District Council 16 Northern California Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. White

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

District Council 16 Northern California Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. White

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DISTRICT COUNCIL 16 NORTHERN Case No. 20-cv-01053-EMC CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND WELFARE 8 TRUST FUND, et al., ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 Plaintiffs, REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 10 v.

11 CLARK R. WHITE, et al., Docket No. 87

12 Defendants.

13 14 Plaintiffs have sued two defendants: (1) Clark R. White dba Integrated Surfaces 15 (hereinafter the “individual defendant”) and (2) Integrated Surfaces Flooring, Inc. (hereinafter the 16 “corporate defendant”). In August 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment 17 as to the individual defendant but denied the motion (without prejudice) as to the corporate 18 defendant. See Docket No. 73 (order). As to the individual defendant, the Court ordered that he 19 provide contribution reports for the period sought by Plaintiffs (October 2016-October 2019) or, 20 alternatively, submit to an audit. The Court further ordered that the individual defendant pay 21 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $16,046.12. See Docket No. 73 (order). Plaintiffs 22 now move for an entry of a final judgment as to the individual defendant. See also Supp. 23 Mendoza Decl. ¶ 3. 24 The issue before the Court is whether entry of a final judgment against the individual 25 defendant only is appropriate given that Plaintiffs still seek to proceed (for now) with the case 26 against the corporate defendant. This issue is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).1 27 1 Rule 54(b) provides that,

2 [w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final 3 judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for 4 delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities 5 of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of 6 a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities. 7 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Supreme Court has instructed that,

9 in deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay . . . , a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well 10 as the equities involved. Consideration of the former is necessary to ensure that application of the Rule effectively “preserves the history 11 federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” 12 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

446 U.S. 1, 8

(1980); see also

id. at 10, 12

(indicating that 13 a court should consider the “interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in 14 cases which should be reviewed only as single units”; also indicating that a court may consider the 15 as part of the equities the solvency of the defendant – if the defendant’s “financial position were 16 such that a delay in entry of judgment on [plaintiff’s] claims would impair [plaintiff’s]\ ability to 17 collect on the judgment, that would weigh in favor of [Rule 54(b)] certification”). 18 Here, Plaintiffs have argued that the equities weigh in favor of an entry of a final judgment 19 against the individual defendant now. They have provided evidence of an income and expense 20 declaration that the individual defendant filed in divorce proceedings in state court in June 2021. 21 That declaration indicates that the individual defendant’s income comes from Social Security and 22 that his assets are limited. See Supp. Mendoza Decl., Ex. B (income and expense declaration). In 23 other words, it is possible that the individual defendant is insolvent which would weigh in favor of 24 entry of a final judgment against him now. 25 However, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently addressed the factor of judicial administrative 26 interests – i.e., what is the relationship between the claims brought against the individual 27 1 defendant and the claims brought against the corporate defendant, and would entry of a final 2 judgment against the former only give rise to the prospect of piecemeal appeals? See, e.g., Wood 3 v. GCC Bend, LLC,

422 F.3d 873, 883

(9th Cir. 2005) (“As this is a routine case, the facts on all 4 claims and issues entirely overlap, and successive appeals are essentially inevitable, we conclude 5 that Wood’s Rule 54(b) request was improvidently granted.”). Plaintiffs argue that their continued 6 pursuit of their claims against the corporate defendant “will not change the liability against [the 7 individual defendant] that has already been [o]rdered by this Court. Therefore, there is no risk of 8 conflicting orders, inconsistent judgments, or prejudice by the Court now issuing a judgment 9 against [the individual defendant] for the attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $16,046.12 . . . .” 10 Supp. Mendoza Decl. ¶ 11. But Plaintiffs ignore that they intend to ask for a monetary judgment 11 against the individual defendant should the audit as to him reveal unpaid contributions, see Supp. 12 Mendoza Decl. ¶ 3, and Plaintiffs seem to be pursuing an audit against the corporate defendant as 13 well, presumably for any unpaid contributions during the same period. See Supp. Mendoza Decl. 14 ¶ 6. 15 The Court also concerns about a piecemeal approach to litigation because, if it were to 16 enter a final judgment as to the individual defendant only and then the audit were to reveal unpaid 17 contributions, Plaintiffs would then have to move to seek relief from the final judgment under 18 Rule 59 and/or Rule 60. It is also worth noting that Plaintiffs expect their audit of the corporate 19 defendant to be completed in 90-120 days. See Supp. Mendoza Decl. ¶ 6. Thus, in just a few 20 months, Plaintiffs should be in a position to “complete their assessment as to whether to continue 21 to pursue the corporate Defendant as a successor.” Supp. Mendoza Decl. ¶ 6. 22 Finally, the Court notes that, even if the individual defendant is insolvent, the equities do 23 not weigh strongly in Plaintiffs’ favor. The income and expense declaration that the individual 24 defendant filed in state court has been available since June 2021. The Court granted the motion 25 for default judgment as to the individual defendant in August 2023. See Docket No. 73 (order). 26 Plaintiffs have not explained why they have delayed for more than a year in seeking relief from 27 the Court. 1 individual defendant pursuant to Rule 54(b). The denial is without prejudice, but, if Plaintiffs 2 || intend to move again, they will need to address the Curtiss-Wright factors more fulsomely, 3 particularly the factor of judicial administrative interests. 4 This order disposes of Docket No. 87. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: October 22, 2024 9 10 ED I United States District Judge 12

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