1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3

4 Ofelia Aguilar CASE NO. 1:21-cv-00365-GSA 5 Plaintiff, 6 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY v. FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 406(b) 7 (Doc. 26) 8 Commissioner of Social Security, 9 Defendant. 10

11 Plaintiff’s counsel Jonathan O. Peña seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to

406(b). 13 I. Background 14 Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement with counsel which provides for attorney fees of 15 up to 25% of the past due benefits awarded. Doc. 26-2. The agreement also provides that counsel 16 would seek fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), fees which would be refunded in 17 the event of an award of past due benefits and payment of the 25% contingency fee.

18 Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on March 9, 2021, appealing the Commissioner’s 19 decision denying her application for benefits. Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20 20), after which the parties stipulated to remand to the agency for further proceedings (Docs. 21–23), 21 and counsel was awarded EAJA fees in an amount of $5,950.47 (Doc. 25). 22 On remand the agency determined that Plaintiff was disabled and entitled to past due benefits 23 (Doc. 26-1 at 1–2) of which the agency withheld 25% ($31,778) for payment to counsel (Id. at 3). 24 II. Legal Standard 25 An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is 26 awarded benefits: 27 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [

, et seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and 1 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . 2

(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002) (Section 406(b) 3 controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement is 4 unenforceable by the Court if it provides for fees exceeding the statutory amount. Gisbrecht,

at 807 (“Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they 6 provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.”). 7 District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” 8 Hern v. Barnhart,

(N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review 9 contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 10 particular cases.” Gisbrecht,

. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of 11 the representation and the results the representative achieved.”

. In addition, the Court should 12 consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or 13 excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.” 14 Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Vazquez v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15 1:17-CV-1646-JLT,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2020). 16 III. Analysis 17 Here, Plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel and achieved a favorable result, namely a 18 stipulation to remand, entry of judgment, and ultimately a substantial award of past due benefits. There 19 is no indication that counsel engaged in dilatory conduct, excessive delay, or substandard performance. 20 Counsel’s itemized bill reflects 25.5 hours of time to review the administrative record and draft a 21 detailed motion for summary judgment (the potential merits of which were ostensibly a factor 22 motivating Defendant’s decision to stipulate to remand the matter). Doc. 26-3. 25.5 Hours is a 23 reasonable time expenditure for the performance of those tasks. 24 The effective hourly rate amounts to $1,246.19 per hour, which is significant but is within the 25 upper limit of reasonableness. See Malta v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-CV-00415-CDB,

3618430, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2024) (collecting cases and finding that “hourly rate of $1,553.87 is 27 within the upper boundaries of reasonableness.”); Coder v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-00497- 1 CDB,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2024) (reducing de facto hourly rate of $3,532.87 to 2 $1,500.00 per hour); Reyna v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-00484-SAB,

, at *2 3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024) (approving de facto hourly rate of $1,326.57 per hour); Langston v. Saul, No. 4 1:18-CV-00273-SKO,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) ($1,453.42 per hour). 5 Although this is a substantial hourly rate, the fee award would not amount to a windfall. Unlike 6 fee motions governed entirely by the lodestar method, in contingency fee matters pursuant to section 7 406(b) the lodestar is merely a guidepost, and a comparatively high effective hourly rate is generally 8 warranted to compensate counsel for the risk assumed in representing social security claimants. See 9 Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009). 10 The $31,778 total amount is also consistent with total contingent fee awards granted under 11 section 406(b). See, e.g., Ortega v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12–cv–01030–AWI–SAB,

5021646, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) ($24,350); Thomas v. Colvin, No. 1:11–cv–01291–SKO, 2015

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) ($44,603.50); Boyle v. Colvin, No. 1:12–cv–00954–SMS, 14

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013) ($20,577.57); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv- 15 00490-LJO-DLB,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) ($34,500). 16 Considering the character of the representation, the result achieved, and the fee amounts awarded 17 in similar cases, the request here is reasonable. 18 Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 19 1. Counsel’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 406(b) (Doc. 26) is granted. 20 2. The Commissioner shall certify a payment of a gross award in the amount of $31,778 21 to: Jonathan O. Peña. 22 3. Upon receipt of this sum, Jonathan O. Peña shall remit directly to Plaintiff Ofelia Aguilar 23 the EAJA fees previously awarded in the amount of $5,950.47. 24 25 IT IS SO ORDERED.

26 Dated: October 17, 2024 /s/ Gary S. Austin 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE