Garrett v. Sycuan Casino
Garrett v. Sycuan Casino
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM ALLEN GARRETT, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01296-JES-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 13 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING CASE 14 SYCUAN CASINO, et al., WITH PREJUDICE 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 2, 3, 5] 16 17
18 Plaintiff William Allen Garrett (“Garrett”) proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 19 alleging breach of contract, fourteenth amendment and due process violations. See 20 Compl. In addition, Garrett filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 21 No. 2. Garrett further filed a motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3), request for 22 injunctive relief, and production of documents. ECF No. 5. Upon review, the Court 23 DENIES Garrett’s IFP request and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Garrett’s 24 complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 25 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 26 On April 27, 2024, Garrett states he won a $2,335 jackpot while at Sycuan Casino. 27 Compl. at 1. It is unclear from the complaint, but at some point, prior to winning the 28 1 jackpot, Garrett alleges that he was instructed to leave the casino by a slot machine 2 supervisor as he was accused of going into the women’s restroom. Compl. at 2. On April 3 27, 2024, after winning the jackpot, Defendant Sycuan Casino1 and a casino slot machine 4 supervisor “confiscated” the jackpot and ordered Garrett to be escorted off the casino 5 property.
Id. at 3. Garrett was then informed that he was excluded from the casino for 6 twelve months.
Id.On May 28, 2024, Garrett received notice about his exclusion from 7 the casino.
Id.Garrett seeks injunctive relief and requests the Court to order Sycuan to 8 pay the $2,335 jackpot immediately. 9 The complaint is not clear, but it appears Garrett is alleging a violation of 42
10 U.S.C. § 1983and asserting a violation of his fourteenth amendment rights and due 11 process rights. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A. In Forma Pauperis Application 14 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 15 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 16 $405.2 See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Upon a showing of an inability to pay, a party may 17 proceed, in forma pauperis, without prepaying the filing fee. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 18 The determination of indigency and thus whether to grant an IFP application is left to the 19 discretion of the district court. See Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Adv. Council v. 20 Rowland,
939 F.2d 854, 858(9th Cir. 1991) (noting “Section 1915 typically requires the 21
22 1 The Court presumes Garrett means to refer to the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, which is a 23 “federally recognized tribe of Mission Indians from Southern California, located in an unincorporated area of San Diego County just east of El Cajon. The Sycuan band are a Kumeyaay tribe, one of the four 24 ethnic groups indigenous to San Diego County.” See 25 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sycuan_Band_of_the_Kumeyaay_Nation (last visited August 10, 2024). Sycuan Casino is an Indian gaming casino owned by the Sycuan Tribe. See 26 https://500nations.com/casinos/caSycuan.asp (last visited August 10, 2024). 2 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. 27 See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, section 14 (eff. Dec. 2020). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted 28 1 reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the affiant has 2 satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), rev’d on other grounds,
506 U.S. 194 3(1993). To satisfy the requirements of § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient 4 which states that one cannot because of [her] poverty pay or give security for the costs … 5 and still be able to provide [for herself] and dependents with the necessities of life.” 6 Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 339(1948) (internal quotation 7 marks omitted). 8 Here, in support of Garrett’s IFP request, he reports in his affidavit and his motion 9 for appointment of counsel, self-employment monthly income of $500, disability income 10 of $1,300, monthly expenses of $400 and debts of $800.46 to SDGE. ECF Nos. 2, 3. 11 Based on the information provided, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the 12 funds to pay the filing fee and “still afford the necessities of life.” See Escobedo, 787 13 F.3d at 1234. The motion for IFP is DENIED. The Court will now review Plaintiff’s 14 complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 15 B. Screening Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 16 When reviewing an IFP application, district courts must screen the complaint to 17 ensure it states a claim, is not frivolous, and does not seek monetary relief against a 18 defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 19
203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A “frivolous” complaint “lacks an 20 arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325(1989). To 21 survive screening, all complaints must include a “short and plain statement of the claim 22 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The standard for 23 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 24 granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter,
668 F.3d 1108, 1112(9th 26 Cir. 2012); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699(9th Cir. 1988) 27 (recognizing that a complaint fails to state a claim if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or 28 does not allege enough facts under a cognizable legal theory); Barren v. Harrington, 152
1 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9 Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 2 parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 3 Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 4 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 5662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Determining whether a complaint 6 states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 7 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. at 679. “[T]he pleading 8 standard … demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 9 accusation.”
Id. at 678. Thus, the “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting 10 the Iqbal plausibility standard.
Id. at 679; see Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572
11 F.3d 962, 969(9th Cir. 2009). 12 1. Sovereign Immunity 13 The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity provides that Indian Nations are exempt 14 from suit “absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.” Oklahoma Tax 15 Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,
498 U.S. 505, 509 16 (1991) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. 1, 17(1831)). Indian tribes enjoy 17 sovereign immunity over their business activities conducted in their territories. Id. at 510. 18 Garrett attempts to hold a casino slot manager supervisor liable in their official 19 capacity for allegedly violating his constitution rights, but the manager is entitled to 20 immunity. Sovereign immunity “protects tribal employees where a tribe’s officials are 21 sued in their official capacities” because such a suit would in effect be against the tribe. 22 See Pistor v. Garcia,
791 F.3d 1104, 1110(9th Cir. 2015) (citing Maxwell v. Cnty. of San 23 Diego,
708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2015)). Thus, absent a waiver of sovereign 24 immunity, Garrett cannot sue Sycuan or any of its employees based on acts taken within 25 the scope of their delegated tribal authority in federal court. See Kennerly v. United 26 States,
721 F.2d 1252, 1258-59(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, because “there has been no 27 express waiver [of sovereign immunity] or consent to suit, nor any congressional 28 authorization for such a suit against the Tribe, [the federal courts] are without 1 || jurisdiction”); Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
779 F.2d 476, 479-80(9" Cir. 2 || 1985). 3 Thus, the Court concludes Garrett’s complaint must be dismissed sua sponte for 4 || failing to state claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) and § 1915A(b)(1). 6 I. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice Garrett’s 8 ||Complaint in its entirety based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 9 || granted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1) and 1915A(b)(1); and the Court finds 10 |}amendment would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood,
759 F.3d 1112, 1116 11 || (9 Cir. 2014) (“’Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to 12 ||amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon,
59 F.3d 815, 845(9" Cir. 1995)). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: August 13, 2024 15 Sa Sin, 16 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Reference
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