1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAEF LAWSON, Case No. 15-cv-05128-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S STANDING 9 v. TO PURSUE PAGA PENALTIES AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF 10 GRUBHUB, INC., et al., PROPOSITION 22 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. Nos. 369, 371

12 13 Raef Lawson brings a representative PAGA claim alleging Grubhub unlawfully classified 14 its food delivery drivers as independent contractors and as a result failed to reimburse them for 15 necessary expenses, pay them minimum wage, and pay them overtime wages. (Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 33.)1 16 Following oral argument on January 31, 2024, the Court stayed Lawson’s overtime and expense 17 reimbursement claims pending final adjudication of the remaining minimum wage claim because 18 Lawson lacks Article III standing to pursue PAGA penalties for violations he did not personally 19 suffer. (Dkt. No. 367.) On the issue of whether Lawson lacks Article III standing to pursue 20 penalties for minimum wage violations, if any, that occurred after Proposition 22 took effect on 21 December 16, 2020, the Court ordered supplemental briefing. (Id. at 2, 16.) Before the Court is 22 the parties’ supplemental briefing. (Dkt. Nos. 369, 371.) 23 Proposition 22 provides app-based drivers are independent contractors if certain conditions 24 are met. Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 7451. So, after December 16, 2020, the criteria for classifying app- 25 based drivers changed. This Court has not adjudicated whether any post-Proposition 22 Grubhub 26 driver was misclassified. Nonetheless, Lawson seeks to pursue PAGA penalties on behalf of 27 1 Grubhub drivers classified as independent contractors under Proposition 22 despite his never 2 having driven for Grubhub under Proposition 22’s scheme. 3 A litigant who challenges a statute inapplicable to him lacks constitutional standing. See, 4 e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,

(2009) (ruling no constitutional standing 5 when the challenged regulations “neither require nor forbid any action on the part of respondents” 6 and the alleged injury “was not tied to application of the challenged regulations.”); Clements v. 7 Fashing,

, 966 n.3 (1982) (“A litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality 8 of a statute only insofar as it adversely affects his own rights.”); Warth v. Seldin,

, 9 508 (1975) (“[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege 10 specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he 11 personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention.”); Get Outdoors II, LLC 12 v. City of San Diego, Cal.,

(9th Cir. 2007) (“[A plaintiff] has standing to 13 challenge only those provisions that applied to it.”). Lawson is not challenging the 14 constitutionality of Proposition 22. However, Lawson must “allege (and eventually prove)” 15 Grubhub failed to comply with Proposition 22’s requirements to recover PAGA penalties for any 16 post-Proposition 22 minimum wage violations. James v. Uber Techs. Inc.,

, 145 17 (N.D. Cal. 2021). But because Lawson did not drive for Grubhub on or after December 16, 2020, 18 he lacks a personal stake in the adjudication of Grubhub’s compliance with Proposition 22. 19 TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct at 2203; see also Raines v. Byrd,

(1997) (“We have 20 consistently stressed that a plaintiff’s complaint must establish that he has a ‘personal stake’ in the 21 alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him.”). So, Lawson 22 lacks Article III standing to argue Grubhub drivers are employees under Proposition 22’s scheme. 23 Lawson argues he still has constitutional standing to pursue PAGA penalties for minimum 24 wage violations after December 16, 2020, because “Proposition 22 did not alter the standard for 25 determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor” and instead “simply 26 established an affirmative defense to the application of the ABC test[.]” (Dkt. No. 369 at 5.) Not 27 so. Proposition 22 provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . an app-based driver 1 relationship with a network company” subject to four conditions.

. 2 Proposition 22 does not place the burden on “network compan[ies]” to prove compliance with 3 Proposition 22.

“[W]here the plain text of the statute is silent as to which party carries the 4 burden of proof, as is the case here, [the Ninth Circuit] begin[s] with the ordinary default rule that 5 plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.” Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard, 900

(9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). So, to pursue PAGA penalties for minimum wage 7 violations after December 16, 2020, Lawson must show Grubhub violates Proposition 22. James, 8 338 F.R.D. at 145. As determined above, Lawson lacks Article III standing to adjudicate whether 9 Grubhub violates Proposition 22 because Lawson did not drive from Grubhub on or after 10 December 16, 2020. The PAGA period thus spans December 13, 2014, to December 16, 2020. 11 Even apart from Lawson’s lack of Article III standing, district courts possess “inherent 12 powers that are “governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 13 manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Dietz 14 v. Bouldin,

(2016) (cleaned up). The Court’s exercise of its inherent power 1) 15 “must be a reasonable response to the problems and needs confronting the court’s fair 16 administration of justice” and 2) must not “be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the 17 district court’s power contained in a rule or statute.”

(cleaned up). Though trial 18 courts lack inherent authority to dismiss or strike a PAGA claim on manageability grounds, trial 19 courts may “limit[] the types of evidence a plaintiff may present or us[e] other tools to assure that 20 a PAGA claim can be effectively tried.” Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., No. S274340, 2024

, at *18 (Cal. Jan. 18, 2024); see also Woodworth v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr., 93

(2023), reh’g denied (Aug. 17, 2023) (“When faced with unwieldy 23 PAGA claims, trial courts may limit the scope of the claims or the evidence to be presented at trial 24 but may not prohibit PAGA plaintiffs from presenting their claims entirely.”). 25 As the Court previously noted:

26 Even aside from standing, December 16, 2020 is a reasonable bookend to Lawson’s PAGA penalty period because the Court can 27 employ a consistent analysis to classify app-based drivers from beyond December 16, 2020, would require evaluation of Grubhub’s 1 compliance with Proposition 22 and thus a whole new misclassification trial. By limiting the PAGA period through 2 December 16, 2020, the Court avoids this issue altogether without contradicting any express rule or statute. The effective date of 3 Proposition 22 marks a change in work circumstances. This is an appropriate and administrable limit on the evidence Lawson may 4 introduce at trial to prove the alleged minimum wage violations 5 suffered by other aggrieved employees. 6 (Dkt. No. 367 at 14-15 (internal citations omitted).) 7 Finally, Lawson argues “cutting off Plaintiff's ability to seek PAGA penalties on behalf of 8 aggrieved employees as of December 16, 2020, would be premature, given that the California 9 Supreme Court is now deciding whether Proposition 22 is constitutional.” (Dkt. No. 369 at 6.) 10 || The Court may reconsider its limitation of the PAGA period based on the California Supreme 11 Court’s forthcoming decision in Castellanos v. State of California, No. $279622. 12 CONCLUSION

13 For the reasons stated, the period for which Lawson may seek to recover PAGA penalties

v 14 for minimum wage violations is December 3, 2014, through December 16, 2020, the day O 15 || Proposition 22 took effect. QO 16 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 369 and 371.

17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 || Dated: July 23, 2024 19

JAQQUELINE SCOTT CORL 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28