1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSIO CARDENAS, Case No. 2:24-cv-06742-FLA (PVCx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING ACTION FOR 13 v. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 14 COSTCO WHOLESALE 15 CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. 16

17 18 RULING 19 On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff Rosio Cardenas (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action 20 against Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 21 10 in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Dkt. 1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). The 22 Complaint asserts state-law claims for general negligence and premises liability based 23 on a slip-and-fall incident at Defendant’s store in Lakewood, California. Id. at 14.1 24 On August 9, 2024, Defendant removed the action to this court based on alleged 25 diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 (“NOR”). In its Notice of Removal, Defendant alleges 26 the court has subject matter jurisdiction under

because the amount in 27

28 1 The court uses the CM/ECF page numbers to cite the Complaint. 1 controversy exceeds $75,000. NOR ¶¶ 9–10. Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s 2 Statement of Damages served on July 12, 2024, seeking general damages “[i]n excess 3 of” $1 million and special damages “[i]n excess of” $1 million.

; Dkt. 13-1 4 (“Statement of Damages”). 5 On August 20, 2024, the court ordered the parties to show cause (“OSC”) why 6 the action should not be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to an 7 insufficient amount in controversy. Dkt. 12. Defendant filed a response in the form 8 of a declaration from her counsel, Deborah S. Tropp. Dkt. 13 (“Tropp Decl.”). 9 Plaintiff did not respond. 10 Having reviewed the Notice of Removal and the declaration of Deborah S. 11 Tropp, and for the following reasons, the court finds Defendant fails to establish 12 subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly REMANDS this action to the Los Angeles 13 County Superior Court. 14 DISCUSSION 15 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power 16 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 17 Am.,

(1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. District courts are 18 presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the 19 record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

, 342 n. 3 (2006). 20 Additionally, federal courts have an obligation to examine jurisdiction sua sponte 21 before proceeding to the merits of a case. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526

(1999). 23 Federal courts have jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or 24 where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the 25 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. 26 §§ 1331, 1332(a). Thus, a notice removing an action from state court to federal court 27 must include “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 28 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574

, 89 (2014). Where “the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 2 defendant’s allegation” concerning the amount in controversy, “both sides [shall] 3 submit proof,” and the court may then decide whether the defendant has proven the 4 amount in controversy “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 88–89. “Federal 5 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 6 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992). It is Defendant’s 7 burden as the removing party to justify this court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

. 8 Here, the amount of damages Plaintiff seeks cannot be determined from the 9 Complaint, as it does not set forth a specific amount. Compl. at 12 (“The amount of 10 damages is … according to proof.”). Defense counsel, however, points to Plaintiff’s 11 Statement of Damages, wherein Plaintiff contends general damages are in excess of 12 $1 million and special damages are in excess of $1 million. Tropp. Decl. ¶ 5; 13 Statement of Damages. A statement of damages “is relevant evidence of the amount 14 in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.” 15 Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2002). “A plaintiff’s damage 16 estimate will not establish the amount in controversy, however, if it appears to be only 17 a bold optimistic prediction.” Romsa v. Ikea U.S. W., Inc., Case No. 2:14-cv-05552- 18 MMM (JEMx),

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted). 20 It is clear the $2 million in damages set forth in the Statement of Damages is 21 simply a “bold optimistic prediction” and is not a reasonable estimate of Plaintiff’s 22 claims. See

(“The leap from $4,597.77 in medical expenses incurred to 23 [defendant’s] assertion that [plaintiff’s son] has suffered damages in excess of $75,000 24 because he cries a lot and wakes up several times a night is difficult to credit. 25 [Defendant] cites no facts that indicate a damages award anywhere near $75,000 – let 26 alone $1,000,000 – is likely.”). Significantly, the Statement of Damages cites no facts 27 to explain how Plaintiff determined the $2 million amount. Statement of Damages; 28 see also Romsa,

, at *2 (remanding action where Plaintiff’s 1 statement of damages did not explain how he arrived at the damages estimated); 2 Schroeder v. Petsmart, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-01561-FMO (AGRx),

1895573, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2019) (same); Mata v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 4 Case No. 2:22-cv-01758-FMO (AFMx),

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 5 2022) (same); see also Owens v. Westwood Coll. Inc.,

, at *4 (C.D. 6 Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) (finding plaintiff’s settlement demand letters could not be used to 7 establish the amount in controversy requirement because they “demand[ed] an 8 arbitrary settlement figure, with no showing of how [the] figure was calculated”). 9 Next, defense counsel declares that “Plaintiff was billed a minimum of 10 $67,776.43 for medical treatment she sought as a result of the alleged incident, prior 11 to filing suit.” Resp. ¶ 8. Counsel, however, does not cite any evidence in support of 12 this contention. 13 Even if the court were to consider $67,776.43 of purported medical bills as 14 being in controversy, this is still less than the jurisdictional minimum. Defense 15 counsel argues the Complaint “clearly states that in addition to medical bills, Plaintiff 16 will be seeking damages for loss of earnings, property damages, loss of use of 17 property[,] and general damages.” Tropp. Decl. ¶ 9. Counsel, again, provides no 18 citation or support for this contention.

As best as the court can tell, counsel is 19 referring to the page of the Complaint wherein Plaintiff checked every box to indicate 20 she suffered every possible type of harm, i.e., she purportedly suffered wage loss, loss 21 of use of property, hospital and medical expenses, general damage, property damage, 22 loss of earning capacity, and “other damages,” including prejudgment interest and 23 interest on damages. Compl. at 12. Plaintiff provides no facts in support of these 24 purported damages, and it is unclear how and to what extent Plaintiff suffered 25 property damage or loss of use of property from a slip-and-fall incident. See

26 Defendant also fails to provide any evidence establishing these damages are sufficient 27 to exceed the jurisdictional threshold, either alone or in conjunction with Plaintiff’s 28 purported medical expenses. Tropp Decl. ¶ 9. Instead, in conclusory fashion, counsel 1 | argues these “additional damages” added to the $67,776.43 in unsupported medical 2 | expenses “clearly” meet the $75,000 threshold. /d. However, like Plaintiff's 3 | Statement of Damages, these “additional damages” are not supported by any facts and, 4 | thus, are too speculative to be considered in controversy. See Romsa,

| 4273265, at *2; Schroeder,

, at *2; Mata,

, at *2. 6 || Defense counsel’s conclusory statements are insufficient to change the calculus. 7 | Tropp Decl. 4] 8—9; see Gaus,

. 8 Given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must 9 | be resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus,

, 10 | the court is not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that Defendant has met its 11 | burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy 12 || meets the jurisdictional threshold. Therefore, there is no basis for diversity 13 | jurisdiction. See

. 14 CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, the court REMANDS the action to the Los Angeles 16 | County Superior Court, Case No. 24NWCV01840. All dates and deadlines in this 17 | court are VACATED. The clerk of the court shall close the action administratively. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 || Dated: September 4, 2024 2 FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28