 16 injury that results from a custom or policy of the municipality or a failure to 17 adequately train the municipality’s police officers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; City 18 of Canton v. Harris,

(1989). Where Monell liability is based on a 19 policy or custom, a plaintiff must allege several threshold requirements: (1) “[the 20 plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [they were] deprived”; (2) “the 21 municipality had a policy”; (3) “this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 22 plaintiff’s constitutional right”; and (4) “the policy is the moving force behind the 23 constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina,

(9th Cir. 24 2011) (first alteration in original). “Failure to train may amount to a policy of 25 ‘deliberate indifference,’ if the need to train was obvious and the failure to do so made 26 a violation of constitutional rights likely.”

(quoting Canton,

). 27 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Monell claim with leave to amend 28 because Plaintiffs failed to “alleg[e] the specific constitutional right that Martinez 1 possessed and was subsequently deprived.” (Prior Order 7.) Now, in their First 2 Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs remedy this error by clarifying they are alleging a 3 violation of Martinez’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from harm and receive 4 adequate medical care. (FAC ¶ 79.) Accordingly, the Court begins with the second 5 requirement—that “the municipality had a policy.” Dougherty,

. 6 To establish that the municipality had a policy, a plaintiff must do more than 7 merely allege that a municipal defendant “maintained or permitted an official 8 policy . . . of knowingly permitting . . . the type of wrongs” a plaintiff alleges 9 elsewhere in the complaint. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare,

, 10 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather, to state a cause of action for Monell liability, a plaintiff 11 must: (1) “identify the challenged policy/custom”; (2) “explain how the policy/custom 12 is deficient”; (3) “explain how the policy/custom caused the plaintiff harm”; 13 (4) “reflect how the policy/custom amounted to deliberate indifference, i.e. show how 14 the deficiency involved was obvious and the constitutional injury was likely to occur.” 15 Young v. City of Visalia,

(E.D. Cal. 2010). 16 Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had multiple policies which contributed 17 to the deprivation of Martinez’s constitutional rights. (See FAC ¶¶ 76–78.) However, 18 Plaintiffs do not provide any factual support to show the existence of these policies, 19 making the allegations conclusory and speculative. For example, Plaintiffs allege that 20 Defendants have a policy to “allow and encourage” deputies to submit inaccurate 21 safety check reports, but Plaintiffs provide no examples of this behavior occurring or 22 explain why they believe the deputies are not thorough or sincere when conducting the 23 checks. (See generally id. ¶ 76.) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege there is a policy to “cover 24 up violations of constitutional rights” by ignoring incidents of such violations, but 25 Plaintiffs again provide no support for the existence of such a policy. (See generally 26 id.) Without factual support, these claims are conclusory and fall short of the pleading 27 requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). See Iqbal,

(“Where the well-pleaded 28 facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 1 complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 2 (cleaned up)). 3 Plaintiffs also allege that there is a widespread and longstanding custom of 4 denying inmates in Defendants’ facilities reasonable medical care, and that this 5 custom is another moving force behind Martinez’s constitutional violations. (Id. 6 ¶ 80.) To support this assertion, Plaintiffs provide substantial information about 7 individual deaths from medical complications in County jails between 2018 and 2023, 8 arguing that these deaths are similar to Martinez’s death and therefore establish the 9 County’s and LASD’s custom of denying medical care. (Id. ¶¶ 80–106.) However, 10 although Plaintiffs list numerous inmate deaths from medical complications, Plaintiffs 11 offer nothing to support that those deaths were all somehow caused by the alleged 12 custom of denying medical care. Indeed, the described inmates may have died from 13 medical complications even had Defendants followed the correct medical procedure 14 perfectly in every instance. 15 While Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to support an inference that at least some 16 of the named Defendants acted with reckless disregard for Martinez’s health and 17 rights, Plaintiffs do not provide sufficient facts to support an inference that the 18 deceased inmates identified in the First Amended Complaint were treated similarly to 19 Martinez, or that their deaths were somehow caused by a custom of denying inmates 20 in Defendants’ facilities reasonable medical care. 21 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead their fourth 22 cause of action for Monell liability against the County and LASD. As such, the Court 23 GRANTS the Motion as to this claim, with leave to amend. 24 C. Supervisory Liability—Sheriff Villanueva9 25 In their fifth cause of action for supervisory liability, Plaintiffs allege that 26 Villanueva is also liable for Martinez’s death due to his failure to train, supervise, and 27 9 Plaintiffs also bring this cause of action against Defendant Reedy. (See FAC ¶¶ 110–23.) Reedy 28 has not yet appeared, and Moving Defendants address the fifth cause of action only as to Villanueva. (See Mot. 21.) Thus, the Court considers the fifth cause of action only with respect to Villanueva. 1 discipline his subordinates. (FAC ¶¶ 110–23.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to 2 allege any facts supporting a causal connection between Villanueva and the violation 3 of Martinez’s constitutional rights. (Mot. 20–21.) The Court finds Plaintiffs fail to 4 state a claim against Villanueva for supervisory liability. 5 A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists 6 either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 7 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 8 constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black,

(9th Cir. 1989). For 9 instance, in Starr v. Baca,

, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2011), the court found 10 the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded supervisory liability against Los Angeles County 11 Sheriff Leroy Baca. There, the plaintiff alleged that prison officials violated his 12 constitutional rights by failing to protect him from an attack by a fellow inmate while 13 in custody, and that Baca had received reports documenting the systematic problems 14 with ongoing inmate attacks and acquiesced in his subordinate prison officials’ 15 unconstitutional conduct

at 1204–05. The Ninth Circuit determined that the 16 plaintiff’s detailed factual allegations specifically connected Baca’s deliberate 17 indifference to the danger posed from the ongoing attacks with the plaintiff’s harm. 18

at 1216–17. 19 In their fifth cause of action, Plaintiffs do not allege that Villanueva was 20 personally involved in denying Martinez protection and medical care, relying instead 21 on the causal connection prong to state this claim. (See FAC ¶¶ 110–23.) Plaintiffs 22 argue that Villanueva was aware of the pattern of “detainees dying in his jails” due to 23 his subordinates’ failure to provide medical care, and yet Villanueva failed to train, 24 supervise, or discipline his subordinates to prevent the ongoing constitutional 25 violations. (Opp’n 10–11.) Plaintiffs allege that, in 2022—the same year Martinez 26 died—forty-three other inmates died in Defendants’ jails.10 (FAC ¶ 116.) Plaintiffs 27 10 Plaintiffs break down the forty-three deaths into the following causes: eight overdoses; three 28 homicides; four suicides; twenty natural causes; one undetermined; two accidental; and five pending investigation. (FAC ¶ 116.) 1 argue that, as the head of LASD, this information would “have been revealed” to 2 Villanueva, meaning he should have been on notice and is therefore liable for his 3 failure to act and acquiescence in the constitutional violations. (See

¶¶ 116–19.) 4 However, this cause of action suffers from the same deficiency as Plaintiffs’ 5 fourth cause of action: Plaintiffs do not adequately support their contention that the 6 deaths of inmates at Defendants’ facilities were caused in some way by Defendants 7 violating those inmates’ constitutional rights. As Plaintiffs fail to establish that the 8 listed inmate deaths are the consequence of any constitutional violations, it follows 9 that they also cannot show that Villanueva knew or should have known the deaths 10 were caused by his subordinates’ unconstitutional actions. See Dubner v. City & 11 County of San Francisco,

(9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff 12 may establish supervisory liability through causal connection by establishing a 13 supervisor “knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the 14 supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 15 constitutional injury”); Cf. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1209–1212, 1216 (finding sufficient 16 allegations that Baca knew or should have known about danger posed from inmate 17 attacks in the county jails because he received several reports on the systemic 18 problem). 19 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead their fifth cause 20 of action for supervisory liability against Villanueva. As such, the Court GRANTS 21 the Motion as to this claim, with leave to amend. 22 D. Negligence 23 Plaintiffs assert two causes of action for negligence, the sixth cause of action 24 for wrongful death against all Defendants save Villanueva, and the seventh cause of 25 action for medical malpractice against Doe Defendants, the County, and LASD.11 26 (FAC ¶¶ 124–37.) 27

28 11 As above, the Court limits its analysis to only the Moving Defendants against whom Plaintiffs assert these causes of action: the County, LASD, and Baltodano. 1 1. Wrongful Death 2 To state a claim for negligent wrongful death, plaintiffs must plead “(1) a 3 wrongful act or neglect on the part of one or more persons that (2) causes (3) the death 4 of another person.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co.,

(1999) (cleaned up) 5 (quoting

). A “county ordinarily is not liable if the 6 employee’s act or omission would not give rise to a cause of action against that 7 employee[,] or if the employee is immune from liability.” Walker v. County of Los 8 Angeles,

(1987) (citations omitted). “Thus, the county’s 9 liability depends on the liability of its employee[s].” Id.; see Cal. Gov’t Code 10 § 815.2(a) (“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or 11 omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if 12 the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action against that 13 employee or his personal representative.”). 14 Here, Plaintiffs allege that Baltodano owed duties of reasonable and due care to 15 Plaintiffs and Martinez and breached those duties, causing harm including Martinez’s 16 death. (FAC ¶¶ 127–29; see also id. ¶¶ 25, 28–30 (alleging that Martinez had been 17 assessed as suffering from dementia, classified and specially placed in an IRC single 18 cell, and that Baltodano was charged with responsibly conducting required safety 19 checks, yet failed to note Martinez’s medical emergency for several hours).) Plaintiffs 20 further allege that the County and LASD are vicariously liable for Baltodano’s 21 breaches and the resulting harm. (See id. ¶ 130.) These allegations are sufficient at 22 this stage to support Plaintiffs’ assertion that Baltodano was negligent as to the care of 23 Martinez. Correspondingly, these allegations are also sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ 24 assertion that the County and LASD are vicarious liability under California 25 Government Code section 815.2. 26 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently plead their seventh cause 27 of action for negligence—wrongful death, and the Court DENIES the Motion as to 28 this claim. 1 2. Medical Malpractice 2 In Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for medical malpractice, they allege Doe 3 Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment as County medical staff 4 when they negligently failed to provide medical care to Martinez. (FAC ¶¶ 132–37.) 5 Plaintiffs contend the County and LASD are consequently vicariously liable for Doe 6 Defendants’ negligence. (FAC ¶¶ 132–37.) Defendants move to dismiss this claim 7 based solely on the argument that it is duplicative of Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim 8 and should fail for the same reasons. (Mot. 21–23.) The Court disagrees that the sixth 9 and seventh claim are “one and the same,” (id.), and finds that Plaintiffs fail to 10 sufficiently plead medical malpractice. 11 To state a claim for medical malpractice, the plaintiff must establish: (1) “the 12 duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of 13 his profession commonly possess and exercise”; (2) “a breach of that duty”; (3) “a 14 proximate causal connection”; and (4) “actual loss or damage resulting from the 15 professional’s negligence.” Borrayo v. Avery,

(2016) 16 (quoting Hanson v. Grode,

(1999)). As above, a 17 municipality’s liability depends on the liability of its employees. Walker,

App. 3d at 1397. 19 Here, Plaintiffs allege Doe Defendants were “C[ounty] medical staff assigned to 20 the C[ounty] Jails, including Twin Towers” and Martinez was under their treatment 21 and care. (FAC ¶ 133.) Plaintiffs assert the Does breached their duty of care to 22 Martinez and Plaintiffs by “negligently, carelessly and unskillfully” caring for 23 Martinez, and by failing to “classify,” “appropriately diagnose,” “detect, monitor, and 24 follow-up,” or provide additional physician care for Martinez. (Id.) Plaintiffs 25 conclude that the Does’ “acts and omissions” caused Martinez’s death, and the County 26 and LASD are vicariously liable for the Does’ negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 134, 137.) 27 As pleaded, the cause of action is impermissibly speculative and conclusory. 28 Preliminarily, it is unclear from Plaintiffs’ allegations whether Does treated, observed, 1 or even had contact with Martinez before Baltodano found him to be unresponsive. 2 (See generally FAC.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to elucidate 3 what the Does purportedly did or did not do that Plaintiffs contend was negligent. 4 Plaintiffs’ only factual allegation concerning medical treatment is that “[p]ersonnel 5 administered glucose” to Martinez before paramedics arrived to transport him to the 6 hospital. (Id. ¶ 30.) However, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs have named these 7 “personnel” as a Does in this action, and Plaintiffs do not allege that the 8 administration of glucose was inappropriate or unreasonable under the circumstances. 9 Although the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it does 10 not accept such conclusory and speculative allegations, and declines to make the 11 inferential leaps necessary here to complete Plaintiffs’ cause of action for medical 12 malpractice. See Iqbal,

(explaining “pleadings that . . . are no more 13 than conclusions[] are not entitled to the assumption of truth”). 14 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead their 15 seventh cause of action for negligence—medical malpractice against Doe Defendants, 16 the County, and LASD. As such, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to this claim, 17 with leave to amend. 18 E. Bane Act, California Civil Code Section 52.1 19 Lastly, Plaintiffs allege in their ninth cause of action that Defendants, except 20 Ramirez-Hernandez and Villanueva, violated California’s Bane Act because they were 21 aware of Martinez’s medical condition, and were threatening, coercive, and recklessly 22 disregarded Martinez’s constitutional rights concerning his medical needs. (FAC 23 ¶¶ 144–54.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts reflecting any threat, 24 intimidation, or coercion, and thus fail to sufficiently plead this claim. (Mot. 23–24.) 25 The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to plead a cause of action under the Bane Act. 26 The Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1, enacted to address hate 27 crimes, “civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that 28 are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats, 1 intimidation or coercion.’” Reese v. County of Sacramento,

, 1040 2 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Venegas v. County of Los Angeles,

App. 4th 1230, 1238 (2007)). To state a claim under the Bane Act, a plaintiff must 4 allege: (1) the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s 5 constitutional or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts; (2) the 6 plaintiff reasonably believed that if he exercised his constitutional right the defendant 7 would commit violence against him; (3) the defendant injured the plaintiff to prevent 8 him from exercising his constitutional right or to retaliate against the plaintiff for 9 having exercised his constitutional right; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the 10 defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. Austin B. 11 v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist.,

(2007) (quoting CACI 12 No. 3025). 13 Here, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Bane Act for the same reasons 14 discussed in the Prior Order: (1) Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that indicate 15 Defendants used threats or committed violent acts to interfere with Martinez’s Fourth 16 and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) Plaintiffs do not allege that Martinez 17 reasonably believed Defendants would commit violence against him if he exercised 18 his constitutional rights, and (3) Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants injured 19 Martinez to prevent him from exercising his constitutional rights. (See generally 20 FAC; Prior Order 13–15.) 21 Plaintiffs urge the Court to find that alleging “threats, intimidation, or coercion” 22 is not a necessary component for their Bane Act claim. (See FAC ¶¶ 148–49; 23 Opp’n 12–13.) The basis of this confusion stems from Plaintiffs’ misunderstanding of 24 the holding in Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco,

(2017). In Cornell, the court held that when the constitutional violation itself contains 26 an element of threat, intimidation, or coercion, the plaintiff does not need to plead an 27 additional, independent element of coercion.

at 801–04. The plaintiff in Cornell 28 was subject to an unlawful search and seizure, and such violations of the Fourth and 1 Fifth Amendment necessarily contain an element of coercion (e.g., a person who is 2 being detained and does not feel free to leave is essentially being forced to stay).

3 at 801–02 (acknowledging the “inherent” coercion present in a wrongful detention). 4 The Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the right to medical care as is being alleged 5 by Plaintiffs, does not have the same element of inherent coercion. If Plaintiffs wish 6 to maintain a Bane Act claim for violation of Martinez’s Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Plaintiffs must necessarily allege some sort of additional coercion or threat to satisfy 8 the requirements of the Bane Act. Plaintiffs have not done so here. 9 Additionally, Plaintiffs state that their Bane Act claim may also apply to a 10 violation of Martinez’s Fourth Amendment rights. (See FAC ¶ 146.a. (alleging 11 Defendants interfered with Martinez’s “right to be free from objectively unreasonable 12 treatment and deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs while in 13 custody as a pretrial detainee as secured by the Fourth and/or Fourteenth 14 Amendments”).) Plaintiffs do not explain how or why the Fourth Amendment could 15 apply to the instant case. (See generally FAC; Opp’n.) While the Court is skeptical 16 that Plaintiffs will be able to marshal facts redeeming this cause of action on the third 17 attempt or supporting a violation of Martinez’s Fourth Amendment rights, it 18 nevertheless grants leave to amend to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to better explain 19 their Fourth Amendment claim. 20 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead their ninth cause 21 of action under the Bane Act, whether for violation of Fourth or Fourteenth 22 Amendment rights. As such, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to this claim, with 23 leave to amend. 24 V. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND 26 DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 38.) Specifically, the 27 Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ fourth, fifth, 28 seventh, and ninth causes of action, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court 1 | DENIES Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, and sixth causes of 2 || action. 3 If Plaintiffs wish to amend, they must file a Second Amended Complaint no later than twenty-one days from the date of this Order, in which case Defendants shall 5 || answer or otherwise respond within fourteen days of the filing. If Plaintiffs do not 6 || timely amend, the dismissal of the fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth causes of action 7 || shall be deemed a dismissal with prejudice as of the lapse of the deadline to amend, 8 | and the case will proceed as to the first, second, third, sixth, and eighth causes of 9 || action. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 August 21, 2024 14 NZ. x

16 OTIS D> GHT, II 4 UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGE

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