1 2 3 4 JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MANIKA MILLIS, ) Case No. CV 24-7688 FMO (MAAx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) ORDER REMANDING ACTION ) 14 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS ) INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, et ) 15 al., ) ) 16 Defendants. ) ) 17 ) 18 19 On August 30, 2024, Manika Millis (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County 20 Superior Court against Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”) as well as Alex 21 Wiercigroch, Quinn Monsen, Brent Reimer, Julie Bellagamba, Weislaw Kwiecien, Phong Pham, 22 Lauren Smith, Jaye Parker, Jamie Hicks, and Erica Williams (“individual defendants”) (collectively, 23 “defendants”), asserting state law claims relating to her employment. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of 24 Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1); (Dkt. 1-1, Exh. A, Complaint at ¶¶ 3-15). On September 9, 2024, SAIC 25 removed the action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to

and 1441. 26 (See Dkt. 1, NOR at 1). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to 27 state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

(c). 28 In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 1 States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 2 district court[.]”

(a). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that 3 removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The 4 strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden 5 of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The 6 Dow Chem. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- 7 canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). If there is any 8 doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve such doubt in 9 favor of remanding the action to state court.1 See Gaus,

(“Federal jurisdiction 10 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Indeed, “[i]f 11 at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 12 the case shall be remanded.”

(c); see Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. 13 v. Homestead Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction may not 14 be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”); 15 Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court 16 may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction “either by 17 motion or sua sponte”). 18 When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, complete 19 diversity must exist between the opposing parties, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,

, 20

(1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction statute “applies only to cases in 21 which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant”), and the 22 amount in controversy must exceed $75,000.2 See

(a). Here, there is no basis 23 for diversity jurisdiction because complete diversity does not exist between the opposing parties. 24 1 An “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the Class Action 25 Fairness Act (“CAFA”),

(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. 26 Owens,

, 89,

(2014). 27 2 In relevant part,

(a) provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 28 1 Plaintiff is a citizen of California, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 17), whereas SAIC is a citizen of 2 Delaware and Virginia. (Id. at ¶ 16). However, SAIC failed to allege the citizenship of the 3 individual defendants. (See, generally,

). 4 Although the Complaint alleges that the individual defendants are, like plaintiff, citizens of 5 California, (see Dkt. 1-1, Exh. A, Complaint at ¶¶ 5-14) (alleging that the individual defendants are 6 domiciled in California), it appears that SAIC is relying on

(b)(2), the so-called 7 “forum defendant rule,” see Casola v. Dexcom, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2024), to support 8 removal despite the absence of complete diversity of the parties. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 8) 9 (“Complete diversity exists between Plaintiff and all served Defendants.”) (emphasis added). 10 Section 1441(b)(2) provides that “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the 11 jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest 12 properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 13 If further appears that SAIC has attempted to effect “what is known as a ‘snap removal’ – filing its 14 notice[] of removal before service of the summons and complaint” on the forum defendants. 15 Casola,

. In effect, SAIC seeks to use snap removal as an end-run around the 16 requirement of complete diversity, see

(a), by removing the action before the 17 individual defendants have been served. (See Dkt. 1, NOR ¶¶ 8 &17) (referencing only the 18 “served” defendant). 19 However, § 1441(b)(2) “does not render the citizenship of non-served defendants irrelevant 20 for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction and the right to remove[.]” Pinter v. Arthur J. 21 Gallagher Service Co., LLC,

, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2016). In other words, the forum- 22 defendant rule only comes into play if there is complete diversity among the opposing parties 23 under § 1332(a). It does not, as SAIC attempts to do, abrogate the requirement that complete 24 diversity exist in order to establish the court’s diversity jurisdiction. See Trotta v. URS Fed. Servs., 25 Inc.,

, 986 (D. Haw. 2021) (“Defendants misapprehend the snap removal 26 doctrine, which cannot create jurisdiction where, as here, the parties are not diverse in the first 27 instance.”); Menchaca v. Howmet Aerospace, Inc.,

, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2023) 28 (remanding where defendant attempted to use snap removal to establish complete diversity of 1 citizenship). The court thus joins other district courts in holding that “[w]hen evaluating whether 2 diversity exists, a court cannot ignore a defendant’s citizenship simply because the defendant has 3 not yet been served.” Greenway Nutrients, Inc. v. Pierce,

, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2022) 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved 6 in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus,

, the court is not 7 persuaded, under the circumstances here, that SAIC has met its burden. Therefore, there is no 8 basis for diversity jurisdiction. 9 This Order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or 10 submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis. 11 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 12 1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of 13 California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

(c). 15 2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court. 16 3. Any pending motion is denied as moot. 17 Dated this 22nd day of October, 2024. 18 /s/ Fernando M. Olguin 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28