1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYON JONES, Case No.: 24-CV-846 JLS (MSB) CDCR #G-35669, 12 ORDER GRANTING RENEWED Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA v. PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING CIVIL 14 ACTION PURSUANT TO SUMMER STEPHAN, District Attorney, 15

(e)(2) AND Defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 16

17 (ECF No. 4) 18 19 Presently before the Court is a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983 by Plaintiff Rayon Jones, a prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), who 21 is proceeding without counsel. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff claims the San Diego 22 County District Attorney violated his due process rights by failing to timely bring him to 23 trial on criminal charges in response to a California Penal Code § 1381 demand he 24 submitted in December 2022. Id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in punitive damages. Id. 25 at 8. 26 Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required by

(a) to commence 27 a civil action, but instead filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 28 pursuant to

(a). ECF No. 2. While Plaintiff’s initial IFP motion was 1 denied based on his failure to attach certified copies of his prison trust account statements 2 as required by

(a)(2), he has since filed a renewed IFP motion correcting 3 that deficiency. ECF No. 4 (“Mot.”). 4 For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed motion to 5 proceed IFP but DISMISSES his Complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because it fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can 7 be granted and seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is absolutely immune. 8 RENEWED MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 9 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 10 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee.1 See 11

(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay only if the court 12 grants the Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to

(a). See Andrews v. 13 Cervantes,

(9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 14

(9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, 15 Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 16 While “[t]he previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 17 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . the [Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)] 18 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 19 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal [IFP], the prisoner shall 20 be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas,

(quoting 28

(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for collecting this 22 fee.”

(citing

(b)(1)–(2)). 23 To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of 24 all assets [they] possess,” as well as a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants filing suit are required to pay an additional 27 administrative fee of $55. See

(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The administrative portion of the fee does not apply to 28 1 (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of 2 the complaint.”

(a)(1)–(2); Andrews v. King,

(9th 3 Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “shall assess and, when funds exist, 4 collect, . . . an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average monthly 5 deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s 6 account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly payments 7 of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” Hymas, 8

& n.3 (quoting

(b)(1)–(2)). Thus, while prisoners may 9 qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the statutory filing fee in one lump sum, they 10 nevertheless remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly payments. See Bruce 11 v. Samuels,

, 84 (2016);

(b)(1)–(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281

(9th Cir. 2002). 13 Plaintiff’s renewed IFP motion complies with both

(a)(1) and (2). 14 In support, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate issued by an SVSP Trust Account 15 Officer Supervisor, as well as a copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement Report. Mot. at 6, 16 8‒10; see also S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; King,

. These documents show 17 Plaintiff maintained an average monthly balance of $373.40, but had no money deposited 18 to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. 19 Plaintiff had an available balance of $64.49 at the time of filing. Mot. at 6, 8. 20 Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed motion to proceed 21 IFP and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $74.68 pursuant to

(b)(1). 22 However, this initial fee need be collected only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s 23 account at the time this Order is executed. See

(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n 24 no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or 25 criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to 26 pay the initial partial filing fee”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 28 solely on “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 1 ordered”). Pursuant to

(b)(2), the CDCR or any agency later having 2 custody must forward payments to the Clerk until the $350 statutory fee is paid in full. 3 SCREENING 4 I. Standard of Review 5 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a 6 preliminary screening pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 7 statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion 8 thereof, if it is found frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim, or seeking damages from 9 defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith,

, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) 10 (en banc) (discussing

(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson,

, 1004 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is to 12 ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 13 responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan,

, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 14 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 15 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 16 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 17

(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman,

, 1121 18 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied 19 in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) require a complaint to “contain 21 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 22 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 23 omitted); Wilhelm,

. A complaint fails to state a claim if it lacks a 24 “cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory.” 25 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2010) 26 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Navarro v. Block,

(9th Cir. 2001)). 27 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 28 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,

. And while the court has an “obligation . . . where the petitioner is pro se, 2 particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 3 petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 4 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bretz v. Kelman,

, 1027 n.1 5 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not initially 6 pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska,

(9th Cir. 1982). 7 Title

“creates a private right of action against individuals who, 8 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 9 Devereaux v. Abbey,

(9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 10 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 11 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor,

, 393‒94 (1989) (internal 12 quotations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 13 (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 14 (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao 15 v. Desert Palace, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and citation 16 omitted). 17 II. Factual Allegations 18 Plaintiff claims the San Diego County District Attorney violated his Fourteenth 19 Amendment rights by failing to timely bring him to trial on charges for indecent exposure 20 in violation of

in response to a demand he submitted while 21 incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 22 § 1381. See Compl. at 3, 11. Plaintiff attaches a copy of his CDCR Form 643 Notice and 23 Demand for Trial dated December 25, 2022, as well as the Office of the San Diego District 24 Attorney’s January 17, 2023 letter in response.2 Id. at 3, 10. 25 26 27 2 “Courts must consider the complaint in its entirety,” including “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference,” when determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may 28 1 The January 17, 2023 letter, which is not signed by Defendant Summer Stephan, but 2 instead by a deputy district attorney in the District Attorney’s Office Case Issuing & 3 Extradition Division, acknowledges Plaintiff’s Penal Code § 1381 demand was received 4 on December 29, 2022. Id. at 10. However, the letter informs Plaintiff that “[a]fter a 5 thorough search of local criminal records, using the information [Plaintiff] provided, we 6 are unable to find any outstanding matters pending against [him] in this jurisdiction.” Id. 7 Plaintiff was advised that if he believed he had “outstanding matters . . . with a different 8 name or date of birth, [he must] provide [] specific case numbers.” Id. 9 Plaintiff does not allege what, if anything, he did in response to the January 17 letter, 10 but he claims “8 months after the District Attorney received the demand,” an unidentified 11 trial court “signed an order of removal” in an unspecified case. Id. Plaintiff contends 12 District Attorney Stephan’s failure to bring him to trial within 90 days of his Penal Code 13 § 1381 demand violates due process, requires a “dismiss[al] of the charges,” and entitles 14 him to $5,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 3, 8. 15 III. Discussion 16 Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 17 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) both because it fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 18 relief can be granted and because he seeks damages from a defendant who is absolutely 19 immune. Iqbal,

; Shroyer

; Chavez v. Robinson, 20

(9th Cir. 2016) (noting application of

(e)(2)(b)(iii) 21 to claims barred by absolute immunity). 22 A. Heck Bar 23 First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages based on a violation of his constitutional 24 right to a speedy trial, a § 1983 civil rights suit offers him no recourse. “Federal law opens 25 two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment.” Muhammad v. Close, 26

27 Dep’t of Corr.,

, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a 28 1

(2004) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973)). Claims 2 related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s confinement must be brought in a civil rights 3 action under § 1983, see id., while constitutional challenges to the validity or duration of a 4 prisoner’s confinement must be raised in a petition for federal habeas corpus under 5

, Wilkinson v. Dotson,

, 78‒79 (2005) (citations and internal 6 quotation marks omitted); Nettles v. Grounds,

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 7 (“The Court has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state 8 prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 9 action.” (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81‒82)). 10 Here, because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an alleged speedy trial violation,3 11 his suit is subject to dismissal because he may not pursue such claims in a civil rights action 12 pursuant to

without first showing the underlying conviction at issue has 13 already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey,

, 486‒87 (1994). 14 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 15 [I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 16 whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 17 invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 18 19 3 California’s speedy trial statute provides in pertinent part: 20 Whenever a defendant has been convicted, in any court of this state, of the 21 commission of a felony or misdemeanor and has been sentenced to and has 22 entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison . . . and has entered upon his or her term of commitment, and at the time of the entry upon the 23 term of imprisonment or commitment there is pending, in any court of this state, any other indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal 24 proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced, the district attorney of the county in which the matters are pending shall bring the 25 defendant to trial or for sentencing within 90 days after the person shall have 26 delivered to said district attorney written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment or commitment and his or her desire to be brought to trial or 27 for sentencing.

; Paine v. McCarthy,

(9th Cir. 1975) (identifying Section 1381 28 1 sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 2 make such determination, or called into question by a federal 3 court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,

. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 4 sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 5 § 1983.

6 Id.; see also Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

, 1054‒55 (9th Cir. 7 2016). 8 “Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 9 ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner 10 who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the 11 fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza,

(9th Cir. 2003) 12 (emphasis added) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498‒99 (holding that a writ of habeas 13 corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 14 “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court)). 15 Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on claims that the District Attorney failed to 16 timely comply with his Penal Code § 1381 demand, and that he was denied his right to a 17 speedy trial as a result, see Compl. at 3, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 unless and 18 until he can show that the conviction which resulted has already been invalidated. Heck, 19 512 U.S. at 486‒87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855–56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a 20 prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under 21 § 1983.’” (quoting Heck,

)). A federal district court cannot invalidate a 22 state court criminal conviction pursuant to § 1983 if an award of damages based on that 23 conviction would necessarily imply its constitutional validity and consequently affect the 24 duration of Plaintiff’s confinement. Heck,

; see also Pattillo v. Lombardo, 25 No. 2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF,

, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (“When 26 a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, raises a constitutional 27 challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release[,] . . . or seeks damages for 28 purported deficiencies in his state court criminal case, which effected a conviction or 1 lengthier sentence, his sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.”); see also Munywe 2 v. Peters, No. 3:21-cv-05431-BJR-JRC,

, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 3 2022) (dismissing plaintiff’s speedy trial claim because it called into question the validity 4 of his underlying conviction and was therefore Heck-barred); Gibbs v. Contra Costa Cnty., 5 No. C 11-00403-MEJ,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011) (dismissing a 6 speedy trial claim as Heck-barred because such a claim “necessarily implies” the invalidity 7 of the plaintiff’s conviction); Velasco v. Balaam, No. 2:23-CV-00192-CDS-DJA, 8

, at *4 (D. Nev. May 24, 2024) (same). A habeas petition, rather than a 9 civil rights complaint, is the proper vehicle for bringing a claim that a petitioner’s speedy 10 trial rights are being violated. See e.g., Lopez v. Haskell, No. 5:18-cv-01196-CJC-KES, 11

, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2018) (finding that speedy trial violation could 12 not be raised in civil rights complaint because “a finding in the plaintiff’s favor would 13 necessarily imply the invalidity of the underlying convictions”), report and 14 recommendation adopted,

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018). 15 Thus, because Plaintiff does not allege to have already invalidated the conviction, 16 which forms the basis of his suit by way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the 17 issuance of either a state or federal court writ of habeas corpus, Heck,

, his 18 Complaint must be dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 19 relief can be granted pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), see Lopez, 20 203 F.3d at 1126‒27; Wilhelm,

. 21 B. Prosecutorial Immunity 22 Second, to the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant Stephan violated his right to a 23 speedy trial in both her official and individual capacities as the District Attorney for the 24 County of San Diego, see Compl. at 2, his Complaint must also be dismissed pursuant to 25

(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b) because the District Attorney is entitled to 26 absolute prosecutorial immunity. 27 Criminal prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for 28 actions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. 1 Pachtman,

(1976). This immunity specifically attaches to the initiation 2 of a prosecution and in the presentation of the state’s case.

; see also Burns v. 3 Reed,

(1991) (noting “pretrial court appearances by the prosecutor in 4 support of taking criminal action against a suspect” are protected by absolute immunity); 5 Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2016) (holding state 6 prosecutors to be absolutely immune from suit for “‘initiating a prosecution’ and 7 ‘presenting the State’s case’” (quoting Imbler,

)); see also Lomeli v. Cnty. 8 of San Diego,

, 1076–77 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (finding San Diego County 9 District Attorney entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity in § 1983 case for initiating 10 charges “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” (quoting 11 Imbler,

)). 12 IV. Leave to Amend 13 Finally, while the Court typically grants unrepresented litigants leave to amend in 14 light of their pro se status, it concludes that doing so in this case would be futile. See Lopez, 15

; Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

, 16 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal 17 without leave to amend). 18 A § 1983 complaint barred by Heck may be dismissed for failure to state a claim 19 when the pleading as a whole “present[s] an obvious bar to securing relief.” Washington, 20

(internal quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he PLRA expressly 21 authorize[s] the district court to dismiss [a] complaint [barred by Heck] for failure to state 22 a claim at any time, even when . . . the legal basis for the dismissal [is raised] o[n] its own 23 accord.” Hebrard v. Nofziger,

(9th Cir. 2024). Dismissal of the 24 complaint without leave to amend is appropriate if, as is true in this case, “amendment 25 would be futile.” Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

(9th Cir. 26 2011). 27 Amendment is futile because even if Plaintiff’s speedy trial claims were not barred 28 by Heck, or Defendant Stephan were not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, 1 Plaintiff’s own exhibit demonstrates no charges were pending against him at the time he 2 made his Penal Code § 1381 demand in December 2022. See Compl. at 10. Therefore, the 3 asserted speedy trial violation alleged in his Complaint is unfounded as a matter of law. 4 See e.g., People v. Belton,

(Ct. App. 1992) (“[B]ecause no charge 5 had been filed against him as of the date he made his demand, he was not a person described 6 by Penal Code section 1381 and his demand did not have the effect of triggering the 90– 7 day rule.”); see also People v. Evans, No. G041341,

, at *2 8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2009) (unpub.) (finding “no support for a section 1381 violation” 9 because “[a]t the time defendant notified the district attorney, the current charges had not 10 [yet] been filed”); Mousa v. Trump Admin., No. 1:19-CV-01349 LJO SAB PC, 11

, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019) (dismissing prisoner’s § 1983 unlawful 12 detainer claims sua sponte pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(ii) because “[s]ection 13 1381 only addresses a pending ‘indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal 14 proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced’”) (emphasis added) (internal 15 citation omitted). 16 CONCLUSION 17 In light of the foregoing, the Court: 18 1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915(a) (ECF No. 4); 20 2) ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 21 Plaintiff’s trust account the $74.68 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 22 at the time this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 23 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 24 month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 25 pursuant to

(b)(2); 26 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff 27 Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, via 28 U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to [email protected]; 1 4) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim and for seeking 2 damages from a defendant who is absolutely immune pursuant to

(e)(2) 3 § 1915A(b) without prejudice, but without leave to amend;* 4 5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good 5 || faith pursuant to

(a)(3); and 6 6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ||Dated: August 21, 2024 . tt f te 9 on. Janis L. Sammartino 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 26 ||* See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa,

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding claims barred by Heck to be dismissed without prejudice “so that [the plaintiff] may reassert his claims if he ever succeeds in 27 || invalidating his conviction”); Briggs v. Enriquez, No. CV 17-4615-FMO,

, at *4 28 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-4615-FMO(E),

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017). 12