(PS) Vela v. Amador County

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ISABEL VELIA, No. 2:24-cv-2535-DJC-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AMADOR COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

17 Plaintiff Isabel Velia, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint along with the present Motion for “Emergency Stay Order On All County/State Orders Pending Constitutional Question/Violation Hearing.” (Mot. (ECF No. 3).) The Court construes this to be a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. (Mot.

21 (ECF No. 3).) In order to obtain a preliminary injunctive relief, a party must establish that they satisfy each of the Winter factors: (1) that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that granting injunctive relief is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Counsel Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

27 Plaintiff’s Motion does not meet any of the factors required by Winter. The motion is brief. Plaintiff states that there is a county abatement “along with various other liens, injunctions, [and] orders” against a piece of property that is “preventing us from gathering and praying.” (Mot. at 1–2.) Plaintiff also claims that state and county orders have violated their Constitutional right to freedom of religion by “interfering with our right to worship, pray and utilize or land with shelter [and] coverings for prayer.” (Id.) Nothing in the motion establishes Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits or that Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed without preliminary injunctive relief.

7 Plaintiff also makes no showing on the balance of equities or that granting such an order would be in the public interest.

9 Even looking to Plaintiff’s Complaint for insight as to Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, it is not clear that Plaintiff’s claims will even pass the screening stage of these proceedings as currently presented.1 Many of Plaintiff’s stated claims are based on criminal statutes which do not typically provide a private civil cause of action. (See Compl. at 4–6 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 247, 241, 242); see also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242] provide no basis for civil liability.”); Monet v. United States, No. 97-00281-DAE, 1997 WL 1038149, at *2 (D. Haw. Sept. 15, 1997) (“[18 U.S.C. § 247] provides no private right of action.”)

17 Those claims in the Complaint for which civil causes of action do exist — Plaintiff’s First Amendment and Religious Freedom Restoration Action claims — rest on unclear, vague, or conclusory factual allegations. (Mot. at 2–4, 6–8.) Thus, even considering the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits.

22 /// /// /// /// 1 As a plaintiff proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Nothing in this order should be construed as a final determination of whether Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for purposes of screening.

1 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 3) is DENIED without prejudice. This | matter is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings.

4A | Dated: September 19, 2024 “Dane J brat 5 THE HONOR E DANIEL J. CALABRETTA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE